

The Month in Review

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE Soviet Union, in intra-bloc relations, in dealings with Yugoslavia and in international diplomatic maneuvers seem to indicate that a major shift in Soviet policies may be in the offing. Straws in the political wind have come from unexpected directions and they have come so abruptly, in tempestuous gusts, as to suggest that far-reaching storms have been raging in Moscow's power center. The inexplicable awkwardness of the Soviet Union's UN protest against United States aerial preparedness, which was presented without adequate preparations and suddenly withdrawn in the face of certain defeat, was one such symptom. Another indication was the self-defeating tactic of requesting the Western powers to confront the Soviet Union separately in preliminary talks for a summit conference. Did both moves presage a Soviet retreat from former insistence on a top-level meeting? If so, why? And what is the reason for *Pravda's* sudden authority not only to polish Nikita Khrushchev's prose but actually to change the meaning of many of his verbal sallies? At this moment it is not yet clear whether these shifts are Khrushchev's own in all respects and, if they are, what his intent might be. In those areas, however, where the new line is most explicit, as in relations with the countries of Eastern Europe, the trend seems to be toward intransigence. Since the new twist was decreed on Khrushchev's return from his "triumphant" tour of Hungary, it is conceivable that what he experienced there may have caused the latest grimness in Soviet attitudes.



Khrushchev's assumption of the Premiership on March 27 and his elimination of his last rival, his predecessor Marshal Bulganin, presumably does not spell a return to outright Stalinism. On the other hand, within a month of his elevation to power over the combined State-Party machinery, a new clarity seems to be emerging in what was the haziest—and the most damaging—aspect of the interregnum: the Soviet Union's ideological and practical relations with the countries of Eastern Europe. Three major questions had been left unanswered. First, there was the running sore of doctrinal differences with Tito's Yugoslavia; both sides acted as if these differences were marks of a shameful social disease to be treated privately and not talked about publicly. Second, there was the problem of Gomulka's Poland, born in the "silent revolution" of October 1956; could the Soviet Union countenance his reforms, many of which struck at the core of the Soviet program? Finally, a decision had to be made on the touchy Hungarian situation, where Party Secretary Kadar, heading a highly unpopular, isolated and divided Party, was desperately fighting off a return to power by the Rakosiist wing of the movement. Acting briskly, Khrushchev has taken the bull by the horns and has apparently made far-reaching decisions in each case.

The Soviet Premier was most explicit in countless tirades addressed to often sullen audiences in the course of his ten-day April tour of Hungary. Though Khrushchev, as usual, contradicted himself on a number of occasions, he expressed his main opinions with unambiguous bluntness. Eastern Europe, he told a world hopeful for the possible give-and-take of a Summit conference, is out-of-bounds to all but the Soviets themselves. They and they alone have the right, indeed the duty, to interfere in the affairs of these nations—by force of arms if necessary. The regime of First Secretary Janos Kadar was given a warm endorsement, presumably on the assumption that he, better than his rivals, could manage the country's affairs according to the Khrushchev blueprint. It is undoubtedly a measure of Soviet pressure that the two Communist-run countries which hitherto had voiced

reservations about Kadar's policies now simultaneously gave his regime their backing. In Poland the unreserved accolade was bestowed in the Party paper on the occasion of the 13th anniversary of Hungary's "liberation." Tito was more direct: he received Kadar in Yugoslavia and held "comradely" consultations with the man responsible for the abduction of former Premier Imre Nagy from the sanctuary of the Yugoslav Embassy.

Ironically, Tito's amenity did not save him from Khrushchev's apparent decision to ostracize him ideologically. The latest dispute, far more serious than many of the recent squabbles because it involves crucial aspects of Tito's program, stems from the publication, weeks before the Congress of the Yugoslav Party, of the draft program adopted at the meeting. The Soviets apparently objected most strenuously to the Yugoslav attitude of "a plague on both your houses" denouncing equally the Atlantic and Warsaw Pacts and condemning foreign interference in the internal affairs of other countries, including Soviet forays in Eastern Europe. The Soviets and their Satellites received the document with cold animosity and the Yugoslavs thereupon modified it in an attempt at conciliation. The attempt failed, apparently because Khrushchev is now as unwilling to justify Soviet policies to Tito as he is to the West.

That the new ideological line should incorporate Kadar's Hungary and exclude Yugoslavia was predictable. The real enigma was Poland. Now the suspense seems to be over: though still highly unorthodox, the country is fast moving away from its experimental, national program. With Gomulka leading the way to conformity, the chances of a break with Moscow are fast receding. Undoubtedly backed and perhaps urged by the Soviets, the Polish leader chose to use the occasion of a Congress of Polish Trade Unions to decree the most stringent anti-labor measures since the start of the Polish ferment. Strikes are now once again illegal. Workers' councils, though preserved, are to be merged into so-called "conferences of workers' self-government," in which the trade unions will cooperate and the Party will be in supreme control. And, as in the hated Stalinist past, "norms" are to be raised—that is, workers will be made to work harder whether they like it or not.

This bleak news for the restive workers of Poland was supplemented with equally distasteful news for the intellectuals. Reports from the country indicate that the censorship has been appreciably tightened and that new, restrictive rules have been introduced in all spheres of publishing. It remains to be seen of course whether Gomulka will be able to carry out all new measures or whether he would be willing to do so in the face of inevitable opposition. In the past many of the Secretary's schemes (such as his "verification" of Party members) were diluted in the course of their application. His object, however, is clear. He wants to reimpose complete Party control over all sectors of national life and he apparently believes that it is less dangerous for him to seek this control than to muddle through without it. His destruction of the workers' councils as independent organs of worker sentiment is thus undoubtedly linked to the reorganization of the Polish economy. To accomplish this task, more than 200,000 industrial workers will have to be fired from their posts. Under these circumstances, if the workers were able to act in defense of their immediate interests, paralyzing strikes would probably take place.

Paradoxically, the Poles seem to be reverting to political orthodoxy the better to carry out unorthodox economic reforms. Instead of re-collectivizing, for instance, they are now distributing hundreds of thousands of hectares of State land to private farmers. In so doing, however, the Poles are only more extreme than their neighbors, not basically different. It appears that the Soviets have approved a variety of measures, in all the Soviet-bloc countries, designed to raise production, particularly agricultural output. Czechoslovakia is thus now in the midst of a radical economic shakeup, and both Romania and Bulgaria have lately been flooded with decrees or exhortations on contemplated improvements in their agriculture.

The total picture this month, then, is one of marked political "purification" of the area (including its divorce from Yugoslavia and its further incorporation into the Soviet domain), coupled to economic reorganization. These trends spell further repression and dislocation in days to come.

The Military Establishments—II

This is the second of two articles on the military forces of Eastern Europe. The first, which appeared in the April East Europe, discussed the varied functions of Satellite armed services, their relationship to Party power, and their strengths. The article below includes changes in the military sphere since the upheavals of 1956, relations with Soviet troops, military economics, and facts on military life.

Since October 1956

NEITHER THE "THAW" which followed the death of Stalin, nor the "liberalization" engendered by Soviet Party chief Khrushchev's denunciation of the dictator, permeated the administration of the Satellite armies to the extent that they did civilian life in the various Communist bloc countries. It was not until the events of October 1956—the rise of Gomulka in Poland and the Hungarian Revolt—that any significant changes occurred. Since that time, while the military establishments of the other Satellite countries have stood relatively still, those of Poland and Hungary have moved, respectively, away from and toward "Stalinization."

Reform in Poland

THE LICENSE of Soviet troops on Polish territory was considerably curtailed by a joint Polish-Soviet statement issued from Moscow, November 18, 1956, and by an agreement, signed by the Foreign and Defense Ministers of both countries, on December 17, 1956. The latter agreement reaffirmed and particularized the Moscow statement; the following were the key points:

"The location and number of Soviet Army units in Poland will be determined by agreements signed by both sides. Their movement, beyond the bases expressly assigned to them, requires the permission of the government of the Polish People's Republic. . . . Members of Soviet Army units stationed in Poland and their families are bound and required to respect and abide by the rules of Polish law. . . . The time, route and order of Soviet Army units' transit movements through Polish territory will be determined by agreements signed by appropriate representatives of both countries." (*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], November 19, 1956.)

Before the October events Poland's Army was utterly under the domination of the USSR. The Commander-in-Chief, Marshal Rokossovsky, was a Soviet citizen, as was his Chief-of Staff, General Bordzilowsky. Hundreds of Soviet officers with "Polonized" names and vague claims of Polish

ancestry held all responsible positions, and textbooks and tactics were invariably modelled on those used by the Red Army. After October, however, most—but not all—the Soviet officers were sent home. Rokossovsky lost his position on the Politburo and his place as Minister of Defense and Commander-in-Chief. He was succeeded in the latter two posts by General Marian Spychalski, a close friend of Party chief Wladyslaw Gomulka, and one of the Communist political generals who had been imprisoned in the Stalinist era. The position of Army Chief-of-Staff is still held by a Soviet officer, but his two deputies are now Poles. Similarly, USSR generals have been replaced in most command posts by genuine Polish officers.

The liberalization process continued in depth after October and applied even to many former members of the AK, the underground anti-Nazi army whose members had previously been discriminated against by the regime, with power and privilege going exclusively to the war-time Communist underground organization. This "rehabilitation" for large numbers of those whose war effort had been associated with that of the West appears to have continued, even in the face of the recent strengthening of Polish-Soviet ties. The Deputy Chief of the Political Board of the Polish Army, General E. Kuszko, was quoted on Radio Warsaw, October 12, 1957, as saying that "almost all Polish soldiers who fought on various fronts and in various branches of the service during the last war have rallied



A Bulgarian soldier. His uniform appears indistinguishable from that of the Soviet army.

Photo from *Bulgarski Voin* (Sofia), March 1957

around the flag of the Polish People's Army." This was one way of saying that the regime will now belatedly permit them to "rally around the flag."

An attempt at democratization of Party activities within the Army has also been made, as may be inferred from a Radio Warsaw broadcast, October 11, 1957, summarizing an interview with Deputy Defense Minister Lt. General J. Zarzycki. The broadcast stated that while "previously only the executives of basic Party organizations were elected, and higher Party officers were appointed, now, for the first time, divisional and regional committees have been elected."

The "verification" campaign inaugurated during the Tenth Plenum of the Polish Communist Party, seeking to weed out factionalists (i.e. "revisionist" liberalizers and "dogmatist" Stalinists) and corrupt and inactive elements from the Party appears thus far to have had little significance in the Army. According to Lt. Colonel Lucjan Pracki in an article in *Życie Warszawy* (Warsaw), November 15, 1957, "the phenomena of revisionism and dogmatism . . . appear only in moderate form [in the services]". On February 12, Radio Warsaw reported that the verification campaign in the Army "was generally concluded," that only 1.2 percent of the Party members in the military had been expelled and that 5.3 percent had been crossed off the lists. The latter is a process applied, for the most part, to apathetic members.

An instance of "liberalization" is the greater degree of Army freedom from supervision by the State security organs. A draft bill, read to the Parliament on December 30, 1957, was explained over Radio Warsaw on the same day as follows: "The changes [encompassed in the bill] are based on the principle that investigation should be conducted exclusively by the military prosecutor's office. The possibility of investigation officers of the security organs being able either to initiate or to conduct investigations is eliminated."

Regression Elsewhere

NO PROGRAM OF REFORM similar to that in Poland has been undertaken in any of the other Satellite countries. The Romanian, Bulgarian and Albanian Armies have undergone no appreciable "liberalization," and in Hungary there has been a move in the opposite direction in the reorganized military forces. In that country the Soviet occupying troops are, of course, supreme, and there is no toleration of even the slightest step toward the creation of a national-minded army. It would, obviously, be ludicrous for the Kadar regime to claim demonstrated and active loyalty to Communism for the pre-Revolt Army, part of which went over to the insurgents while the rest remained passive in the uprising. (For discussions of the events leading to and including this military break-down, see articles by General Bela Kiraly, Military Commander of Budapest during the Revolt, in *East Europe*, March 1958 and in a coming issue.) The regime merely attempts to explain away the Army's unwillingness to oppose the freedom fighters—and, indirectly, the Stalinists' inability to control Hungarian troops in the emergency—by so-called "treachery" in the

ranks. Typical of such "explanations" was an article in the official Party organ, *Nepszabadsag*, on September 28:

"Had it not been for the helpless and the traitorous in its midst, the People's Army could have proved what force it represented in the People's State. Imre Nagy and his group, who betrayed the people, betrayed the People's Army as well. There are several hundred examples proving that the units of the Hungarian People's Army stood their ground in defense of our people."

The journal did not cite these "examples."

Details are as yet scarce and vague on the reorganization of the Army, but an indication of the regime's efforts at recruitment propaganda may be found in the September 15, 1957 *Nepszabadsag* description of a group of draftees from the village of Szalkszentmarton on their way to join the forces. The young men came in "beflagged cars," their arrival greeted by gypsy orchestras, according to the newspaper, which also stated that "the villagers and onlookers danced in celebration."

In Czechoslovakia, the heritage of Stalinist Defense Minister Alexej Cepicka (dismissed from office in April 1956) remains, although some of his personal trappings, such as photographs of himself on barracks walls and military calendars, are gone. On April 27, 1956, *Rude Pravo* (Prague) scored Party work in the Army under Cepicka as showing "incorrect working methods, personality cult tactics, immodesty and isolation." Certain minor reforms were introduced, such as a loosening of furlough restrictions for enlisted men, but the servility of the Army to the Soviet Union was quite unchanged, especially after the Hungarian Revolt. At that time there was concern that the uprising would spread to Czechoslovakia, and since then even closer surveillance has been maintained on the troops.



Czechoslovak factory militiamen—workers under Party command—on "invasion" exercises. Such groups of armed Party stalwarts were used in the Party coup of 1948; they are still a potent force against public unrest.

Photo from *Svet v Obrazech* (Prague), February 22, 1958



A Polish army tank. It is apparently a model of the Soviet T-34-85.
Photo from *Zolnierz Polski* (Warsaw), July 1957

Soviet-Satellite Troop Relations

PERHAPS the most noticeable of the changes which have occurred in East European relationships since the death of Stalin has been the improvement in the public manners of Soviet officers in dealing with their counterparts in the Satellite armies. Politeness and at least surface respect are now the rule, and any table-pounding orders from Soviet military men are currently delivered in private. This new "correctness" has been especially manifest since the events of October 1956 and is, as would be expected, nowhere more apparent than in Poland. Under Marshal Rokossovsky, the Polish officers were a caste apart and below the Soviets, subject at any time to disdainful commands and rebuffs.

Similar liberties with nationalist feelings of the subject peoples were taken in Romania by Soviet officers who continued to behave as conquerors long after the end of the war. Even in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, where the USSR had no troops present in mass, the Soviet "advisers" and military missions had living quarters, rations and special shops so far superior to those of the local population as to cause boundless resentment. These conditions have now been either corrected or better concealed. If Soviet officers retain their full privileges and attitudes, they do so in a far more circumspect manner. However, the arro-

gance and the insistence on special treatment of Red Army officers is long-standing and not confined to their relationships with Satellite citizens.

An article in *Red Star*, the organ of the Soviet Army, summarized on August 21, 1957 over Radio Moscow, highlighted not only the age-old military problem of "distance" from subordinates, but also the rather special "prima-donna" personalities of many high-ranking Soviet officers. After stating that "soldiers complain that some commanders display inflexible exactness and cruelly punish infringers of military discipline," the broadcast averred that "such exactness should have nothing in common with rudeness." On the subject of officers' privileges it said:

"The officers' practice of using various dining rooms in accordance with their military rank has been resolutely criticized in the Army, because higher ranks were thus artificially separated from the lower ranks and communication was made impossible. However, here and there the determination to preserve these social barriers has been noted. In the Headquarters of the Transcarpathian Military District, for instance, the officers merely removed the door signs indicating which ranks were to use the rooms. But the situation has not changed. Generals and colonels continue to dine only in their 'own' rooms. In some rest homes in the Transcarpathian District separate beaches are marked off for higher and lower ranks. Special premises, which usually remain empty, are assigned in officers' homes of this district for higher commanders.

"Are such special privileges necessary? Do they contribute to closer relationship between commanders and their subordinates?

"It is definitely time to abandon all those features which do not spring from the requirements and nature of military services, but artificially separate higher and lower ranks."

Soviet Aloofness

With such privileges common, at least until recently, even in the USSR, it is not surprising that Soviet officers behaved undiplomatically, and on many occasions rudely, during their tours of duty in the Satellite States. From all reports they are still keeping to themselves in the various countries, in spite of the fact that their outward actions are far more proper. The Soviet troops, too, have little personal contact with the Satellite peoples, although this may be only partially their own or their superiors' decision. The Red Army behaved so badly immediately after World War II that in most cases its members are still shunned by the local populations, although the conduct of Soviet soldiery (except, of course, in Hungary) has much improved since then. In lieu of actual social contacts between the Red Army and the civilians of the Satellite States, there is an unremitting propaganda campaign centering on the valor and kindness of the Soviet soldier and the debt of gratitude owed him for "liberation" from the Nazis.

There is also little fraternizing between Soviet and Satellite troops. The different languages form a natural barrier, but even so, there has been no indication that the Red Army commanders would like closer relationships between their own and the Satellite enlisted men—in fact, quite the contrary. It is important to note, however, that during the Hungarian Revolt, many Soviet soldiers were reported as reluctant to take up arms against their rebelling "fellow

workers." A small but significant number of Red Army individuals actually went over to the "counterrevolutionary" side, and it was finally necessary to reinforce the Soviet troops with freshly imported non-European elements who presumably felt less kinship with the Hungarians.

Military Budgets

NO TRUSTWORTHY accounts of the military budgets of the Satellite armies are available. All published figures are carefully pruned to fit predetermined estimates and propaganda claims of restrained armament. Furthermore, there are no institutions in Communist countries comparable to democratic parliamentary committees to challenge budgetary statistics released by administrative organs; direct Soviet military aid is often minimized or hidden; and military expenditures are habitually concealed under "police" budgets and under those of the various ministries, particularly the ones dealing with heavy industry. For example, in Czechoslovakia the Ministry of Building Industry is said to finance barracks construction and the Ministry of Chemical Industry to bear much of the cost of producing explosives. However, for what they are worth, there follow the figures (representing billions in the local currencies) released in the official bulletins of the various countries for the year 1957:

Official "Statistics" on Budgets

	Total Expenditures*	Military Expenditures
Czechoslovakia	97.9 koruny	9.3 koruny
Poland	139.3 zloty	10.2 zloty
Romania	43.7 lei	3.7 lei
Bulgaria	18.4 leva	1.5 leva
Hungary	51.8 forint	1.9 forint

These "statistics" reveal that the regimes keep the publicized portions of their military budgets somewhat under ten percent of the "total" expenditures. The disproportionate lowness of the Hungarian figures were due to the Revolt and subsequent break-up of the local Army; the main cost of the military establishment in Hungary following the uprising was, of course, borne by the USSR. In the previous year (1956) the Hungarian regime claimed total expenditures of 42.2 billion forint, military expenditures of 4.1 billion. In the past five years there has been a trend toward reduction of the published figures by two or three percent. Thus Poland in 1954, while spending more (10.6 billion zloty) on the armed services, had a smaller total budget (103.4 billion). (Poland's 1958 military budget, however, is slated to be 20 percent higher than 1957's because of "increased costs." Bulgaria devoted 11.4 percent of its total expenditures to "defense" in 1954, 11.1 percent in 1955, 8.8 percent in 1956 and 8.3 percent in 1957. Some of these decreases, doubtless, reflect tendencies toward reducing costs in the military and in heavy industrialization in favor of an increase in living standards. Nevertheless, figures showing such relatively minor allotments to "defense" strain credulity, as do similar statistics released by the USSR.

* It should be kept in mind that Communist State budgets are in no way comparable to those of Western countries: they include expenditures for the "national economy."

After the Criminals—the Soldiers

On January 5, 1958 *Swiat* (Warsaw) announced the end of convict labor in the coal mines.

On February 5 Radio Warsaw announced that the Ministry of Mining and Power "is now trying to replace" soldiers of the Army Mining Corps with civilian miners. According to the broadcast, the Mining Corps once numbered 30,000, now numbers 8,000, and is to be reduced to 6,000.

Satellite Armaments Industry

IN THE SOCIALIST countries arms are produced by State factories, according to the needs of the Army, under conditions of maximum secrecy. The enemy must know as little as possible; it is well if he should be surprised at the decisive moment." (*Zolnierz Polski* [Warsaw], June 1957.)

From the above quotation the difficulty in obtaining a comprehensive survey of Satellite war production may be seen. Added to the uncertainties created by this official policy of concealment is the relative ease with which most establishments in heavy industry may be converted to war production. Nowhere was this better exemplified than in Poland, whose armament contributions to the Communist side during the Korean War were on a very large scale. Yet the regime did not find it necessary to admit the resultant dislocations of the economy until August 16, 1956. At that time Edward Ochab (then First Party Secretary, now Agriculture Minister and still a Politburo member) stated that his government, in responding to the "imperialist attack on Korea," had "spent millions for the defense industry and transferred its best workers and machines there." Ochab went on to say that "the Party leadership was correct in building the defense industry, but, alas, was wrong not to come to the working class at the time and tell them of the changes made in the Six Year Plan." The sections of this speech dealing with the Korean War were broadcast over Radio Warsaw, August 16, 1956, but deleted from the *Trybuna Ludu* text of the address.

In spite of the difficulties, however, certain general and many specific facts about Satellite war production are known. Most importantly, the policy of emphasizing heavy industry, inherited from Stalin, deemphasized briefly under Malenkov, and reinstituted in somewhat milder form under Khrushchev, continues to hold sway throughout the area. The military leaders, of course, favor concentration on "producing the means of production," for the fruits of this policy—as exemplified in the USSR—have meant more war industry and a simultaneous enhancement of authority and prestige for the military.

As might be expected, Czechoslovakia, the most industrialized of the Satellite countries, and Poland, which has made large strides in industrialization since the war, are now able to produce a significant share of their own armaments. The latter country is especially helped by the factories taken over from the Germans in the Oder-Neisse

territories. Military items produced in Poland include trucks, tractors, cannon platforms, armored shields and explosive materials, and in Stalowa Wola, Rzeszow and Radom there are apparently anti-aircraft, machine gun and tank factories, according to the exile publication, *Dziennik Polski* (London), May 25, 1954. General Spychalski has stated that Poland now possesses "a modern network of airfields, warehouses, magazines, as well as other military facilities." (*Trybuna Ludu*, March 28, 1957.) The same newspaper, on September 8, 1957, gave the following account of one section of the aircraft production industry:

"The Polish aircraft industry is producing powerful jet fighters based on the models of the Soviet MIG. . . . LIM-1 and LIM-2 are by no means the latest word in modern jets, yet they attain the 'modest' speed of 646.22 miles per hour and a ceiling of over 45,000 feet. . . ." The article also mentioned the production of "training and tourist" planes and gliders.

Two Polish shipyards apparently work exclusively for the Navy. The one in Gdynia has both construction and repair sections; the other in Oksywie is for repair and perhaps small naval craft construction only.

Jet fighters, modeled on the Soviet originals, are extensively manufactured in Czechoslovakia. Bombers produced in local factories include the Iljushin II and the TU IV, based on the Soviet-type of B-29. T-43 and Stalin III tanks are manufactured in quantity. There is also an extensive small arms industry in Czechoslovakia, as well as precision tools and explosives factories which supply the USSR, and to a lesser extent other member countries of the Warsaw Pact.

The armaments industries in Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria are considerably less significant, and therefore the information available is vague and unreliable. It is known that all the countries depend on the Soviet Union for their heavy arms and their aircraft, which consist principally of obsolete USSR World War II models. Considerable quantities of light arms are manufactured in Hungary, and there are light cannon factories in Diosgyor and Győr.



Polish Minister of Defense Marian Spychalski, right, with Polish Party leader Gomulka. Spychalski was imprisoned during the Stalinist era in Poland. After Gomulka's assumption of power in October 1956, Spychalski replaced Rokossowsky as head of the Polish armed forces. Rokossowsky is now Deputy Defense Minister of the Soviet Union.

Photo from *Zolnierz Polski* (Warsaw), August 15-22, 1957

An aircraft factory is located in the Romanian town of Stalin (formerly Brasov), but its production is probably not large nor very up-to-date. Bulgarian factories supply little in the way of armaments. All Black Sea naval craft appear to be built in the Soviet Union.

"Labor Battalions"

A COMMON FEATURE of Satellite army life is the impressment of regular troops in work units to provide manpower for State farms and collectives and for building military installations, bridges and roads. These troops often join "agricultural" and "technical" battalions which perform this type of work throughout their period of service. Exact figures on the strength of these "volunteers" are difficult to determine. This is due not only to the unreliable quality of most statistics released by Communist States, but also to the semantic confusion in ascertaining whether many units nominally termed "engineering" forces are legitimately so. Also the regimes are sometimes reluctant to call such formations "labor battalions," apparently because of the memories of similarly termed units under Nazi domination during the war.

In all the countries, labor brigades, whether so termed or camouflaged under other names, are composed to a significant extent of "uncertain" elements of the young male population. These may be political dissidents, young men of "bourgeois" background, or members of minority groups. Thus, citizens of Turkish ancestry in Bulgaria are seldom placed in regular units and those of German background in Czechoslovakia often are assigned to "technical" pick-and-shovel formations.

The open use of military personnel in the more grueling forms of civilian endeavor was brought out by the following comments over Radio Prague, October 2, 1957.

"One month ago the military-technical unit at Orlova received the Order of the Republic, a distinction well-deserved. The soldiers of this unit extracted more than 72,000 tons of coal over and above what was planned, during the first half of 1957. The Czechoslovak Army had been instructed to recruit this year [1957] 2,800 soldiers for mine work. It has, in fact, exceeded this quota by enrolling 3,300 soldiers for our mines, and recruitment continues.

"This year's harvest, delayed by bad weather, was saved with the help of soldiers. In August, for instance, an average of 5,000 to 9,500 soldiers helped daily to gather the harvest from our fields. We could also mention the tremendous assistance given by our soldiers on the occasion of various natural catastrophes or the tens of thousands of hours worked by our soldiers in the town-embellishment campaigns."

Pre-Military Training

NOT ONLY is conscription universal throughout the area, but quasi-obligatory pre-military training is also the rule. This training, which is regulated by special acts of the various "parliaments" as well as by decrees of the Defense, Education and Manpower Ministries, takes place in the schools, in the apprenticeship centers and especially in certain mass youth organizations. In Czechoslovakia, for example, the Union for Cooperation with the Army

with over 700,000 members, male and female, provides drill in the use of arms, flying, parachuting, nursing and civil defense. The Czechoslovak Communist Youth League similarly stresses some aspects of pre-military training.

Although there is a small amount of military drill for pre-highschool-age students in the Satellite countries, serious training does not begin until two or three years before the induction age. This varies in all the States from the ages of eighteen to twenty-three, depending on the youth's educational status and the available manpower supply. The Polish law on pre-military training, adopted February 25, 1948, is typical of areawide rulings on the subject. It states that all citizens of both sexes must undergo preparatory military training from the age of 16.

Special attention is devoted to university students who are expected to supply cadres for the reserve officer corps. Military Study Centers, attached to each institution of higher learning, enable young men to secure reserve army commissions without interrupting their civilian studies, thus assuring a flow of educated specialists to every division of the State apparatus and economy, without the loss of years entailed in full-time military service. The sources are by no means superficial, demanding in Poland, for example, 16-24 hours per month as well as a yearly 30-day training period in the field.

A distinctive feature of the bureaucratic mechanics of the pre-induction period is the procedure of "examination" devoted to the background of every youth before his military assignment. Those whose activities—or whose relatives' activities—classify them as "politically unreliable" are usually placed in labor units. This procedure is followed more closely, of course, in the States under more Stalinist regimes. In Bulgaria, for example, the draft boards are reported to begin their compilation of material on the potential soldiers three years before induction. This material is supplied by local officials, Party members, youth groups and educational functionaries. Relatively unschooled peasant youths are preferred in the ranks of the regular army. Bourgeois background, membership in "nationalistic" minorities, and intellectuality unchanneled along Marxist lines, tends to lead to enrollment in a labor battalion.

Special schools to train career officers have been set up in all the countries. These military academies are divided into separate units, according to the type of training provided. In Czechoslovakia there is a military academy in Prague which trains line officers and awards academic degrees to its graduates, a Military-Political Institute in the same city to train political officers, a Military-Medical Academy in Hradec Kralove. At another Prague school, the Klement Gottwald Military Academy, the "political tasks" of commanders are stressed. According to *Obrana Lidu* (Prague), July 31, 1957, "every commander," at the Gottwald school, "must be the political leader of his subordinates, must always know in every situation how to cement the political and ideological unity of his subordinates."

Lower-level military schools in Czechoslovakia include a technical air force institution in Liberec, a tank school in Dedice, and communications training centers at Nove Mesto and Vahom.

The other Satellite countries have similar institutions, and there is some interchange of students between the various States. In Warsaw the General Staff Academy for graduate officers stressed "scientific studies in the field of military science, based on the leading science of Marxism-Leninism and the experiences of Soviet military science" (Parliamentary decree, *Dziennik Ustaw*, December 21, 1952). The political academies in that country were all headed by Soviet officers until the Gomulka regime took power. Now both the staff personnel and the textbooks have been to a significant extent purged of their predominantly Soviet coloring.

Military Life

THE ARMY YEARS in the life of the Satellite draftee are grim ones. His work is rigorous, his living conditions poor, his food sparse and his pay almost non-existent. Also his term of service, though limited by law, can be extended at the will of the regime, for there is no recourse from arbitrary decisions at the top level.

Polish regulations state that the term of compulsory service in the Army is two years, in the Air Force and Navy three years and in the Security Forces 27 months. Reservists may be called to participate in military maneuvers once each year, and the maneuvers may be of no more than two months duration, unless extended for "important reasons" by the Minister of Defense. Individual reservists are not normally called out each year. These regulations are fairly typical of those in other countries in the area.* After the October 1956 upheavals and the ascension of "national"

* Officially Czechoslovakia and Romania have across-the-board enlistment periods of two-years for ground troops. According to exile reports, this service may be extended another year. Bulgaria and Hungary demand two-year enlistment periods for infantry troops, three years for the air forces.



The Romanian navy (the captain tasting the crew's food) in its Soviet-style uniforms.

Photo from *Romania Today* (Bucharest), August 1956



"On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of our liberation the military parade by the Hungarian People's Army took place on Stalin Square." The giant statue of Stalin was pulled down by the rebels during the Hungarian Revolt.

Photo and quoted caption from *Hungary* (Budapest), April 1955

Communist Spychalski to Army leadership in Poland, there were plans to reduce terms of compulsory service by about one third (press interview with Spychalski, reported over Radio Warsaw, January 12, 1957). However, thus far the reduction has not been put into effect.

Training in all Satellite armies is extremely rigorous. A report on an ordinary rifle company in Bulgaria states that reveille was sounded at 05:00 hours, followed immediately by a thirty-minute calisthenics period. From 05:30-06:00 the troops policed their barracks, after which they stood company inspection. Breakfast was from 06:20-07:00. There ensued an hour of political indoctrination, followed by battalion inspection. From approximately 08:10 to 13:00 hours there was active training in rifle firing, bayonet drill, care-and-cleaning of weapons, etc. Lunch was served at 13:15, and there followed a rest period until 15:00, after which there was another company inspection, then three hours of training. From 18:00 to 19:00 the soldiers cleaned their weapons and uniforms. From 19:00 to 20:00 there was another period of political indoctrination, followed by supper, and then a free period of about an hour. Evening roll was called at 21:30; lights out at 22:00.

The separation between officers and enlisted men is extreme, and old-world concepts of rigid divisions between non-commissioned officers and privates are carried to a much further extent than is now general in Western military services. Nowhere are the differences in rank more glaring than in the pay scales. In the Bulgarian Army, for example—according to a reliable refugee report—a battalion commander receives 1200 *leva** per month, a company commander 900, a platoon leader 750, a master sergeant 650, and a private 1.80 to 4 *leva* per month, depending on his length of service. Huge pay differentials are a long-standing policy of Satellite armies. In 1952, for ex-

* The legal minimum wage for industrial workers in Bulgaria is 400 *leva* per month.

ample, Hungarian military wage rates ranged from 60 *forint* per month for a private to about 6200 per month for a division commander. In Communist armies a private's pay is nominal, and even the miniscule sums he receives used to be and, in some cases, still are, liable to deductions for youth group membership dues and "voluntary" contributions to State loans.

Food and living quarters vary from country to country, and indeed within the countries, with the specialized troops enjoying much the better conditions. Czechoslovakia, whose prewar economy was the most advanced in the area, continues to provide its soldiers with comparatively good barracks quarters and sufficient nourishment. Bulgarian troops, on the other hand, are meagerly fed and, according to reliable reports, receive only two meat meals a week.

Punishment

In a Satellite country the ordinary soldier who runs afoul of his officers is as helpless as the ordinary civilian under the jurisdiction of Communist courts of law. The familiar monolithic authority, with Party military leaders sharing in the Party civilian ruling hierarchy, makes a mockery of the "safeguards" provided by law. Thus, under normal circumstances, a biased decision by a lower military court will be upheld in appeal by a higher court with the same bias. A lawyer assigned the defendant will have the same "safe" motivations as the judges. Under these conditions there is little real importance in the facts that a lawyer for the defense is obligatory in all serious cases in each country and that decisions may be appealed within three to eight days, depending on the country involved.

Wide latitude for sentencing is provided the military courts in each country. For example, minimum sentences for absence without leave for under six weeks may be punishment by six months in prison in Czechoslovakia or two years in Bulgaria, but in these and all the other countries, the

same offense in "qualified cases" may range legally up to twenty years. It is, of course, the court's own decision as to whether the case is "qualified." The "crime" of insubordination is equally all-encompassing and may be dealt with by the courts of all countries far more severely if the defendants appeared to have been acting in concert. For mild infractions of military rules—i.e., weapons not properly cleaned, drunkenness, small thefts, etc.—the soldier may be sent to a disciplinary labor battalion, his length of stay there being determined by his company officers.

Military regulations governing court martial proceedings are published, allegedly in full, in the official gazettes of Czechoslovakia and Poland, but only in part elsewhere in the area. However, as has been stated, the regulations are less meaningful than the disposition of the presiding officers and the temper of the regime. It is significant that Poland's recent "democratization" merely affirmed rights that the pre-Gomulka regime—and those of the other Satellite countries—had all along publicly upheld but privately ignored. In *Trybuna Ludu*, October 11, 1957, Deputy Defense Minister Janusz Zarzycki spoke vaguely but with apparent forcefulness of the necessity to "emphasize the soldier's rights as well as his duties." He also charged commanders with the duty to "respect their subordinates."

Morale

Under the conditions prevalent in Satellite armies, the morale of the ordinary enlisted man can hardly be high. Not only is his work gruelling and almost unrecompensed, but he is constantly faced with discriminations. He sees his officers and high-ranking non-commissioned officers enjoying pay rates literally hundreds of times greater than his own, as well as privileges which include special stores with stocks of merchandise he would not be permitted to buy, even



Czechoslovak troops on winter maneuvers.

Photo from *Svet v Obrazech* (Prague), January 18, 1958



A rifle range in Czechoslovakia, operated by the organization Union for Cooperation with the Army (Svazarm).

Photo from *Svet v Obrazech* (Prague), January 5, 1957

if he could afford them. Unlike the enlisted men in Western countries, Satellite soldiers cannot accept their inferior privileges and situations as temporary conditions of military service. For the higher caste status of the Army hierarchy is a precise reflection of the status of the ruling bureaucracy in civilian life. Furthermore, the officers are not a group set apart from the civilian officials, but, as Party members and regime leaders, a part of the regime itself. Thus no recourse from their rule or their excesses is available.

The enlisted man is also well aware that favored branches of the service, such as the security forces, are not only better paid, but far better housed, clothed and fed. In all probability the ordinary draftee has not even the Communist *mystique* to uphold him, for if he were a fervent Party member or had distinguished himself in subservience to the Party's will, he himself would very likely be an officer or, at any rate, in one of the more rewarding branches of the service. Indeed, this separation of the ordinary soldiery from what might be termed the elite troops, gives rise in many instances to real "class hatred." The attacks on the security police by the young people of Hungary during the Revolt and the present vast unpopularity of the Polish militia are cases in point.

Another source of discontent in the ranks is agricultural collectivization. The peasant soldier, dreaming of his army discharge and return home, can only be appalled at the upheaval of his family life, the obliteration of farms which, in many cases, his forebears have worked for countless generations. Each new collectivization campaign is undoubtedly greeted with resentment by substantial numbers of ordinary soldiers.*

Similarly the industrial worker drafted into the army—and he may well have been formerly a peasant "recruited"

* Collectivization drives are a chronic source of bad morale in Communist armies. As far back as the early 1930s Soviet Marshal Blucher was protesting the effect of collectivization on the state of mind of his troops in the Far East. The Marshal "disappeared" in 1938, was posthumously "rehabilitated" in 1957.


into the factories during the industrialization campaigns—can look forward only to a civilian life in towns whose overcrowded housing conditions have not kept pace with the industrial build-up.

The soldier's morale is also undermined by worry about his family's financial plight. Both in the countryside and in the industrial settlements, the East European family depends, often to a crucial extent, on the working and earning power of its young men. Their induction into the army is frequently a source of extreme hardship to the average family. Nor does the regime provide any "allotments" for dependents of the soldier as is the case in the American Army and to an extent in other military services. Only in the case of "inability" to work—a condition decreed, of course, by Party officials and seldom extending farther than financial aid to mothers of several children—will financial aid be given to the families of soldiers. Otherwise it is areawide policy to force the entire adult population into full-time employment, including the soldier's immediate family.

From a military point of view, perhaps the most morale-deadening factor in the Satellite armies is their emptiness of tradition. Lacking a past—for the regimes dogmatically posit the condition of their national prewar armies as "feudalistic" or "Fascistic"—the armies must make do with the unhappy present or, as in civilian life, with the

promise of a future nirvana. Unlike professional armies throughout history, they cannot build *esprit* on past glories. Unlike even the Soviet soldier they are not permitted to hark back to national armies "safely" far in the past for victories fought on terms "progressive for the time." Even this "judicious" kind of nationalism is forbidden in the Satellite countries. Since most of the territory in the area was "liberated" after World War II by the Soviet Army, and since the people's own resistance efforts were often tied to those of non-Communist nationals now in exile or in disgrace with the regimes, there is little in the last two decades on which to construct Communist—as distinct from nationalist—army morale. The only recourse is to borrow *esprit* from the Red Army, an operation somewhat more difficult than "borrowing" Soviet advisers or even armaments, given the nationalist state of mind of the non-Communist populations of Central and Eastern Europe. Further, the Satellite armies are precluded, by the servility of the regimes which master them, from even the anticipations of great victory or national conquest. The mere contemplation of such an eventuality is unallowable, for in the present composition of military affairs in the Satellite countries, all strategic planning is controlled by the fact that the separate national forces can never be more than appendages of the Red Army.

The map shows estimated approximations of Soviet and Satellite troop strengths, as of February 1, 1958: East Germany, 80-110,000 local troops, 385,000 Soviet; Poland, 280-300,000 local troops, 30,000 Soviet; Czechoslovakia, 230-280,000 local troops, no officially stationed mass Soviet formations; Hungary, local Army being reorganized after virtual dissolution in 1956 Revolt, strength unknown; 53,000 Soviet troops; Romania, 130,000 local troops, 20,000 Soviet; Bulgaria, 150,000 local troops, no officially stationed mass Soviet formations; Albania, local and Soviet formations of undetermined size.





PROLETARIUSZE WSZYSTKICH KRAJÓW ŁĄCZCIE SIĘ!

NOWA KULTURA

Masthead of the Warsaw weekly *Nowa Kultura*, where Kolakowski's articles appeared, and which is currently one of the periodicals leading the fight for the continuation of criticism. The line above the journal's name says: "Proletarians of the world, unite!"

This is the fourth and last in a series of excerpts from the article "Responsibility and History" by the young Polish philosopher Leszek Kolakowski, which appeared in four installments in the Warsaw weekly Nowa Kultura, beginning with the September 1, 1957 issue. (Excerpts from the first three installments were published in East Europe, December 1957, February and March 1958.) "Responsibility and History" is a detailed, brilliant analysis of many of the basic ideological preconceptions of contemporary Communist doctrine; it is especially concerned with the interaction between the processes of history and the moral judgments of the individual. It derives added force and interest from the fact that Kolakowski himself is a member of the Polish Communist Party, and editor of

Studia Filozoficzne, the leading Polish philosophical periodical.

"Responsibility and History" has aroused a great deal of comment in Poland and throughout the area. Kolakowski has been widely attacked as a leader of intellectual "revisionism"—indeed, Moscow's Pravda, February 5, used his name as a generic term for revisionists, saying "What Imre Nagy did in Hungary in practical politics, the kolakowskis are doing [throughout the area] in theory." (For further details on the debates aroused by "Responsibility and History," see page 16.) Nevertheless, Kolakowski has not, as far as is known, been subject to disciplinary action.

The excerpts below are from the fourth installment of the article, subtitled "Hope and the Fabric of History."

"Responsibility and History"—IV

THUS, PRACTICAL choice in life is made in a world defined by "duty" and not by "existence." These two categories, *Sollen* and *Sein*, characterize two attitudes and two visions of reality between which we continuously but fruitlessly try to establish contact. The same question constantly arises in different forms: how to ensure that the *Sollen-Sein* alternative will not become the alternative between utopianism and opportunism, romanticism and conservatism, useless madness and collaboration with crime masked by sobriety? How to avoid the fatal choice between the Scylla of duty, casting its arbitrary slogans into the desert, and the Charybdis of obedience to the existing world which gradually transforms itself into a voluntary affirmation of the world's most dreadful creations? How to avoid this choice on the assumption, which we think essential, that we can never really measure truly and with complete predictability the boundaries of what we call "historical necessity," and that therefore we shall never be able to declare definitely which of the facts of social life are components of historical fate, or which possibilities are concealed in existing reality?

For a more detailed answer to this question, we accept the following assumptions [first three in 3rd installment]:

Fourth assumption: *historical interpretation of value. Duty is a form of being.* I.e., the very fact that a specific moral consciousness has acquired a social character, means it has become a part of historical process and a factor influencing the course of that process. What is more, the awareness of a certain duty inherent in that consciousness has become an objective need of social life. Various social rules are reflected in social consciousness not in the form of theoretical knowledge but in the form of value judgments, of a belief that this or that is morally "good" or "evil," that this or that "should" or "should not" be done. If we do not wish, following the pattern of positivist literature, to be satisfied with reflecting on the specific character of the verbal forms in which moral opinions are expressed, and to consider as the final end of our knowledge the truth that normative statements cannot be deduced from propositions derived from the rules of logic; and if, therefore, we do not wish to be content with the trivial knowledge that no world view is in itself sufficient to validate a theory of value, we must consider both the knowledge of social phenomena and the world of value as specific manifestations of collective life, reflecting in different ways its laws, tendencies and needs. If we adopt such an

attitude, we will be less concerned with the question of whether statements containing specific moral judgments are equally subject, with other statements, to the dichotomy of truth and falsehood (although we share with the positivists the negative reply to this question); we will be more interested in the type of relation that exists between consciousness pronouncing value judgment and consciousness making theory as two forms of the same social process. In reality, and it is almost shameful to repeat this truth, theories about social phenomena only too often are masked by ideology; that is, they are often (though not exclusively) a concealed collection of values imposed upon society under the guise of research altruistically serving scientific knowledge. But also consciousness which pronounces value judgments—if that consciousness assumes social dimensions (and the criteria which determine when this takes place are very difficult to formulate)—is a distorted perception of certain facts of social life, certain regularities in it reflected in the distorting mirror of interests. If a certain norm is widely accepted, then, even if it were never fully respected, by the very fact of its existence it constitutes evidence that the needs of society, or of a certain important segment of it, require that its violations be kept within limits. "Duty" is only the voice of a social need, and in this sense, the world of values is not only an imaginary heaven over and above the real world, but is actually a part of the real world, that part which exists

only in social consciousness, though also rooted in the material conditions of social life. From this, we derive:

Fifth assumption: *negation of pseudo-realistic criticism of moralizing utopias.* A social movement which has a moral basis for its program does not reveal its ineffectiveness by the mere fact that its moral postulates have little chance of realization in the foreseeable future. It is, in fact, a platitude, the truth of which all humanity has been learning from its daily experience, that social systems established by means of attractive slogans with a moral aura only faintly resemble those slogans in content. In other words, we should be wise enough not to be deceived about the speedy arrival of the Kingdom of Heaven. In general, however, we seem to lack this wisdom which does not apparently demand great mental effort, and because of this, from time to time, we receive from our mother—history—blows which are even more painful because they are spiced with the mockery and the realization of our own naivete. . . .

Sixth assumption: *the possibility of moral judgment of political choices.* The basic political choices we make are subject to moral evaluation. In a world where every particle is politically evaluated, where the struggle between parties is total, the situation described brings about a deep change in life. Our assumption rejects in essence the view, sometimes encountered, according to which group solidarity is subject to moral evaluation, but the mere act of access to some group or other, among which one makes a voluntary choice, is not subject to it. Since political elements in social life are now manifest with an intensity never before encountered, a large number of our actions which previously might have passed as neutral now carry a moral weight. For this reason, the shadow of anxiety dogs everyday life's most trivial events, because all of them contain the tormenting awareness of the connection between these events and the fundamental political conflicts. This universal system of interconnected social actions has become a fact difficult to ignore, irrespective of one's opinions of its origins and regardless of whether one likes it or not.

Doubtless, there is a category of so-called "decent men." But there are so many ways one can be a "decent man." And how much of this depends on the situation one finds oneself in, irrespective of one's intention? What does it mean to be a "decent man" in Nazi Germany, as a member of the chosen race? What does it mean to be a "decent man," and a member of the Social-Democratic party conducting a policy of colonial terror? Who is a decent man during a war? And during an election? And yet, there really are decent people in every situation, and there is no reason to abandon this category, vague and not clearly defined though it is, but which is effective within certain limits. . . .

If one wishes to console himself in this situation by the conviction that he may save his own soul solely by personal decency, and "the whole will be settled of itself," he will be deeply disappointed when, on the other bank of the Styx, he is handed the bill for the crimes about which he did not know at all. The entire drama consists of the



Don Quixote holds a document: "List of Untouchable Windmills."
Polityka (Warsaw), June 12-18, 1957

fact that we are compelled to make morally binding decisions with a hopeless ignorance of their results. . . .

THE CONCLUSIONS WORTHY of formulation which emerge from these last assumptions are the following:

To oppose existing social conditions with a program based essentially on moral demands is not in itself socially useless (or even less, harmful), even when its practical realization is quite doubtful in view of the objective possibilities inherent in the complex of conditions. If in this contrast, the *Sollen* and *Sein* are extremely sharply opposed and separated by a huge distance, social life itself condemns these purely moralizing programs to practical ineffectiveness by preventing them from becoming any real force whatever in the existing situation in a given community. Whenever these programs emerge as a vital element in social consciousness, whenever they make themselves known as a factor noticeably influencing public opinion, they thereby testify to being non-utopian—in the traditional meaning of the term, which means being partially effective—and they provide testimony to the fact that they arise from certain real requirements of the social consciousness.

This does not mean that thereby they become "realistic" in the sense that the possibilities exist in the society for realizing them rapidly in their pure form. If the slogans organizing the collective consciousness appeal to the moral feelings widespread at a given time, they must of necessity, as has already been stated, greatly exceed the possibilities of existing reality, yet they do not thereby prove themselves chimerical. The abstract moralizing slogan of freedom constitutes the battle cry of innumerable social movements throughout modern history. Of course, freedom could never be realized in this abstract and moralizing form. Nonetheless, it passed through many stages of fragmentary and incomplete realization, and just to ignore them because they were fragmentary and did not fulfill maximalist demands would be stupid (apart from the fact that this slogan and others also have had their deceptive and backward forms which are, however, recognizable). And yet, and we stress it once again, partial realizations succeed only when the postulates exceed the practical "potentialities" of reality because only then are they able to mobilize and accumulate sufficient quantities of the collective energy necessary to achieve progress. This disproportion between intentions and possibilities has a certain "optimum" which is difficult to define and beyond which criticism of utopianism begins. Programs of change which far exceed the existing possibilities condemn themselves to impotence. The disproportions are necessary for any effectiveness and for this reason they characterize all the undertakings of the left-wing social movements. *Excess of hope and excess of demands with relation to the possibilities are necessary to force reality to yield all its possibilities, to tap all the springs hidden in the actual shape of reality.* It is true that excess hope also runs the risk of disappointment, and it is also true that disappointment discourages further efforts which, in turn, prevent mobilization of the social energy necessary for exploiting ex-



"Cross off what is unnecessary."

Polityka (Warsaw), July 10-17, 1957

isting possibilities. As a result, the potential of collective activity, in turn, becomes disproportionate to the possibilities of reality, and falls below the required level. . . .

And here is the next conclusion from the proposed assumptions:

Let us not disregard the positive role of hypocrisy. When a social system based on lawlessness, oppression and misery masks itself with humanistic verbiage, it does not, contrary to appearances, make itself more effective in the long run. At a certain stage its facade turns against it because it was always alien to it, and was imposed only under the pressure of historical circumstances. *Generally speaking, an increase in hypocrisy is a proof of moral progress* because it testifies to the fact that things previously done openly without fear of disgrace can now no longer be done without risk. In other words, the moral consciousness of society is more susceptible to incentives to which it formerly did not react. In the 20th Century people were tortured just as effectively as in the 15th, but the fact that this is no longer done in public squares, and that no system of government is willing to admit that it uses torture, proves that the moral sensibilities of the community no longer tolerate these practices as a system. Military aggression continues to be practiced, but the fact that everyone has plenty of slogans with which to condemn any aggression indicates that no one wants to be called an aggressor, and proves that the idea of non-aggression as a principle has become rooted in public life. Still, Mussolini was one of those who was not afraid to state that he con-

ducted a policy of conquest, but no present-day politician would like to admit any purpose but defense. The principle of self-determination was a novelty when put forward by Lenin and the Bolshevik Party before World War I. After World War II it was recognized by the United Nations Organization, including governments engaged in the most reprehensible colonial oppression. The Nazis proclaimed conquests of nations in the name of the interests of a superior nation. Today, nothing can be offered to nations except liberation, freedom and progress.

Therefore, we repeat, the facade of humanistic phraseology which disguises even criminal systems is not only a product of and a testimony to a certain progress in social consciousness, but is in itself a positive factor in this progress. The facade takes on a life of its own and when this is incompatible with the system, breeds and nurtures the seeds of its destruction. When the system, because of excessively strong traditional ties, is unable to throw off the facade, it risks the possibility that its deceptive dress will one day become the robe of Deianira. Contradictions between facade and content transform themselves into an internal contradiction of the system, each time the facade becomes alienated from the system, and this is the natural course of human history. . . .

Thus, the general conclusion derived from our deliberations is that the rules of moral behavior cannot be deduced from any theory of historical progress, nor can historical progress justifiably be used as a pretext to violate certain moral rules which otherwise remain valid for us. Apart from all of the reasons presented above, two other easily observed circumstances are involved here. The idea of progress is inherently a value judgment, and there is no theory of progress which is not inconsistent; i.e., which does not, when applied concretely, lead to conflicts between different values, each of which fulfills some criteria and simultaneously exclude others. (We are not presently

inquiring why this is so.) Nor can moral rules be deduced from any theory of moral progress, in the specific sense of the term, because the concept of moral progress, burdened by all the flaws and difficulties of a general concept of progress, has in addition its own flaws and difficulties which make construction of a general rational conception of moral progress an apparently hopeless task. . . .

In this matter we can only formulate very general observations. The major values we accept are, according to our third assumption, unprovable in the strict sense of the term; that is, in the case of conflict between two value judgments discussion is made impossible where there is no possibility of further appeal to more general common values. This situation does not seem alarming to us. If the values—according to our second assumption—are an historical product, there is always a set of very general values universally recognized to which, in practice, we may appeal. The real difficulty lies in the permanent conflicts which arise between unquestioned values as they are concretely applied, and we are often unable to remove these conflicts. Since, according to the sixth assumption, our basic acts of political choice have a moral aspect, they must present themselves to the individual consciousness as something of a risk, because we count on the values we recognize most probably being realized in a specific concrete form of already existing social action. That risk concerns the judgment of facts and not any sort of evaluation; it is a certain bet by which we assume the probability of realization of our values. But the stake is always high and is always morally binding because it entails responsibility for the results of our acts, which are difficult to predict. Since the risk concerns judgments about facts or historic processes which must eventually take place, one thing at least remains our permanent duty: we must constantly verify our choices by investigating the facts connected with them. We must maintain a constant, watchful awareness that our choice always concerns a probability not a certainty, and that, therefore, it may always be questioned and overthrown by facts. Ignorance of the results of social actions we espoused on the basis of their values is never justifiable. We are not justified by indulging in neglect, laziness, or indolence in the face of the necessity to exercise unceasing control over our own choice. We are not justified by ignorance, if as a result of it, we condone crime. The line of demarcation between innocent ignorance and voluntary blindness cannot be drawn: ultimately, we are responsible for both. Since our choice arises from a combination of recognized values (for which we are also responsible to the society, though the act of recognition is independent of us), and from knowledge of the probabilities of their realization in a given set of circumstances, this knowledge must be the object of a constant, a most suspicious, and a most merciless control, taking into account everything that might prove its falsehood. We are obliged to familiarize ourselves with everything that contradicts us. Our every choice contains a risk, and no choice, by the mere fact of its realization, can be considered final and irrevocable.

Nevertheless, the greatest errors cannot be excluded. Neither can the most fateful conflicts between recognized



On the hospital wall: "Silence Heals." Caption: "The operation has been going on for a year now."

Polityka (Warsaw), October 23-29, 1957

values be thus excluded. Such conflicts cannot be removed by any moral doctrine because none of them can be free of contradictions in application. We are, therefore, equally powerless to prevent the inevitable occurrence of situations in which nobody is guilty in terms of naked intentions and yet everyone is morally responsible. In short, tragedies are a permanent possibility of this world in which we live. Contrasting skepticism with bigotry masked by loyalty, the principle of responsibility with conformism masked by theoretical relativism, the duty of individual choice with an opportunistic philosophy of history masked by realism, contrasting rationalism with the superstitious cult of unverified "laws of history," the principle of active engagement with the principle of humility and obedience, we have no intention of considering all these contrasts as any kind of solution to actual conflicting situations with which we are faced, when we resort to accepted general moral rules of conduct. These moral rules, if they arise from the conflict-ridden nature of social reality itself, are solved with a risk no longer theoretical but moral, and a moral risk which everyone individually assumes. . . .

The inevitability of the present is the inevitability of the past because everything which really exists belongs to the

past. The truth about the inevitability of the past is a tautology and gives rise to no disputes. The inevitability of what does not yet exist is always doubtful, and to predict it is generally as uncertain as roulette, and in any case, the role of what depends on our decisions is difficult to determine. The poverty of prophetic philosophy of history is a daily proof of this. Therefore, decisions for which we are morally responsible cannot be based on confidence in its pronouncements. A philosophy of history worthy of consideration describes only what has existed, the past, and not the creative future of the historical process. For this reason, those who wish to subordinate their own engagement in future processes to the pronouncements of the philosophy of history are only tourists who write their names on the walls of dead cities. Everybody can, if he wishes, interpret himself historically and discover the determinisms to which he was subject in the past. But he cannot do so with respect to the self he has not yet become. He cannot deduce his own future development from the pronouncements of the philosophy of history in which he trusts. To work such a miracle would mean to become the irrevocable past oneself; that is, to cross the river of death which, the poet says, no one ever sees twice.

ONE OF THE MOST extensive attacks on "Responsibility and History" in the Polish press was put forth by Adam Schaff in two articles in *Polityka* (Warsaw), February 1 and 8. Schaff, although not considered a real "Stalinist," has exerted his influence against the "liberals" of the Polish Party, of whom Kolakowski is one of the most vocal.* Although the Schaff articles did not mention Kolakowski or "Responsibility and History" by name, it is clear that they were the focal point of Schaff's attacks on intellectual "revisionism." The title of the first Schaff article was "Zurück zu Kant [Back to Kant], or the Bankruptcy of Clerks." The first essay of "Responsibility and History" dealt with a dialogue between a Communist and a "clerk" (i.e., an intellectual, in the sense used by the French writer Julian Benda's "La Trahison des Clercs"). Further, it has been widely noted that many of Kolakowski's ideas on the relationship of personal morality to historical phenomena are to a degree based on Kant.

Below are excerpts from Schaff's article in which the attack is directed against Kolakowski and "Responsibility and History":

"If a former Marxist (even if his Marxism wasn't deeply rooted) writes today in an existentialist spirit about the 'freedom' of an individual and his role as an autonomous creator of reality . . . and if he thus finds applause among leftish young people, we have to look for the social roots of such a phenomenon. . . . 'Man in the universe' (brrrr! what metaphysical nonsense)—that's the problem they say absorbs philosophers and that's why Marxism must be "supplemented" with existentialism. And morality? What else but that which comes from inside a man like a spider-web from a spider—if a man is 'free,' 'alone' and 'tragic' and, above all, is an omnipotent creator of reality. . . .

"There have been various 'revisions' of Marxism. . . . The present one is typically moralizing. . . . [It] is, above all, existentialist just because it is moralizing. But ideologically, philosophically, its roots go deeper—to Kant—that is, to the source to which, in a part of its doctrine, existentialism also reaches. . . . Our liquidators have had their spiritual growth from the marriage of existentialism and Kantianism. . . . All kinds of revisionism have traditionally been linked with Kantianism. . . . I merely quote such names as Bernstein, Vorlander, de Man, Leon Blum and the whole concept (between the wars and after the war) of so-called humanistic Socialism. . . .

"After Marx, one can defend subjective and 'fideist' positions in morality, but only at the price of renouncing science. . . . When people who call themselves Marxists begin to build an annex to Marxism out of their Kantian-existentialist positions—this is ideological bankruptcy. In Poland, such opinions are uttered by people who do call themselves Marxists, who call themselves 'leftist.' . . . This is scientific and ideological bankruptcy. Political bankruptcy is closely linked to it. And this is the bankruptcy of clerks."

* Schaff is Director of the Philosophical and Sociological Institute of the Polish Academy of Sciences; Kolakowski is editor of the Institute's monthly *Studia Filozoficzne*.

The Party

and the

Peasant—IV

Last of a series on farming in Eastern Europe. Previous articles covered the Communists' failure to collectivize agriculture in Poland and Hungary, their brutal victory over the peasants in Bulgaria and the Baltic States, and their continuing campaign in Czechoslovakia, Romania and Albania. This article analyzes the consequences of their policies, comparing present farm production with that of twenty years ago, and shows why the agricultural problem has become increasingly important in the calculations of Communist planners.



Stoyan Milev, a Bulgarian farmer—"An old collective farm hand."
Photo from Bulgaria (Sofia), Nov. 11, 1957

Politics and Food

FOR ALL ITS EMPHASIS ON factories and technology, the Communist world is still largely rural. More than two-fifths of the working population in the Soviet Union are employed in agriculture. The proportion is similar in Poland and Hungary, and rises to considerably more than half in Romania and Bulgaria. Czechoslovakia, relatively the most industrialized Communist country, keeps between a quarter and a third of its manpower on the farms, as do Western European countries like France and Austria. The modern agricultural revolution as symbolized in the United States—which has less than one-eighth of its manpower in agriculture but produces more than enough to feed its population—has not yet come to the Communist world.

Until recently the East European Communists, trained and groomed in Moscow, followed the Soviet model in all their social and economic policies. As applied to agriculture these policies did little to raise the economic efficiency of the countryside above the level of twenty years ago. In the area as a whole, the production of such staple commodities as bread grain, potatoes and cattle has not yet returned to the prewar level, and crop yields are far below modern standards. One reason for this is that—despite all their talk of scientific farming—the Satellite regimes gave agri-

culture a secondary role in their economic schemes. Compared to the far-ranging plans for developing industry in Eastern Europe, the goals set for agriculture in the early 1950's were distinctly conservative. The main object was to recover from the war-incurred setback in farm production and at the same time to reorganize agriculture along collectivist lines. Given their total political and economic program, the Communists could not realistically expect to make any marked technical advance.

The Crisis in Production

THE FIRST LONG-TERM PLANS, which ran for periods of five or six years between 1949 and 1955, attempted to change the structure of agricultural production rather than to increase its total size in comparison with the prewar period. They called for substantial increases in livestock numbers (in pigs and sheep, but not in cattle) and in industrial crops such as flax, hemp, cotton, sugar beets and oilseeds. The areas planted to grain were reduced, on the expectation that higher yields per unit of land would bring total grain production in 1953-1955 to a level slightly above that prevailing in 1934-1938. The secondary role assigned to agriculture as against other parts of the economy may be seen by comparing the planned investment in agriculture

with that allotted to industry (in percentages of total fixed investment):*

	Agriculture	Industry
Poland	11.9	45.4
Czechoslovakia	8.0	40.6
Hungary	15.7	41.8
Romania	10.0	53.4
Bulgaria	17.4	40.0

The crucial element in this planning was the expected increases in grain yields, which would have provided the necessary food reserves to carry through other aspects of the economic program. Historically Eastern Europe had been a heavy net exporter of farm produce, particularly of grain. As the years of the big plans wore on these grain exports trickled off and the area became a net importer instead. Industrialization swelled the towns and the requirements of domestic consumption rose, while at the same time the Communist farm policies weakened the incentives of the peasantry. Average crops of wheat and rye in the years 1953-1955 were—for the countries mentioned above—about seven per cent below the prewar average. This enormous shift in the balance of supply and demand imposed a serious strain on foreign trade. In the period from July 1955 to June 1956, Poland alone had to import 1.2 million tons of grain, amounting to roughly 10 percent of the value of its total imports. Hungary, in 1955, imported half a million tons of grain.**

Performance of the agricultural sector in 1953-1955 varied, of course, from country to country and from crop to crop. The production of coarse grain, as distinguished from bread grain, was above the prewar level in Hungary and Czechoslovakia but not in Poland. Potatoes, an important crop in Poland and Czechoslovakia, were substantially below the prewar level. Romania and Bulgaria fared better than the other three Satellites, raising their production of grain above prewar amounts, though their progress was not spectacular by Western standards. Industrial crops, on the other hand (sugar beets, flax, hemp, oilseeds) were produced in generally greater quantities than ever before, a consequence of the Communist policy of expanding the area devoted to these crops even at the expense of reducing the area sown to grain. Livestock breeding presented a mixed picture. The number of pigs and sheep increased considerably, but cattle, requiring larger fodder supplies, did not reach their prewar numbers and were the subject of endless official concern.

The overriding fact was that the efficiency of East European agriculture was still very low. Measured in terms of yield per hectare or output per capita, the general performance was scarcely better than it had been twenty years earlier. Yields of wheat, for example, which are perhaps the best single measure of efficiency in European agriculture, were all below the plan targets and not markedly

*United Nations, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1955* (Geneva, 1956), Table 112, p. 236. The figures apply to the years 1950-1955 for Poland, 1949-1953 for Czechoslovakia, 1950-1954 for Hungary, 1951-1955 for Romania and 1949-1953 for Bulgaria. They cover planned investment as distinguished from actual.

**United Nations, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1956* (Geneva, 1957), Chapter I, p. 17, and *Economic Bulletin for Europe*, Vol. 9, No. 1, p. 86.

Wheat Yields (Quintals per Hectare)

	1934-38	1948	1953-55	1960 Plan
Poland	14.6	11.7	13.4	17.0
Czechoslovakia	17.1	16.1	18.7	19.6
Hungary	14.0	11.6	13.9*	16.0
Romania	10.3	9.4	11.1	—
Bulgaria	12.5	11.6	14.1	15.0
West Germany	22.1	21.5	25.8	
United Kingdom	23.1	26.0	27.9	
Denmark	30.4	36.5	33.0	
Greece	9.0	9.1	11.5	

* 1954-55

Sources: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, *Yearbook of Food and Agricultural Statistics* (Rome), Vol. V, 1951, Vol. IX, 1955, Vol. X, 1956; United Nations, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1956* (Geneva, 1957); *Rocznik Statystyczny 1956* (Warsaw, 1956); *Magyar Statisztikai Zsebkönyv* (Budapest), 1956; *Statistica* (Sofia), No. 1, 1957.

Yields for 1957 reached 18.1 in Poland, 16.4 in Bulgaria.

higher than prewar (Poland's were below the prewar average). In comparison with European agriculture generally, the Satellite countries were still among the most backward.

The "New Course"

During the last half of 1953 Communist spokesmen all over Eastern Europe began to admit that their agricultural policies were inadequate. The death of Stalin in March 1953 brought shifts in policy throughout the Soviet sphere, and one of the most important was a public recognition that something had to be done to raise farm production. Khrushchev's speech to the Soviet Party Central Committee on September 3, 1953, in which he revealed that Soviet livestock production was less than what it had been in 1928, was indicative of the new turn. Some of the Satellite leaders were more outspoken than Khrushchev. Thus Imre Nagy, speaking to Hungary's National Assembly on July 4, 1953, said:

"Agricultural production has been stagnating, and in general in the course of the past few years its pace has been determined by the meager amount of investment, which has been reduced during the past few years compared with other investments; by the lack of support for individual farmers; and finally, by the far too swift development of collective farming, which is justifiable neither economically nor politically and which has made the peasant's work insecure."

Czechoslovakia's Minister of Agriculture reported to his Party Central Committee on December 16, 1953 that agriculture was "lagging considerably:"

"Whereas, during the First Five Year Plan, industrial production increased 100 percent, and machine tool production 250 percent, agricultural production increased only one third, roughly equalling prewar production levels."

And Romania's Gheorghiu-Dej said in a public speech on August 22:

"As a result of the allocation of too much capital investment to heavy industry and certain construction projects,

agriculture—surely one of the principal branches of the national economy—and consumer goods have not been supplied with enough funds, so that agricultural production and the production of consumer goods are lagging behind.”

These statements were not merely national concessions to political expediency but part of an areawide change in policy and the result of sober economic analysis. This was made clear in an article written by Poland's Deputy Premier Stefan Jedrychowski, one of the foremost economic planners (*Nowe Drogi* [Warsaw], November 1953). “It must be stated, he wrote, “that in all the People's Democracies the progress of agriculture has, during recent years, lagged behind industrial development, and as a result various disproportions have been created between the rapid development of industry and the slower development of agricultural production. Thus to increase agricultural production becomes the main task, the main link, in the economic policy of the People's Democracies during the new period of Socialist construction. . . . In Romania, as well as in Czechoslovakia, agricultural production as a whole has not reached the prewar level. . . . In order to increase agricultural production, investment in agriculture is being raised. Thus in Hungary, for example, agricultural investment . . . will be more than doubled next year.” Touching on the food question, Jedrychowski wrote: “The urban population [of Eastern Europe] is growing so rapidly that . . . agricultural production, lagging behind, creates difficulties in supply.”

The agricultural reforms of 1953 included a variety of measures intended to increase production, and were applied in different degree by each of the Satellites. The official utterances in most cases exaggerated the extent of the changes contemplated, since a thoroughgoing attack on the agricultural problem would have meant sacrificing other objects of Communist policy. Moreover, the period of the



“Among the outstanding crops in 1957 were those achieved in potato-growing.” The picture with the accompanying caption appeared in an article entitled “The Co-op Farms Go Steadily Ahead.”

Czechoslovak Life (Prague), February 1958

Principal Crops (million metric tons)

	1934-38	1948	1953-55 average	1956
Wheat and rye				
Poland	8.8	7.9	7.9	8.7
Czechoslovakia	3.1	2.5	2.4	2.6
Hungary	2.9	2.4	2.5	2.2
Romania	2.8	2.5	3.3	2.6
Bulgaria	2.0	1.9	2.1	1.8
Potatoes				
Poland	38.0	26.8	31.4	38.0
Czechoslovakia	9.6	6.6	7.9	8.9
Hungary	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.2
Romania	1.3	.7	2.5	2.7
Bulgaria	.1	.2	.3	—
Sugar Beets				
Poland	6.0	4.2	7.1	6.4
Czechoslovakia	4.7	4.5	5.8	4.5
Hungary	1.0	1.8	2.2	1.8
Romania	.4	.6	1.6	1.5
Bulgaria	.1	.6	.7	1.0

Prewar figures are in terms of postwar boundaries.

Sources: Figures for 1934-38 and 1948 from Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, *Yearbook of Food and Agricultural Statistics*, Vol. V, 1951 (Rome, 1952); figures for 1953-55 and 1956 from United Nations, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1956* (Geneva, 1957), Chapter I, Table 12, and Appendix A, Table XXIV. Figures for Bulgaria in 1948 and 1953-55 from *Statistica* (Sofia), No. 1, January-February 1957. All figures for Romania from *Anuarul Statistic al R. P. R.* 1957 (Bucharest, 1957).

“new course” lasted less than two years—coinciding roughly with Malenkov's premiership in the USSR—and was followed at the end of 1955 by a new program of large-scale industrial expansion and farm collectivization obviously dictated by Moscow. The most pronounced changes of the “new course” period took place in Hungary, where the pressure for collectivization was relaxed to such a degree that almost half the membership of existing collectives left them. At the same time, efforts were made to raise the efficiency of agriculture by channeling more materials and more consumer goods into the countryside and allowing the peasants to sell a greater part of their produce on the free market rather than at the low compulsory State prices. Agricultural investment was also raised, though much more modestly than had been promised.*

In Czechoslovakia collectivization also faltered, and a similar program of readjustment was undertaken. The Minister of Agriculture wrote in *Rude Pravo* on November 18, 1953, that it was the regime's task “to support the production of small and medium farmers in order to increase farm production. . . .” In Poland the concessions to peasants included cancellation of back taxes, premium payments for higher milk deliveries, permission to substitute

*According to the United Nations, *Economic Bulletin for Europe*, Vol. 7 No. 2, p. 88, agricultural investment amounted to 2.5 billion forint in 1954 compared to 2.2 billion in 1952 and 1953—an increase of about 14 percent.

Livestock (million head)

	Prewar	1948	1956	1957
Cattle				
Poland	9.9	5.7	8.4	8.2
Czechoslovakia	4.4	3.7	4.1	—
Hungary	1.9	2.0	2.2	2.0
Bulgaria	1.6	1.9	1.6	1.5
Pigs				
Poland	9.7	4.6	11.6	12.3
Czechoslovakia	3.2	3.2	5.4	—
Hungary	4.7	2.8	6.1	5.0
Bulgaria	1.1	—	1.4	1.5
Sheep				
Poland	1.9	1.4	4.2	4.0
Czechoslovakia	.5	.5	1.0	—
Hungary	1.5	.6	1.9	1.9
Bulgaria	9.9	—	7.8	7.6

Prewar figures are in terms of postwar boundaries. Prewar years vary from 1936 to 1939. Polish livestock censuses are taken in June, Czechoslovak in December, Hungarian in February-March and Bulgarian in January.

Sources: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, *Yearbook of Food and Agricultural Statistics*, Vol. V, 1951 (Rome, 1952); United Nations, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1954* (Geneva, 1955), Table LXII, p. 271; United Nations, *Economic Bulletin for Europe*, Vol. 9, No. 3, p. 14; *Statistické Zprávy* (Prague), No. 1, March 11, 1957.

alternative commodities for grain deliveries and additional credit for small peasants. Romania offered tax reductions, cancellation of delivery arrears and a system of contract purchasing that was designed to encourage higher production of certain crops by offering farmers consumer goods, fertilizer and other supplies for fulfilling the contract.

While the magnitude of the "new course" reforms in agriculture was exaggerated in the propaganda of the time, and some of them—particularly the milder collectivization policies—were abandoned by 1955, a lasting shift did take place in the Communist attitude toward agriculture. It was recognized that this sector of the economy could no longer be starved of capital, manpower and the tools of production without compromising other sectors. In testimony to this, the Tenth Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, held in June 1954 (and attended by Soviet Party chief Khrushchev), gave its main attention to "the considerable lag in the development of agricultural production." Premier Siroky pointed out that the country's croplands had shrunk by more than 500,000 hectares since the war, that farm output was "roughly what it was before the war," and that the low incomes in collective farming had driven badly needed manpower away from the land. The Party Congress approved a three-year program designed to raise crop yields substantially and also to extend the area under cultivation. Basic elements in the program were: more fertilizer, more mechanization, more agricultural experts, more building and a better use of scientific knowledge.

The New Policies

THIS GRUDGING RECOGNITION of the importance of the farm problem made its mark on the new Five Year Plans that began in 1956. While further industrialization still had overwhelming priority, the Plans gave agriculture more realistic attention than it had received previously. The Plans allotted a higher percentage of total investment to agriculture than formerly:*

	1951-55 Actual	1956-60 Plan
Poland	8	12
Czechoslovakia	8	—
Hungary	16	18
Romania	10.5	12.5

At the same time the Plans were more reasonable in their goals for agricultural production. In comparison with the earlier plans, gross output was to increase during the 1956-1960 period as follows (in percentages):**

	Earlier Plan		New Plan (1956-1960)
	Target	Achieved	
Poland	50	19	25
Czechoslovakia ...	37	14	30
Hungary	42	12	27
Romania	88	50	—

Higher yields per hectare were the basis for much of the scheduled growth. Czechoslovakia planned to raise grain yields by 25-30 percent; Hungary by an average of 6 percent, Poland by 17 percent. In corn, potatoes and sugar beets the yields were to rise by 20-30 percent and in some cases even more. The Romanian planners set an astronomical figure of about 60 percent for grain yields, and Czechoslovakia a target of 120 percent for corn yield.

Consonant with this, the Plans stressed a more intensive use of fertilizer. While supplies of artificial fertilizer to the countryside had risen substantially during the years 1949-1955, particularly in Poland and Czechoslovakia, the southeastern countries were only beginning to use it systematically. All of the Satellites planned to increase their fertilizer production, and the area as a whole was to double its production by 1960. East Germany, which is a major fertilizer producer, was to serve as an additional source of supply.

Much was also said about further mechanization. The use of machinery—a cardinal point in Communist farm

* United Nations, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1956* (Geneva, 1957), Chapter II, p. 4, Table 2. The figures cover gross fixed investment by the State in Czechoslovakia and Romania, total gross fixed investment (including private investment) in Hungary, and investment by the State and collective farms in Poland. The Plans were later changed.

**Percentage increases in value of gross agricultural output. The dates of the earlier Plans were: Poland, 1950-1955; Czechoslovakia, 1949-1953; Hungary, 1950-1954; Romania, 1951-1955. Bulgaria's first Five Year Plan ended in four years and its second ran from 1953 to 1957, so no comparison has been made to those of the other countries. The high percentage achieved in Romania (50) probably reflects the very bad harvest of 1950. Sources: United Nations, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1955*, Table 113; *Economic Survey of Europe in 1956*, Table XXI; and *Rocznik Statystyczny 1956* (Warsaw), 1956.

propaganda—is still at an early stage in most Communist countries. If the stock of tractors is taken as a rough measurement of the degree of mechanization (which includes a variety of machines from seed drills to combines), Eastern Europe and the USSR stand far below the level of Western Europe. In 1955 the number of tractors per thousand hectares of agricultural land was as follows (in terms of 15 horsepower units): Poland, 3; Czechoslovakia, 5.5; Romania, 2.5; USSR, 6; Italy, 14.5; West Germany, 43. The East European tractor stock increased during the period 1950-1955 at a rate corresponding to that in Western Europe, though in smaller absolute numbers. While further increases were planned for the period 1956-1960, the expansion was limited by the relatively low capacity of the Satellite machine industries. Poland's Five Year Plan called for doubling the stock of tractors by 1960. Hungary's Plan implied a somewhat more rapid increase, while much slower increases were planned in Czechoslovakia and Romania.*

*Tractor data from United Nations, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1956*, Chapter II, Table 7. A Czechoslovak publication gave the total number of tractors in 1955 by country as follows (in 15 horsepower units): Poland, 56,000; Czechoslovakia, 40,000; Hungary, 11,600; Romania, 30,000; Bulgaria, 18,300; Albania, 217 (*Za Socialistické Zemedelstvi*, November 1956).

Revolution and Reform

THE NEW PLANS had scarcely gone into effect when all of Eastern Europe was shaken by the events of October 1956. The Hungarian fighting and the quiet revolution in Poland were visible proof that Soviet policies could not hope to succeed in the Satellites unless heavily modified to fit local conditions. In particular, the Communist Parties were not strong enough to continue the forced industrialization of previous years, which had required heavy capital accumulation to the detriment of living standards. In the fall of 1956 all the Satellite regimes took hasty action to raise consumption even at the expense of large cuts in their investment programs. Significant concessions were made to the peasants. In Poland and Hungary, where the political weight of the countryside was felt most strongly, the new regimes abandoned any immediate effort to collectivize farming after a third of the collectives in Hungary and most of those in Poland had been dissolved. Throughout the area the heavy tax burden that had been laid on the peasantry was reduced by giving the peasants more money for the products they sent to market and more goods to buy with the money. This was a continuation, on a larger scale, of policies begun during the "new course" era several years



"Three live wires of village bees", in Romania.

Rumania Today (Bucharest), February 1957

earlier. The consequences of October were to be seen in the national budgets for the following year, and in the subsequent revisions of economic plans.

Poland: Peasants Ahead

The most dramatic changes in the status of the peasant occurred in Poland, where the Gomulka regime looked to the countryside for much of its support. A formal statement issued by the Communists jointly with the United Peasant Party declared:

"The State must support the peasant masses and the small and middle peasants, first of all by insuring the profitability of production, by supplying the means of production, by credit policy, and by furthering contracts. It is also necessary to remove those restrictions hampering the development of production on the larger peasant farms." (*Trybuna Ludu*, January 8, 1957.)

The once-revised Five Year Plan was revised a second time. Total investment for the period 1956-1960 was cut from 318 billion *zloty* to 301.8 billion (originally it had been set at more than 331 billion) and the proportion of total investment allotted to agriculture was raised from 11.7 percent to 18.5 percent—as compared with 7.8 percent in 1951-1955 (*Trybuna Ludu*, July 13, 1957, and August 3, 1956).

Poland was now free to develop its agriculture on the basis of peasant initiative and State aid, unencumbered by the traditional Marxist bias against the countryside. In July 1957 the Sejm passed a bill drastically overhauling the compulsory delivery system. The effect of the measure—according to a government spokesman (*Trybuna Ludu*, July 15)—was to free about 30 percent of all farms from compulsory deliveries of grain, potatoes and livestock, and to reduce the quotas on grain and potatoes for 75 percent of the remaining farms. Since compulsory deliveries of milk had been abolished at the beginning of the year, this meant that 730,000 of Poland's 2,630,000 independent farmers were no longer subject to compulsory deliveries of any kind. Moreover, quotas for about three-quarters of the remaining farms were reduced, the reductions being larger for the bigger farms that had suffered under the "anti-kulak" policy. The law also permitted farmers to substitute other grains for wheat in their deliveries. At the same time, prices for compulsory grain deliveries were doubled, and prices for potato deliveries raised by nearly a third.

The effect of the price and quota changes was to raise cash income in the countryside by 9.6 billion *zloty*, or to a level 23 percent above that of 1956, according to the Central Statistical Office (*Trybuna Ludu*, February 15, 1958). Official sources charged that the higher incomes were partially obtained by evading deliveries to the State in favor of the free market. The plan for State deliveries was said to have been fulfilled by only 76 percent, whereas free market sales—at higher prices—were 35 percent above the level of the previous year. Half of the new income was absorbed in higher prices for the goods farmers had to buy, including fodder, building materials, artificial fertilizers and farm machinery. But supplies of these and other goods were greatly increased over previous years. Minister of Agricul-



Polish propaganda during the Stalinist era tended to claim big percentage increases in grain harvests (left strip) while ignoring the simultaneous increases in grain imports (right strip). Faced with the radical reforms of the Gomulka regime the clerk in the State Planning Commission grumbles (bottom): "Why this new program for agriculture, when everything was going so nicely?"

Szpilki (Warsaw), April 21, 1957

ture Edward Ochab told the Sejm agricultural committee on January 13 that the cooperative stores had more fertilizer in stock in the fall of 1957 than they were able to sell (*Trybuna Ludu*, January 14), a fact which suggests that the peasants preferred to buy other things. Deliveries of building materials to the countryside rose in 1957 by the following percentages: cement, 68.9; lime, 12.3; tiles, 2.2; roofing paper, 58.6; window glass, 24.8; asbestos cement, 26.2; lumber 28.9 (*Trybuna Ludu*, February 15).

In order to supply more machinery for the peasants, the government shifted the emphasis of the tractor industry

from large machines designed for collective farming to smaller machines and tools suitable for private farming. This changeover resulted in a large drop in tractor production in 1957. At the same time the county machine stations (GOMs) were liquidated and their machinery sold to the peasants, while the Machine Tractor Stations (POMs), which had formerly been the State's mechanism for controlling collective farms, were deprived of their administrative functions. According to the Minister of Agriculture (see above), the number of POMs was reduced from 425 to 375, and their administrative personnel cut from nearly 17,000 to less than 7,000, while at the same time their facilities for repairing machinery were greatly expanded. State subsidies to the POMs fell from 943 million *zloty* in 1956 to 277 million in 1957, and will amount to only 40 million in 1958.

The supply of credit to private farmers was greatly increased. Total long-term loans in 1957 exceeded 1.3 billion *zloty*—a 40 percent increase—and 1.2 billion of the total went to private farmers—an increase of 123 percent. Short-term loans totalled 1,153 million *zloty* or 4 percent more than in 1956, but short-term loans to private farmers amounted to 997 million *zloty*, or 67 percent more than in 1956.

The harvest in 1957—a good year generally in Eastern Europe—was reported to be Poland's best since the war. Total agricultural production was about four percent higher than the year before. The production of wheat, rye, barley and oats totalled 13.6 million tons, 12.5 percent higher than 1956 and 20 percent above the average for 1950-1955 (*Trybuna Ludu*, February 15).

Hungary: "Equal Support"

While the gains of the peasantry were not as decisive in Hungary as in Poland, the Kadar regime was forced to make two important concessions: an armistice on the collectivization front, and a substantial increase in the prices of farm products. The compulsory delivery system was abolished *in toto* by the transitory government of Imre Nagy during the Revolt (decree-law No. 21 of 1956, effective October 25, 1956) and the present regime has made no effort to revive it. Instead it has relied on State purchasing at prices several times higher than those formerly paid for compulsory delivery quotas. According to the Minister

of Agriculture (*Nepszabadsag*, June 26, 1957), average prices for basic crops in 1957 were 37 percent higher than the average return under the old system (which included free market sales and State purchases as well as quota deliveries). The higher prices have been greatly offset, however, by the reimposition of a land tax paid in wheat or some other grain, by a rise in farmers' income tax rates and by higher prices for things the peasants buy. The real increase in peasant income in 1957 was estimated at 8-10 percent by the Central Statistical Office (*Magyar Nemzet*, February 2, 1958).

This report added significantly that the peasants had "increased the consumption of their own products"—a windfall that could not be measured in terms of prices. Thus the official figure probably underestimates the improvement in the peasants' general situation. Recent reports from Hungary describe resentment among the urban workers at what they consider to be unjustified gains by the peasantry. (Average real wages of workers were said by the Central Statistical Office to have risen 14-16 percent.) An article in the Party newspaper *Nepszabadsag* on February 13, 1958, entitled "With the Eyes of a Worker," reported that workers at the Red Star Tractor Factory in Budapest were convinced that the peasants lived better than they did, and implied that many workers felt that the peasants had profited at their expense. The article concluded:

"There is a certain clash of interests between workers and peasants; the workers would like to buy more cheaply, and the peasants would like to get maximum prices. Most important, however, is the fact that the great majority of the working class is satisfied with, approves of, and supports the peasant policy.

"We profit not only financially but morally from the fact that the peasants live better [than before]. Workers and peasants are brothers, and those who spread the rumor that we complain about the peasants' advantages are fanning the flames of discontent among us."

But the regime's effort to ingratiate itself with the independent peasants—who now hold about 78 percent of the arable land—runs counter to its oft-repeated Marxist preconceptions on the land question. In his speech to the National Assembly on January 27, 1958, First Party Secretary Kadar went so far as to pledge "equal support to collective farms and to individual farmers," arguing that this policy had already won "both the [collective farm] peasantry and individual farmers" to support of the regime. At the same time, however, he entered a strong plea for large-scale collective farming as the best way to increase Hungary's agricultural production.

"There are many reasons," he continued, "for urging large-scale farming in agriculture. Let us examine just one problem. If we want to set the . . . economy firmly on its feet, we will have to increase the country's exports. However, the exports cannot always consist solely of industrial products. In 1939, for instance, Hungary exported 430,000 tons of wheat. In contrast, last year we had to import wheat . . . The comparatively high exports of the past in agricultural products have ceased mainly because the consumption of the population, and the consumption of the villagers, has increased to a considerably greater extent than

Consumption of Artificial Fertilizer

(Kilograms of plant nutrient per hectare of arable land)

	1949/50	1955	1960 Plan
Poland	17.5	35	63
East Germany	125	154	200
Czechoslovakia	25.5	64	95
Hungary	4	10	35
Romania	—	2.5	6.3

Source: United Nations, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1956* (Geneva, 1957), Chapter II, Table 6. Figures in first column for Poland and Czechoslovakia are for 1948/1949, and in second column for Poland and East Germany, 1954/55.

the crop yields We must increase the agricultural exports of the country, but this must be done not by reducing the portions allotted to the workers and peasants but by accelerating the building of a large-scale Socialist farming system, and by producing more and better crops more economically through the application of modern methods."

He did not examine his categories to see whether he had omitted a third possibility: that of mechanized private farming on a larger scale than the 15 hectares (about 37 acres) now considered acceptable in Eastern Europe. Instead he bridged the contradiction between policy and practice by calling for "patient leadership, based on persuasion," to guide the peasant to an ultimate acceptance of collective farming.

An important element in the "persuasion" will be a renewal of the old effort to make collective farms look appealing to the peasants. The economic plan for 1958, following upon the abnormal year of 1957, calls for a resumption of State aid for the collective farms (which now embrace about 11 percent of the arable area). Investment in agriculture will be 40 percent greater than in 1957, a return to the general proportion of previous years, but most of the increase will be lavished on the "Socialist sector." Arpad Kiss, president of the National Planning Office, told the National Assembly on January 28 that the chief object of the investment program in agriculture is "to insure a better life for [collective farm members] so that the working peasantry can convince itself on the basis of the achievements and the higher level of agriculture of the correctness of the road to collectivization." The government is even permitting the collectives to have tractors, a reversal of the previous policy which restricted their ownership to the machine tractor stations. Not long after Khrushchev announced his new policy on farm machinery in the Soviet Union, the Budapest regime revealed that Hungarian collectives had acquired more than 1,000 tractors during 1957 (*Magyar Nemzet*, February 2).

Czechoslovakia: No Compromise

While the USSR and other Satellites were making greater or lesser concessions to the countryside, the Prague Communists busied themselves with collectivizing agriculture and gave no quarter to the peasantry. Early in November 1956, when revolution was in process both to north and to south, the Party organ *Rude Pravo* declared that "by the end of October, 67,000 tons more meat, 171 million liters more milk and 77,476 more eggs were delivered [by farmers to the State] than during the same period last year. And that constitutes a clear answer from our villages to events in Hungary and Egypt." There was no lightening of delivery quotas in 1957, and in June of that year the government announced that quotas in 1958 would be raised. Compulsory wheat deliveries in 1958 were to rise by almost five percent and potato deliveries by nearly four percent. At a time when Soviet collective farmers were being freed of compulsory deliveries from their private plots, the Czechoslovak decree exempted them only from deliveries of beef and at the same time raised the egg deliveries of private plots from 100 to 170 and their milk deliveries

from 250 liters per cow to 300. Hardest hit were the small private farmers. Those with less than half a hectare had to deliver 220 eggs and an increased quantity of milk. Those with one-half to two hectares were faced with average increases of 13 kilograms of beef per hectare, 9 kilograms of pork and 11 eggs, and 50-150 liters of milk per cow (*Zemedske Noviny*, July 4, 1957).

The press defended these increases on the ground that farmers' incomes were rising too rapidly. "While in the last three years the production of 14 main [agricultural] products increased 19.8 percent, the proceeds of farmers' sales increased 43.2 percent If the living standard of workers in industry is expected to rise by about 30 percent [during the Five Year Plan] it is necessary that this rate be also maintained in agriculture."*

One concession was granted to private and collective farms by permitting them to have, for the first time, small machines of their own. In January 1957 a Ministry of Agriculture decree gave permission for the purchase of small farm machinery, including gasoline motors up to six hp, pulling equipment, diesel motors and electric motors up to ten hp (*Zemedske Noviny* [Prague], January 24, 1957). Previously the only source of this machinery had

**Zemedske Noviny*, July 4, 1957. However, the 30 percent increase in real wages for industrial workers scheduled by the plan was reduced to 20 percent in the fall of 1957, when the Five Year Plan was revised. See *East Europe*, November 1957, pp. 48-49, and February 1958, p. 50.



"These housewives are resting before the 8-kilometer walk to Stepowo. If the county cooperative were better stocked with supplies, they wouldn't have to carry these heavy loads of salt, bread and groats all the way from Rybin."

Text and picture from *Dziennik Ludowy* (Warsaw), August 30, 1957

been the MTS. It emphasized that the MTS would continue to have a monopoly on the larger machines, and stuck to this policy in the face of sentiment among the collectivized peasants for abolishing the MTS and distributing all their machines to the collective farms (see *Lud* [Bratislava], March 14, 1957). When Nikita Khrushchev proposed in January 1958 to abandon the Soviet MTS and sell their equipment to the collectives, the Czechoslovak press devoted long articles to explaining why the new policy would not be feasible in Czechoslovakia. In the USSR, went the explanation, collective farms were much larger and it was no longer economical to maintain separate centers for machinery. In Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, one tractor station serviced a number of collective farms as well as independent farms. *Rude Pravo* argued on January 30:

"Under present conditions there are only a very few collective farms which, because of their size and their organizational capabilities, could make full use of [heavy machinery] What should we say in conclusion? That what has already matured in the Soviet Union is only beginning to bloom in our country. Perhaps this simile will best explain what is happening in the Soviet Union and what we are doing in our own country."

Faced with a basic contradiction between its policy of collectivizing agriculture and its stated aim of raising farm production by 30 percent during the Five Year Plan, the Czechoslovak regime has preferred to sacrifice the latter. Output in 1956 and 1957 was so disappointing as to threaten the success of the whole plan. According to official reports, the total volume of agricultural production increased by only 3.4 percent in 1956 and showed no increase in 1957. Moreover, crop production declined by 1 percent in 1956 and 4 percent in 1957, leaving it to livestock and dairy production to balance the total. (*Rude Pravo*, February 12, 1957, and *Zemedske Noviny*, February 7, 1958.) Premier Viliam Siroky told Party workers in Slovakia on December 28 that failure to attain the goals of the Five Year Plan in agriculture would lead to failure "in other sectors of our national economy, especially in industry where we would be unable to achieve an adequate increase in the production of consumer goods and thus insure the fulfillment of our task of raising the living standards of the population." To make up the difference between planning and achievement in the past two years, the Party leadership has committed itself to bigger harvests in the remaining three years of the Plan.

The plan for 1958 (*Rude Pravo*, February 9) calls for an 11.9 percent increase in gross farm production, or a larger increment than was achieved in any past year. (In 1955, an unusually good year, gross output was said to have been 11.5 percent above the previous year.) Wheat yields are to rise by 8.7 percent and potato yields by 13.6 percent but the regime has given no reason why it expects these increases to be attained. While it places some hope in greater fertilizer supplies (14 percent), more mechanization (27 percent) and more capital investment for the collective farms (25), it apparently intends to rely in the coming year on the timeworn instruments of propaganda and exhortation. As Premier Siroky said in the speech mentioned above: "The reasons for the slowing down of



Bulgarian chairman of a collective and worker checking tobacco leaves.

Bulgaria (Sofia), No. 11, 1957

the expansion of agricultural production must be sought in our own ranks. Once all of us, and in particular all Communist Party members, are fully determined to surmount all difficulties, there can be no doubt, comrades, that we shall successfully master our tasks."

Romania: Incentives to Produce

In December 1956 the Romanian leadership announced sweeping revisions in its economic planning. The chief object was a rapid increase in living standards, which the Central Committee admitted to be unsatisfactory. Basic in the reforms were measures to overcome the stagnation in agricultural output. First Party Secretary Gheorghiu-Dej told his Central Committee on December 27 that the agricultural lag "creates difficulties in the development of the other branches of the national economy and is an obstacle to the constant improvement of the people's living standards."

The most important reform in agriculture was the elimination of compulsory deliveries for grain, potatoes, hay, and cow and sheep milk (see *East Europe*, February 1957, pp. 50-52). These were to be replaced by State procurement on a contract basis which would offer the peasants increased supplies of industrial goods in exchange for their



Czechoslovak "harvester-thresher" ZM-330, fitted with threshing drum. The "working width" is given as 11 ft.

Czechoslovak Life (Prague), February 1957

crops. The Party leaders stated that their intention was to raise the peasants' incentive to produce, and also to improve the technical level in agriculture.

While the peasant was offered a higher income along with the rest of the working population, the reforms were financed at the expense of investment both in agriculture and industry. Agricultural investment in 1957 was scheduled at 1.4 billion *lei* as compared with the 1.6 billion spent the previous year. The Central Committee reaffirmed the Five Year Plan targets for 1960 in agricultural production, apparently assuming that higher peasant incomes from the abolition of compulsory deliveries would furnish most of the necessary steam. It did not abandon the goal of further collectivization (by 1960 the "Socialist sector" was to supply 60-70 percent of the marketed produce) and the only concrete addition to its agricultural program was a plan to triple the output of farm machinery in 1957.

Bulgaria's Unique Course

THOUGH FARTHEST-REMOVED from the upheavals in Poland and Hungary, the Bulgarian regime was not slow to recognize their implications. It acted, through a series of well-publicized measures, to raise living standards of peasants as well as urban workers. A decree published on November 27, 1956, raised pensions for collective farmers from the rather nominal level of 20 *leva* per month to a range of 60-150 *leva* monthly beginning in 1957. (See *East Europe*, January 1957, p. 49.) The yearly pension now runs from 720 to 1,800 *leva*, and may be compared with annual earnings averaging 2,666 *leva* for collective farmers in 1955 (not including private income).

Early in December 1956 another decree amended the system of State deliveries, but in a much less radical manner than the similar changes in Poland, Hungary and Romania. It abolished compulsory deliveries of grapes, apples, plums, potatoes, oats, hay and the milk of cows, buffaloes and goats and transferred these items to the system of con-

tract purchasing. Certain localities, particularly mountainous ones, were released from compulsory deliveries of grain. Other compulsory deliveries were to be revised in accordance with local conditions of climate, soil and density of population, but without reducing their total size for a given area. Wool delivery quotas, which had previously discriminated against farms with large numbers of sheep, were to be rescaled in order to encourage bigger flocks. The decree did not bring any substantial reduction in the economic burden of the peasantry—indeed, it continued the discriminatory system of higher delivery quotas for independent peasants than for collective farms—and its main purpose was evidently to rectify certain inequitable and inefficient practices.*

The response of the Bulgarian Communists to the crisis of 1956 remained entirely within the ideological framework of Stalinism. The attempt to raise living standards—common throughout the area—required a sweeping revision in the economic plan for 1957, but there was no shift of resources into agriculture. Total investment in the 1957 plan was reduced by 34 percent in comparison with the 1956 plan, but agricultural investment fell by 58 percent (*Rabotnichesko Delo*, December 28 and 30, 1956), and did not increase substantially in 1958 (*Rabotnichesko Delo*, December 12, 1957). In contrast to the First and Second Five Year Plans, which allotted agriculture 17 percent of anticipated investment, the countryside now receives only 10-11 percent.

More Grapes for Moscow

Bulgaria is in several ways an exception to the pattern prevailing elsewhere in the area. Since 1878, when it won independence from Turkey, until recent years, it had been a land of small peasants farming on scattered holdings. Bulgaria did not become a battleground in World War II, nor suffer the postwar disturbance of land reform and population shifts. Being still a predominantly agricultural country, it has avoided the sharp swings in economic policy that occurred elsewhere in the area—the industrial gigantomania of the early 1950's and the hasty retrenchment of the "new course" period. At the same time it has been the only country in the Soviet orbit to collectivize practically all of its arable land. However, until last year the regime's agricultural policies were very similar to those of the other Satellites, and its progress in raising total production above the prewar level was equally small.

During the interwar period Bulgaria was a heavy exporter of fruit, vegetables and tobacco, adjusting its farm economy both to the foreign market and to its own natural advantages. In 1938 tobacco accounted for two fifths of the country's total export trade, and fruits and vegetables for another fifth. The bulk of these exports in 1938 went to Germany. Since the war the export target has shifted to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and the regime

* In March 1958 pigs, lambs, kids and wool were released from compulsory deliveries. Prices were raised for these and for some of the products still subject to compulsory deliveries. See *East Europe*, May 1958, p. 47. The purpose was said to be to encourage greater production.

has tried to increase its exports of these products, though with questionable success. Exports of oriental tobacco in the period 1950-1954 were 39 percent higher than in 1935-1939, but in order to achieve this the regime had been forced to more than double the growing area while average yields per hectare fell by more than 30 percent. The production of fruits and vegetables has stagnated under the Communists. Before the war Bulgaria was Europe's leading grape exporter, but grape exports fell from 57 thousand tons in 1938 to 35 thousand in 1955. Total production in 1953-1955 was still at the prewar level, despite efforts to increase the number of vineyards.

An attempt is now being made to shift Bulgarian agriculture to a greater concentration on fruits and vegetables for export. In April 1957 a conference on "specialization in agriculture" was held in Sofia, attended by high officials from the USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and East Germany. The chief subject was a proposal that Bulgaria increase its exports of grapes and other fruits and vegetables to the three cooperating countries. The USSR would guarantee Bulgaria supplies of wheat and cotton in exchange. The proposed agreement would run until 1970 (*Rabotnichesko Delo*, April 30, 1957). The project originated at an agricultural conference in Moscow in August 1956 (*Trud* [Sofia], March 15, 1957), and had been further discussed in the course of Bulgarian-Soviet talks in Moscow in February 1957. Premier Anton Yugov told the National Assembly on March 11, 1957, that the expansion in fruit and vegetable growing would be largely in hilly areas unsuited for grain or cotton, but that some reduction would be

made nevertheless in the area devoted to the latter. In this he was probably rationalizing a widespread tendency among the peasants to plant fruit and vegetables on land that the regime has tried to reserve for grain production—a tendency that is bound to increase as the new program gains headway.

The shift of emphasis is also designed to meet some of Bulgaria's current economic problems, particularly that of unemployment. Minister of Agriculture Stanko Todorov wrote candidly on the topic in *Za Kooperativno Zemedelie* December 23, 1956:

"Before the war, all our economists spoke of hidden unemployment. This problem really existed for the rural population. After the collectivization and mechanization of our agriculture, unemployment increased even more. There were many opinions as to the solution of the problem. Some people thought it could be solved by stopping any further mechanization. But that is not advisable in our circumstances. It would mean a poor livelihood for the peasants because it would decrease our competitiveness on foreign markets. . . . The solution is to intensify our agriculture and to develop crops which will bring greater income per unit area, and will occupy the labor of more people."

An article in the English-language propaganda organ *Bulgaria Today*, May 1957, entitled "New Trends in Agriculture," said that the program is designed to make Bulgarian agriculture more profitable. "In Bulgaria there are an average of 1.55 acres of arable land per head of the population—an area insufficient to meet the nation's economic needs except under more intensive cultivation."

In the village of Chiraftei (Galați region) a collective farm has been created; tractors are ploughing up the boundaries between holdings



This villager of Băleni, Gheorghe Grecu, has just been appointed to the auditing commission of the new collective farm there



Photos and captions from the English-language publication *Rumania Today* (Bucharest), No. 9, 1957.

"... As a first step, from 8 to 10 million saplings are to be planted and the total area of orchards is to be extended to at least 375,000 acres. In other words, in 7 or 8 years our country will obtain over a million tons of fruit annually, or a quantity over five times as large as that of 1955.

"... The total area of vineyards is to rise from 362,500 acres in 1956 to 625,000 in 1965, and is to be considerably further increased by 1970.

"... By 1965 at the latest, our hot-houses are to reach an area of 875 acres, with an output of 35,000 tons of early tomatoes, cucumbers and other vegetables. The hot-bed area is to reach 1,500 acres by 1960. The Black Sea coast, the banks of the Danube and the valleys of South-Eastern Bulgaria where there is no frost until late in the autumn, also offer excellent conditions for market gardening. The aim is to create an uninterrupted cycle of vegetable production: in November, December and January—hot-house production; in March, April and May—hot-bed production; in June, July and August—production in the open throughout the country; and in September and October—late production in the open. . . . This would mean an uninterrupted export of vegetables on the international market."

The Lure of the Free Market

Having collectivized virtually all of Bulgaria's farms, the regime is now faced with the problem of governing the collectives. At the Fifth National Conference of Collective Farms in December 1957, both Premier Yugov and First Secretary Zhivkov admitted that the collectives were openly violating their contracts for delivery of fruit, vegetables and dairy products. Rather than sell to the State, the farms took their produce to the free markets where they could get a better price, apparently undeterred by official reminders that they were breaking the law. Todor Zhivkov complained: "Despite the fact that they were under contractual obligation to sell part of their crops to the State purchasing organizations, some collective farm leaders . . . sold a large part of them on the free market before fulfilling their obligations to the State. These people think of their contractual obligations only when it suits them—only when free market prices are low."

This indifference to the State's requirements was the subject of an editorial in *Otechestven Front* (Sofia) on January 15, 1958 pointing out that new contracts for spring deliveries should have been concluded by October 1, 1957. But in the region of Plovdiv only portions of the spring crops had been contracted for, in open defiance of the law.

"In their search for profits, some collective farms are now preparing to plunge into free enterprise. They ignore the golden rule that real, rich and sound remuneration for the work of the collective farm members will be attained only by achieving high permanent yields, by reducing production costs and by strict economy—not by violating State regulations, not through the play of supply and demand. . . .

"The collective farm in the town of Pazardjik has provided in its plan for the production of 2,000 tons of apples,

and it certainly will produce them; but it has made contracts with the [State purchasing organ] in Pazardjik for only 400 tons, and with the Maritsa canning factory for only 200 tons. . . . It is evident that the managers of this collective farm intend to sell at least 1,400 tons of apples on the free market, while at the same time expecting the State to supply them with trucks, farm machinery, fertilizers and insecticides."

The newspaper concluded rather plaintively that last year's "difficulties" must not be repeated this year. It pointed out that "there is a special Decision of the Council of Ministers and the Party Central Committee; there are regulations, orders and so forth. The task is to observe them carefully." But the tone of the editorial, like that of other recent pronouncements on the subject, suggested that the regime did not feel prepared to enforce its regulations.

The Shape of Things

ONE OF THE CONTRADICTIONS of East European Communism is its effort to apply Marxism to countries that have not yet passed through an industrial revolution. Like their Soviet and Chinese colleagues, the Satellite Communists proclaimed themselves allies of the peasant in his struggle against the landholder. The combination of Soviet strategy and peasant land hunger brought an agrarian revolution in Eastern Europe after the war. But once in power the Communists followed the pattern established by Stalin and called on the peasants to give up their private way of life and establish collective farms under the tutelage of the State. While still calling themselves allies of the peasants, the Communists adopted policies harshly inimical to the peasant: grandiose industrial schemes financed at the peasant's expense, compulsory deliveries of farm produce, State planning in the agricultural sector, discrimination against "kulaks," and a doctrinaire Marxist approach to all the technical problems of agriculture.

These Stalinist solutions have not worked in the small countries of Eastern Europe, whose economies are more dependent on the external world than the relatively self-sufficient economy of the Soviet Union, and whose populations have no loyalty to their Communist masters. Since 1953 the failure of the Communist formula has become increasingly obvious, and since October 1956 the political weight of the peasant has been manifested again and again. In Poland and Hungary the independent peasant proprietors are more numerous today than ever before, and Gomułka and Kadar have been forced to assure them the support of the State. In Bulgaria, where about 90 percent of the rural population has been incorporated into collective farms, there are indications that the collectives may prove more difficult to manage than were the peasants individually. Except for the industrialized Czech lands, the peasant is still the most representative "worker" in Eastern Europe and far outnumbers the urban proletariat.

Current Developments

Area

Communists Close Ranks

In the wake of Nikita Khrushchev's consolidation of power, of the Soviet propaganda coup in unilaterally suspending (for the time being) nuclear weapon tests and of the West German Bundestag's decision to accept NATO rocket bases and nuclear weapons, the East European countries drew together to form—outwardly at least—their most solid bloc since the death of Stalin. This latest attempt at unity was demonstrated in the following ways: An apparent relaxation of the areawide ideological feud; complete and explicit support, even by the more "nationalist" States, for Soviet foreign policy maneuvers; fuller inter-area coordination, exemplified by planned or accomplished face-to-face meetings between Polish and Yugoslav Party chiefs Gomulka and Tito and the Hungarian puppet leader, Janos Kadar; Khrushchev's extended visit to Hungary; acceleration of Poland's return to domestic orthodoxy, as shown in Gomulka's April 14 announcement of the withdrawal of the legal right to strike and the significant weakening of the workers' councils; greatly increased areawide propagandizing for a summit conference, as well as for increased trade, between East and West; a continuation of intensive efforts in behalf of the Rapacki Plan for a denuclearized zone in Central Europe.

Response to West German "Threat"

The specter of West German re-emergence as a major military power—distant and speculative as such a "threat" is at the present time—was pictured by the regime leaders as having had a galvanizing effect on their States. In a specially-convoked meeting to discuss the "emergency," Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Vaclav David was joined in Prague by his counterparts from East Germany and Poland (Lothar Bolz and Marian Naszkowski, the latter acting for Adam Rapacki who was ill), and the three officials issued a communique, April 12, expressing their "unanimous and full agreement" with the Soviet position (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], April 13). Although the communique spoke of "renewed West German militarism and imperialism," it was milder than might have been expected and contained no threats of counter measures. This was probably due to Polish reticence; the Poles have made it clear that they do not welcome the prospect of nuclear bases (which undoubtedly would be manned by increased Soviet units) on their own territory. They have therefore sought to avert drastic solutions through what they regard as a compromise solution, the Rapacki Plan. The other two countries endorsed the



Khrushchev arriving in Budapest. Behind him, right to left, are F. R. Kozlov, Soviet Politburo member newly promoted to Soviet First Deputy Premier, Andrei Gromyko, Soviet Foreign Minister, and Hungarian Party boss Janos Kadar.

Photo from *Esti Hirlap* (Budapest), April 3, 1958

Plan as the most appropriate answer to the difficulties in the area.

In spite of their disinclination to accept nuclear installations, the Poles nevertheless hinted that they would do so, if the West Germans went through with their rearmament plans. A Foreign Ministry spokesman was quoted in *Trybuna Ludu*, March 20, as saying that "Poland will take the necessary steps to assure its own security, if the West German Army is supplied with nuclear weapons." Six days later the same newspaper was repeating the "well-documented" Polish fears of German "militarism" and was also calling the Bundestag decision "an attempt to jeopardize the Rapacki proposals."

Indeed the Polish and Czechoslovak press repeated the Rapacki Plan as a theme in their discussions of almost all elements of the international situation, and the Soviet decision to halt nuclear tests was contrasted with West German efforts to equip their forces with nuclear weapons. On April 1, for example, *Zycie Warszawy* compared the "Bundestag anti-peace decision" with the "Soviet initiative toward a correct road to an international *detente*." The Polish stand on the US refusal to halt tests was, however, comparatively moderate. On April 3 *Dziennik Ludowy* (Warsaw) hoped that public opinion would influence the Administration "which has thus far shown little initiative . . . to stop the mad search for ever more destructive weapons."

Poles Support Kadar

On April 4 the Polish regime appeared to end its equivocal position on the Hungarian puppet government. The official Party newspaper, *Trybuna Ludu*, hailing the 13th anniversary of the liberation of Hungary from Nazi control, used the occasion to make a stock orthodox summary of the 1956 Revolt, approving the Soviet intervention and the subsequent formation of the Kadar regime. This was by far

the most wholehearted endorsement of Soviet policy in Hungary which has appeared in the official Polish press. Excerpts from the article follow:

"During the events of October 1956, reactionary and counterrevolutionary forces tried to force their way into power through the wedge which had been prepared for them by the revisionist advocates of 'integral' democracy. . . . The entry of the Soviet armed forces effectively frustrated the calculations of the internal and international reactionary forces. The people's power was saved and the plans of imperialism were defeated. In these conditions the formation of a revolutionary worker-peasant government by Janos Kadar was the only correct decision, a decision which saved Hungary from national catastrophe."

Czechoslovak Initiative

Among the propaganda offensives against West German rearmament was a denunciation of NATO plans for the Bonn Government by Czechoslovakia (*Rude Pravo*, April 2). This took the form of a memorandum delivered to East and West diplomatic representatives in Prague, condemning the move. Support for this memorandum came from all the Communist States, including Yugoslavia. Radio Belgrade quoted a spokesman for the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry to that effect on April 4 and added a plea—by the official—for "general suspension of nuclear tests."

The Czechoslovaks also plumped for a summit conference at which they would be represented (*Rude Pravo*, March 13). Two days previously Radio Prague had denounced the US proposal for discussion of the fate of the Satellite States at such a conference. The juxtaposition of the two messages may have showed the regime's fear that its fate might (despite Soviet participation) be settled to its own detriment. The broadcast stated that in 1938 Czechoslovakia had been "dealt to Hitler" in a discussion "about us, but without us."

Ideological Feud Under Control?

The heated polemics between orthodox States on the one hand, and Poland on the other, have been noticeably muted in recent weeks, probably in line with the areawide reconsolidation of unity under the personal leadership of Soviet Party boss Khrushchev. (For previous details of the blasts and counterblasts, see *East Europe*, March 1958, pages 29-31; April, pages 35-37.) Nevertheless the press continued to publish some evidence not only of the ferment still manifested by non-compliant revisionist writers, but also of the uneasiness with which the orthodox regimes regard this ferment. Stalinist fears that Polish "liberalization" might penetrate the rest of the area were revealed in the rather unconvincing attempts of two members of a Czechoslovak parliamentary delegation visiting Poland to gloss over the differences between the two countries. An interview with the two visitors was summarized over Radio Warsaw on March 14:

"The Czechoslovak Deputy Speaker stressed his admiration for the Polish Deputies' discussions, both in committees and in the Parliament sessions. He was struck by the

"The Fate of Eastern Europe"

by Nikita Khrushchev; First Secretary, Soviet Communist Party, Premier, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

"WE ARE TOLD that it is necessary to discuss the situation of the countries of eastern Europe. But what is there to discuss, and who has given anyone the right to discuss the internal development of other countries? The peoples of eastern Europe have already settled this matter. They are masters in their own house and will not allow anyone to interfere in their domestic affairs."

—From a speech in Budapest, Hungary, April 4 (Hungarian "Liberation" Day), reported by *Tass* (Moscow), April 4.

frankness and interest of these discussions. . . . They were much livelier, he said, and much wider in scope than those in Czechoslovakia."

However, the delegation leader, National Assembly Chairman Zdenek Fierlinger, spoke in different tones. The same broadcast quoted Fierlinger in the following implacable statement of the orthodox point of view:

"After the 20th Congress [of the Soviet Party, February 1956] there were people in the USSR, in Poland, as well as in Czechoslovakia, who did not understand the changes which had taken place and who were not familiar with the new situation. They often voiced criticism which was aimed in an incorrect direction. We, however, never feared criticism and are always ready to take up a discussion.

"Misunderstandings, which found their expression in some articles in the Czechoslovak and Polish press, have been definitely clarified. Any reader may convince himself of that. However, if 'hot-headed' journalists or writers are found who undertake an incorrect campaign, we are not going to make a tragedy out of this."

In the other orthodox countries, the attacks on revisionist Polish writers became veiled and imprecise; in fact, neither individuals nor the country itself was usually singled out. On March 10 *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia), the organ of the Bulgarian Party, contented itself with a condemnation of revisionism which could only indirectly be taken to apply to Poland and Yugoslavia (although it certainly could have been intended for no one else). Referring to revisionists as "profoundly nationalist in character," the journal berated them for "overestimating national peculiarities, revising the commonly valid laws of transition from capitalism to Socialism, and repudiating the necessity for creative application of the experience of Socialist countries, and particularly of the world historical experience of the USSR."

In Romania the publication *Rominia Libera* (Bucharest), March 26, featured a similar article, again failing to mention names, but again showing no inclination to relax previous positions. According to this journal, the revisionists espouse "democratic leadership which would give freedom to factions and bring about the minority's refusal to abide by the decisions of the majority." The paper also claimed that the "general tendency of revisionism is to liquidate the

leading role of the Communist Party and transform working class parties into inoffensive discussion groups."

Tito Raps Soviet Press

Although President Tito had denied ideological differences with the USSR, claiming there are only "differences in method" *Borba* [Belgrade], March 6), he entered a strong complaint on the "silence about Yugoslavia" in the Soviet press, during a speech broadcast over Radio Belgrade, March 16. Comparing the 611 items on the USSR which had appeared in the Yugoslav regime organs, *Borba* and *Politika*, during the previous two months, Tito chided the Soviet press for publishing "only 35 short informational pieces" on his own country. This did not "cast the best light" on relations between the two countries, the Yugoslav Party chief stated, adding that this held "not only in Party relations but in those between the peoples of two Communist States."

On the whole, however, Tito seemed inclined to cooperate in the muting of "differences." He said his nation's relations with Czechoslovakia are "good, although they could be even better." Nevertheless, Tito showed some evidence of irritation. "A number of people in Czechoslovakia," he said, "or even only one man, can spoil the relations between our two countries." Although he then refrained from mentioning the Warsaw Pact, he doubtless pleased the Soviet hierarchy by expressing forebodings about the Atlantic and the Baghdad Pacts: "They can bring nothing good; their prospects are black." (For later developments, see pp. 1-2.)

Delegations Aid Kadar

In March and April Hungary was the areawide focus of delegation visits whose purpose appeared to be the strengthening of Party chief Janos Kadar's "centrist" faction against its openly Stalinist opposition as well as against the more or less hidden but still popular "revisionists." Top men in the various Parties led the delegations to and from Budapest, and the most significant of these was, of course, Nikita Khrushchev's group which devoted ten April days to haranguing the Hungarian people. (For details of the Khrushchev peregrinations, see Hungary, below.)



"They say he's very talented. He's supposed to be a relative of the boss."
Ludas Matyi (Budapest), January 16, 1958

Sputnik III

ON MARCH 20, the Radio Warsaw Home Service announcer interrupted himself with the following startling words:

"Literally one second ago we received some sensational news. The PAP [Polish press service] correspondent in Moscow, Majchrzak, reports that Sputnik III, to be launched shortly in the Soviet Union, will weigh at least 5 to 6 tons. It will be put into orbit by a rocket incomparably bigger and more powerful than those used for the two previous [Soviet] satellites. Sputnik III will be launched with a speed that will enable it to revolve around the moon."

Shortly before the arrival of their Soviet rulers, the Hungarian hierarchy embarked, politically and geographically, in two different directions. Premier Munnich and Minister of State Gyorgy Marosan led a delegation to orthodox East Germany, March 21, and on their return stopped off in equally orthodox Czechoslovakia, where they were "festively received" by Premier Viliam Siroky (*Nepszabadsag* [Budapest], March 26). On March 27-28 Kadar traveled with another "moderate" Politburo member, Gyula Kallai, to Karadjordjevo in Yugoslavia to confer with President Tito and Vice Presidents Edvard Kardelj and Aleksander Rankovic. No results of that meeting were made known beyond the official comments that the gathering was "comradely" and "exchanged opinions on questions of interest" (*Magyar Nemzet* [Budapest], March 29). However, it is significant, in the light of Khrushchev's subsequent public endorsement of Kadar, that none of the notoriously Stalinist members of the Hungarian regime were present in either the group which traveled to Berlin and Prague or the one which journeyed to Yugoslavia.

It is possible that Tito may have wrested a promise from Kadar that Imre Nagy (Premier during the 1956 Revolt) would not be tried in the near future. This possibility would appear to have been strengthened by the fact that Polish First Secretary Wladyslaw Gomulka later announced he would visit Hungary, probably at the end of April, as part of a tour which will include Romania and Bulgaria. Up to then Gomulka had not responded to repeated invitations from the Hungarian capital.

Other Delegations

Other announced visits which (before the latest dispute) indicated the drive for unity in Communist ranks were Tito's decision to travel to Poland in "late Spring" (*Trybuna Ludu*, April 3) and USSR "President" Kliment Voroshilov's arrival in the same country April 17, on a tour which was to include a visit to Yugoslavia in May. Previously two Polish economic delegations were in Moscow, presumably to tighten and increase cooperation between the two countries. One of these groups was led by Chairman of the Economic Council of the Council of Ministers, Oskar Lange (Radio Moscow, March 21), the other by Politburo

member and top economic planner, Stefan Jedrychowski (Radio Moscow, April 1).

Meanwhile Romanian Premier Chivu Stoica continued his tour of the Far East, signing a joint declaration which called for "peaceful coexistence" and "disarmament" with Indian Premier Nehru (Radio Bucharest, March 10). The Poles also had a delegation in the East in late March, led by Deputy Premier Piotr Jaroszewicz, who was received by Chinese Party chief Mao Tse-tung and Premier Chou En-lai.

US Economy Failed

The Soviet propaganda machine has recently made the most of the US economic "recession," and the Satellite States, especially the more orthodox ones, have followed suit. Setting the tone, as always, were two Soviet pronouncements among other items, one a Radio Moscow broadcast, March 12, which dwelt on the theme of "the cancer in the US economy," the other an article in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (Moscow), March 13, in which the propaganda techniques harked back to the days of Stalin. The journal gleefully printed statistics on unemployment gleaned from American publications, described "bread lines, four abreast, extending over an entire block," and characterized the US as being in the thralls of "the beastly morality of capitalist society . . . and dollar-worship."

On the latter theme the article devoted considerable space to a "description" of a New York City beauty parlor for dogs. "While the pampered pets, clothed in nylon, slumber in little mahogany beds," stated the paper, "millions of unemployed line up outside the doors of soup kitchens or sleep on the spittle-covered floors of flophouses."

In their reportage of the US recession some of the Soviet bloc States also plumped for their own particular propaganda lines. A Radio Budapest broadcast of March 18, for example, gloated over what it claimed was the hardship being undergone by exiled freedom fighters who have settled in America: "Hungarian dissidents permitted to come to the 'holy land' of the United States are doing none too splendidly in their new country; on the contrary they are drifting . . . and experiencing increasing discomfort."

Polish comment, milder as usual under the Gomulka regime, appeared to be hopeful that the economic situation in the US would lead to increased trade between East and West. *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw) stated on March 15 that "the threat of a serious depression might induce certain sections of capitalist ruling circles to seek an international *detente* more energetically, if only to expand trade exchange with the East." The paper also claimed that the "ever-sharpening American economic depression is spreading to Great Britain."

The Czechoslovak regime also sought to emphasize the international effects of the US recession, as they affected other Western nations. On March 24 Radio Prague heralded "growing unemployment" in Canada, as well as in the United States. It also stressed what it termed the "limited production-lower wages" trend in Great Britain.

Hungary

Khrushchev in Hungary

Six days after his March 27 consolidation of domestic power in the Soviet Union—formalized by "election" to the premiership—Party chief Khrushchev embarked on a major foreign policy maneuver, a tour (April 2-11) of the Hungarian puppet State. The journey was, to all appearances, primarily intended to shore up the Kadar regime. However, Khrushchev also used the occasions of his almost daily speeches to state that "The Fate of Eastern Europe" (see box, page 30) was not subject to negotiation with the West, to reiterate his country's determination to put down (by force any future revolts in the entire area and to propagandize the Soviet foreign policy line.

Vast crowds were turned out for all the Soviet leader's speeches, as well as for those of his protege, First Deputy Premier Frol Kozlov (appointed March 27, on the same day Khrushchev's former traveling companion, ex-Premier Bulganin, was demoted to head of the State Bank) and For-

The Farmers of Kethely

A REMARKABLY FRANK indication of how firmly the Hungarian peasant is opposed to agricultural collectivization appeared in the provincial Hungarian newspaper *Somogyi Néplap*, March 2. The occasion was a meeting of farmers in the village of Kethely, gathered to hear a speech by Minister of Agriculture Imre Dogei. The report stated:

"When the Minister announced that the way out of the present situation was to organize collective farming, one of the peasants interrupted him, shouting, 'Let's wait with that, Comrade Dogei!' Great applause showed that he spoke from the hearts of many. The anti-collectivization view is very strong in the villages. . . . Another [peasant] speaker demanded that 'the Minister should give us back the pasture taken by the State farms. There would be more milk, more money and we would be able to pay higher taxes. We would name the pasture after the Minister.' Another peasant said, 'We will support the government if it supports us; it should cancel the tax on draft animals.' A third interposed, 'By raising taxes the government deprives us of our incentive to produce. The government should not make us individual farmers suffer.'"

On top of all this, the doughty farmers of Kethely struck a blow at Soviet-Hungarian friendship: "Mention of the Soviet artificial satellite was received with childish laughter," the newspaper complained. "Do those who laughed believe that the most precious treasure on earth—peace—would have been in better hands had the first artificial satellite, the splendid proof of military supremacy, been launched in the West?"



A "grey-market" in the suburbs of Budapest, where a great variety of articles, particularly clothing, is sold by people without trade licenses. The regime is cracking down on such markets.

Photo from *Erdekes Ujsag* (Budapest), March 8, 1958

eign Minister Andrei Gromyko. But the applause was sparse, except for that of regime hirelings, and, according to Western reports, many of Khrushchev's listeners walked out in the middle of his speeches. In fact, on April 8 at Tatabanya, the country's largest mining center, the Soviet Party boss, according to Western reporters, was so annoyed at the reception of his pronouncements that he said, "If you do not like my criticism, swallow it anyway, and see that it does not leave a bitter taste in your mouths."

In the same speech he denied having told Hungarian Party functionaries three days previously at Sztalinvaros that they must settle any future revolts on their own. At Tatabanya he stated that "in the event of a counterrevolution . . . the armed forces of the Soviet Union will always be prepared to provide help and to answer the provocation as it deserves to be answered."

Speeches at Revolt Center

Khrushchev's April 5 Sztalinvaros speech was an occasion of particular irony, because the town was built as a model workers' settlement and in the pre-Revolt past had been heralded as the nationwide showplace of Communism. During the Revolt it was the scene of extremely bitter fighting, and last-ditch resistance continued after the Soviet troops had smashed the rebellion in other sections of the country. Nevertheless, Khrushchev summoned the effrontery to appear in the town and to urge the local Party members to "more discipline" and "higher productivity." He also

told them "your class-consciousness must be strengthened, and you must be able to distinguish clearly between your friends and foes." To the same gathering, new Soviet First Deputy Premier Kozlov commented: "It has been a great and unforgettable experience to be able to meet the workers of Sztalinvaros. At every step we sensed how fervently you like your town and how loyal you are to peace and Socialism." (Radio Budapest, April 5.)

Kadar Endorsed

The Kadar "centrist" regime—under increasing pressure from the great mass of the population and from Stalinist holdovers and suspected revisionists in the Party itself—got a firm endorsement from Khrushchev. The Hungarian Party chief was, in fact, singled out for praise in several of the Soviet leader's speeches, for example, in a broadcast over Radio Budapest, April 3: "Comrade Janos Kadar possesses the magnificent qualities of a militant leader. Thanks to his correct policies, the Party's influence with the masses has been restored."

In sharp contrast to his kind words for Kadar were condemnations of both the revisionists and the pre-Revolt Stalinist regime of former Party boss Matyas Rakosi: "In the reorganization of their party, the Hungarian Communists had to overcome tremendous difficulties which arose partly from the strong revisionist tendencies within the Party and partly from sectarian, dogmatic mistakes committed by the old leadership which had lost its elasticity and proper judgment and followed the Party line in a wavering, uncertain manner." (Radio Budapest, April 3.) On April 8, he called Imre Nagy a "traitor" (Radio Budapest, April 8), but his most furious attack on the Revolt took place five days earlier at the Budapest Opera House. Radio Budapest reported his speech that day (April 3) as follows:

"Hungarian reactionary forces touched off a Fascist uprising. They used every possible means to mislead the people. Like a flock of black crows, the hated scum of the exploiting classes began to return to Hungary. Disguised enemies of the people's democratic system crept out of their holes, and common criminals, freed from the prisons, joined the enemy hordes. The Socialist achievements of your country were threatened. . . .

"The Soviet Union, the Soviet people, could not remain indifferent to the fate of their friends in trouble. . . . In accordance with its duty and prompted by deep and genuine feelings of proletarian internationalism, the Soviet Union could not decline the request of the Hungarian government. The Soviet Union hastened to the aid of the Hungarian people."

International Relations

At Szolnok on April 7 Khrushchev posed "conditions" under which he would withdraw Soviet troops from Hungary: "The moment the Hungarian people and government ask us to withdraw our troops, we will line up and march out with bands playing." (Radio Budapest, April 7.) He also said that USSR forces would be taken from the Satellite countries if US troops were withdrawn from Western Europe. Earlier, in the April 3 speech, he had specified

(Continued on page 36)

A Kiss for Big Brother

by

GENERAL BELA KIRALY



General Bela Kiraly was Commander in Chief of the Hungarian National Guard and military Commander of Budapest during the Hungarian Revolt. From 1951 to 1956 he was imprisoned in Hungary on charges of having resisted the Sovietization of the Hungarian Army. He had before his arrest been Commander in Chief of the Hungarian Infantry and Commander of the General Staff College. (For his account of the Soviet take-over of the Hungarian Army, see East Europe, March 1958.) On these pages, General Kiraly gives his first-hand experience with the staged "popular demonstrations" that are a staple feature of Communist propaganda. The photo of Khrushchev kissing Hungarian children on his recent Budapest trip appeared in Esti Hirlap (Budapest), April 4, 1958.

RECENTLY I SAW a number of pictures of Khrushchev's visit to Budapest; there have also been many accounts of the trip in the Western press. The pictures and the reports told of the military honor guard meeting the Soviet Party boss; particularly, they described how Khrushchev broke away from his bodyguard, mingled with the Hungarian crowd and kissed several Hungarian children.

All this brought back a flood of sharp memories. In the late Forties and early Fifties (before my imprisonment) I had been responsible for the military detachments in parades and demonstrations on such occasions. I remembered the routine before such events (as prescribed by our Soviet military "advisers"): on the morning of the show all military detachments taking part were searched, man by man, by political and security police officers. This was to make sure that no soldier carried any live ammunition or explosive. After the search the troops were not permitted to break formation. All the artillery and tank guns were examined to make sure they were unloaded, and were then sealed with heavy steel wire. It was standard practice to warn military units not to approach closer than 30 yards to the stand where the Party and government dignitaries were.

When I looked again at the picture of the military honor guard greeting Khrushchev, I realized that the current regime had not considered even these stringent measures sufficient. Instead of regular troops, I saw that the honor guard was a unit of the AVH, the secret police.

The accounts of Khrushchev mingling with the crowd and kissing Hungarian children (which seem to surprise some Western observers as evidence that Khrushchev, the butcher of the Revolt, was not really hated by the Hungarian people) brought back even more vivid memories of how such things are arranged. I remember especially the incidents surrounding April 4, 1950.

That day was the fifth anniversary of Hungary's "liberation" by the Red Army. An immense military parade and great civilian demonstrations were planned to celebrate the day. The two focii of the festivities were to be Marshal Voroshilov, head of the Soviet delegation, and Matyas Rakosi, Hungarian Party leader.

As commander of military organizations participating in the parade, I attended the meetings which were to organize the proceedings. Chairman of these sessions was Istvan Kovacs, then a Politburo member and a leader of the Stalinist-Rakosi group. We met in the Communist Party Headquarters, in Budapest. At the first session a time-table of events was handed out. It went:

- 8:00 AM—military parade begins.
- 10:00 AM—military parade ends.
- 10:01 AM—demonstrators from Csepel factory enter the Square of Heroes and greet the Party and government dignitaries.
- 10:05 AM—demonstrators from Factory X, District Y, etc., arrive in the square.

11:35 AM—Five young workers spontaneously break through the security cordon and throw flowers at Comrade Rakosi and Comrade Voroshilov.

11:45 AM—Comrade Rakosi kisses children.

11:55 AM—Etc., etc.

Glancing over this, I was particularly intrigued by the spontaneous break-through of young workers, and by Comrade Rakosi's kissing of children. These matters were cleared up in the ensuing discussion between Istvan Kovacs and various functionaries. First Kovacs questioned the man responsible for the large factory delegations as to how their presence in good order was to be assured. "Simple, Comrade Kovacs," the man replied briskly. "All workers must report to the factory first and get special cards. We will collect these cards at the Square after the demonstration. This way we'll know if anyone fails to attend, and they know we'll know."

Five Young Workers

KOVACS NODDED approval and turned to an AVH Major. He asked him about the five young workers who were spontaneously to burst through the cordon and fling flowers. The Major answered: "Comrade Kovacs, with your permission I will call in Comrade Blank to explain the details. He is the leader of the five youngsters."

"Well, who is he?" Kovacs asked.

"His father is the Party Secretary of a Budapest district. All the adult members of his family are in the Party. The young man himself is in our service. Do you want any further information on him?"

"No, no, no," Kovacs answered hurriedly, a bit embarrassed by the Major's truculent readiness to assure him and everybody else that what the AVH does it does thoroughly, and no questions need be asked.

Young Comrade Blank was called into the room and made his report. All of the five youngsters in the group (three young men, two young women) knew their job perfectly. Nobody else knew about the assignment. They would wear the black uniform of students living in hostels for those of worker-peasant origin. They would hide themselves next to the Yugoslav Embassy at the beginning of the parade. They would mingle with the demonstrators at 11:30 AM. They would move with the crowd toward the reviewing stand, and precisely at 11:35 AM would shove against AVH Sergeants X, Y, and Z guarding that section of the cordon. Passing through, they would approach the stand and fling their flowers.

Further arrangements were noted for photographing the spontaneous incident.

"Rakosi Kisses Children"

THE NEXT ITEM on the agenda was "Rakosi kisses children." This was the most carefully planned. An AVH officer was in charge of the incident. It was explained that the children would consist of a young nephew of Erno Gero (then a Politburo member, Minister of State and close associate of Rakosi), and the daughter of another Communist leader. They would be accompanied by two female Party stalwarts. They would all be carefully rehearsed. For the precise kissing place the meeting selected the stairs on the northern side of the reviewing stand. The children's clothing, that of their guardians, and other details were carefully discussed. There was even discussion of the possibility of arrangements to increase the hygiene of the kissing.

On April 4, the great day, after the parade was over, an aide to Defense Minister Mihaly Farkas came to me and told me to come to the main reviewing stand. He led me up to Marshal Voroshilov, who congratulated me on the success of the parade, and invited me to stay on the stand for a while and watch the civilian demonstration.

The stand was crowded with Hungarian and Soviet officials, who (except for the leading figures seated in front) moved around chatting, laughing, pointing at various figures in the mob of "demonstrating" workers being driven past. There was a steady stream of traffic between the stand itself and the little specially prepared chamber beneath it which was stocked with a wonderful variety of rare delicacies, edibles and potables. The shabby swarms of workers flowed past.

I stood some rows behind Rakosi's chair. At 11:43 AM an AVH officer came and whispered in Rakosi's ear, Rakosi rose and moved toward the stairs. I was puzzled for a moment, wondering if anything important had happened that demanded the attention of the Party leader himself. Then it flashed through my mind—of course, timetable item 11:45 AM is about to take place. Rakosi is going to kiss children.

In a matter of moments the whole thing went off perfectly. Rakosi suddenly appeared at the appointed spot. Two women lifted two small figures, one boy, one girl. Rakosi kissed them. Cameramen worked to catch the spontaneous fleeting moment. It was all over. Rakosi had kissed the children.

These were my memories (half-comic, half-tragic) as, the other day, I looked at the photographs and read the accounts of Khrushchev's visit in Budapest, and how Khrushchev kissed the children.



(Continued from page 33)

that German unification could be achieved only by agreement between East and West Germany, "without interference from other States." This declaration was made in rebuttal to US proposals to take up the German question at a summit meeting.

Propagandizing for his suspension of nuclear weapon tests, Khrushchev made the following statement: "If Mr. Eisenhower really believes that our suspension of nuclear weapons tests is propaganda, why do not he and other Western statesmen engage in similar propaganda by suspending their own tests?" (*Tass*, Moscow, April 4.)

Kadar Echoes Khrushchev

Accompanying the Soviet Party boss throughout most of the tour, Kadar reiterated Khrushchev's points and brought out nothing new on his own. Speaking on April 4 in Budapest, the Hungarian Party chief thanked the Soviets for intervening in the Revolt and hailed the Warsaw Pact and "the rally of the Socialist countries, led by the Soviet Union" (*Radio Budapest*, April 4).

In an interview reported over *Radio Budapest*, April 3, Kadar said that Imre Nagy was at present in a "health resort," but refused to say where the resort was or whether the Revolt Premier would be brought to trial. He said, "we are taking good care" of Revolt military leader General Pal Maleter and that he is "under guard in Budapest." Queried about his recent discussions with Yugoslav President Tito (see above, Area), Kadar would say only that it is possible "to have different opinions on different subjects, but still remain good friends."

Joint Communique

On April 9 *Nepszabadsag* published a communique signed by the chief figures of both delegations. It was generally milder and less colorful in tone than the Khrushchev speeches and contained no surprises. Revisionism was roundly condemned and dogmatism-sectarianism was adjudged to have "created an abyss" between the Party and the working class. The Soviet Union pledged to continue an unspecified amount of economic support to Hungary, and a non-aggression pact was urged between the Warsaw Pact and the NATO countries.

Revolt Figures Executed

On March 10 *Radio Budapest* announced the executions of Jozsef Nagy and Imre Farkas. The men were described as "armed counterrevolutionaries and former members of the National Guard of Csepel." No further particulars were given.

Western sources reported the execution in March of Jozsef Kovacs and the fifteen-year jail sentence of Jozsef Perbire, formerly president of the Szeged Workers' Council. Kovacs, who was vice-president of the same council, had been jailed for five years during the Rakosi era. Both men were active leaders in the Revolt; both were instrumental in saving the lives of members of the Security Police (AVO) who had been taken prisoner during the fighting. After the Revolt was crushed even the local Com-



Rosa Fain, of the Soviet Union, winner of the first prize in the recent international violin competition in Poznan, Poland. Sidney Harth, of the US, won second prize.

Photo from *Poland* (Warsaw), No. 2, 1958

munist newspaper praised the Szeged Workers' Council for its maintenance of order. It is noteworthy that the regime did not make public the execution and imprisonment of these prominent Freedom Fighters.

Kossuth Prize Denied Writers

For the first time since they were established in 1950, no Kossuth Prizes were given to writers. These cash awards, which were formerly given mainly to writers, but also to scientists, technicians and artists, are the regime's highest mark of distinction. The absence of writers from the year's list was explained by *Elet Es Irodalom* (Budapest), March 15, as indicating that "no work of high ideological and literary standards was published." The decision not to award the prize to writers underlines the fact that, since the Revolt, no first-rate Hungarian literary man has produced the kind of work which the regime would see fit to honor.

The regime's dissatisfaction with the non-compliance of writers was borne out by other articles in the press over the past months. The nation's most distinguished Communist philosopher, Gyorgy Lukacs, who has been under attack since his release from Romanian detention—he was taken

there with Revolt Premier Imre Nagy—again came under fire. Bela Fogarasi, formerly an intimate of Lukacs and himself a well-known Communist philosopher, called for a disclosure of “the connection between the wrong political attitudes of Gyorgy Lukacs in 1956 and his philosophical work” (*Magyar Nemzet* [Budapest], March 19). Fogarasi advocated an “unbiased, objective critical analysis so that we can evaluate and use the positivism in Lukacs’ work.”

Intellectuals Attacked

Continued attacks on the intellectuals appeared in the official Party organ in Budapest and also in the provincial Party newspapers. The March 21 issue of *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest) spoke of the “unprincipled struggle waged by intellectuals—some of them even Party members—against the regular Party organization.” The Szeged provincial daily, *Delmagyarorszag*, stated on March 3 that “the results achieved in literature are smaller than those in other fields of life.” According to the same journal, “complete chaos reigns in the fields of ideology and culture.”

In Szombathely the Party daily, *Vas Megye*, March 3, dealt with the “false attitude of certain strata of the intelligentsia”:

“The counterrevolution caused much harm to the intelligentsia. Many of them, including Party members, wavered; others propagandized for the restoration of bourgeois democracy. . . . The remnants of ideological confusion still haunt the intelligentsia, and the shadows of nationalism and chauvinism are still apparent in their attitudes, even in their chance remarks. . . . A number of the intellectuals refuse to recognize the results achieved so far in consolidating the people’s power and in building Socialism.”

Some Soviet Troops Withdrawn

The first detachments of the 17,000 Soviet troops who are to be withdrawn from Hungary departed with the maximum of propaganda fanfare on March 15. These troop cuts, which were announced January 6 and parallel similar cuts throughout the area, will, when finally put into effect, reduce Soviet military personnel in the puppet State

to approximately 53,000. (For discussion of areawide Soviet troop cuts, see *East Europe*, April 1958, page 11.)

Saluting the departing Soviet soldiers in a ceremony at Veszprem, Minister of State Gyula Kallai warned that the withdrawal did not signify a change in Hungarian-Soviet relations. There would still be ample Soviet might in the country, he cautioned, “to smash any renewal of the counterrevolution from abroad or at home.” Kallai also expressed “our deepest gratitude” for the troops of the USSR “who liberated us in 1945 and helped us defeat the counterrevolution in 1956.”

Mass Organizations Prodded

Both the Communist youth organization (KISZ) and the Patriotic Peoples’ Front were urged to greater efforts recently in their task of promoting subservience to the Party and regime. KISZ especially was taken to task; its First Secretary, Zoltan Komocsin, stated bluntly in *Nepszabadsag*, March 21, that the organization “is by no means the kind of political, revolutionary, young Communist movement needed by the Party.” Komocsin went on to say that “the political-ideological efforts of KISZ are scanty, and many of the branches tend merely to promote recreational activities.”

On March 15 there was an article in *Magyar Ifjúság* (Budapest) which complained that “too many girl members of KISZ are still religious.” The journal advocated increased use of debates and lectures to convince these girls “that there is nothing behind their beliefs, that their religious convictions are plain superstitions or man-invented mysticism.”

Leaders of the Patriotic Peoples’ Front from all over the country met in Budapest, March 31, and were told to “take a more active part in the peace movement” and to participate more actively in the rural communities (*Magyar Nemzet*, [Budapest], April 1). They also heard complaints that “the peasantry markedly avoids taking an active part in Front activities.”

The Front’s principle *raison d’être*, however, remains that of attempting to take the place of independent political parties. The Communist theoretical monthly, *Társadalmi Szemle* (Budapest), devoted a long article in its March issue to the proposition that “a multi-party system . . . is out of the question for Hungary.” Even such Communist-dominated “independent” parties as exist in China and Poland were ruled out for Hungary, because of the “counterrevolution.” The journal called “the one-party system a necessity for our Socialist revolution” and said that “we would dig our own grave if we were to deviate from the one-party system.”

Stagnant Economy

Hungary’s economy has made virtually no progress in the last five years, according to an editorial in *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest), March 16, while other Communist countries have been “marching ahead.” The editorial said that total industrial production in 1957 was only four percent higher than in 1952. By contrast, output per capita rose 22 percent in Bulgaria between 1952 and 1956, 28 percent

"Indecency"

UNDER THE ABOVE title, the Bratislava newspaper *Predvoj*, February 13, related another scandalous interruption in the smooth course of Soviet-Satellite relations:

“During the course of the hockey game between the Soviet and Anglo-Canadian teams [at the Winter Stadium in Bratislava] . . . any decent person might have expected to hear a Soviet song or two—for example, the familiar and popular ‘March of the Athletes,’ to make the Soviet players feel welcome. But all that was heard from the loudspeaker were English and American popular songs.”

in Czechoslovakia, 30 percent in Poland, 34 percent in East Germany, 32 percent in Romania and 32 percent in the USSR, it was stated. The editorial called for a more efficient exploitation of Hungary's industrial plant, primarily through raising the technological level. It added, however that "technical improvement requires in most cases investment and, as we all know, under present circumstances comparatively little is left for production investments."

Private Law Practice Ending

Minister of Justice Ferenc Neszval announced the virtual abolition of private law practice (Radio Budapest, March 22). Probably the result of the marked increase in the number of lawyers who, since the Revolt, conscientiously represent their clients' interest rather than that of the State, the new law will organize all lawyers into "co-operatives" within the next few months. These "working associations" will be assigned all cases in the future and, according to the broadcast, lawyers will be allowed to practice privately only in specific instances and only with the express permission of the Minister of Justice.

The Broadcast also quoted Neszval as announcing that a five-man commission had been set up to screen all Hungarian lawyers and to purge "those elements which are unworthy of belonging to the profession." A considerable number of lawyers, the Minister said, "have actually hindered the proper working of the courts and other organs, as well as Socialist legality."

Neszval added that most of the "counterrevolutionary criminals" thus far apprehended have already been tried, "except in Budapest and [some] other counties." He stressed the concurrent campaigns against "speculation and corruption" and for "the protection of social property."

Birth Control Campaign

"We do not talk openly enough about sexual problems and the prevention of pregnancy," stated *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest) on March 13. Advocating a vigorous campaign for birth control, the Party newspaper announced that "medical classes on sex life" were to be introduced "experimentally" in the schools and that "within two or three weeks a large quantity of materials for the prevention of pregnancy . . . will be put on the market."

The March issue of the literary magazine *Kortars* (Budapest) also devoted an article to the problem, this time highlighting the difficulties met by "social welfare workers" in the countryside. The journal stated that "women cannot be persuaded to have abortions, even though the average family may have as many as six children."

Emphasis on Vocational Training

There will be increased emphasis on compulsory practical training in the elementary and secondary schools, according to a new government decree, published in *Nepszabadsag*, (Budapest) March 22. According to the newspaper, "new textbooks and curricula must be prepared in view of the new system." *Nepszabadsag* stated

that "a new subject—practical occupations—will be introduced in 5000 secondary schools as of the next school year."

New Social Statistics

Hungary's population rose by 21,000 in 1957, reaching a total of 9,825,000. In January the average monthly wage in State industry was reportedly 1,576 *forint*, as compared to 1,486 in the year 1957 and 1,234 in 1956. Highest wages are in mining, where the January average was 2,018 *forint*. Books published in 1957 numbered 2,407, the same as in 1956, and the number of copies reached 23.4 million, an increase of 1.3 million over 1956. Movie attendance in 1957 reached a record height of 133.4 million people, the most popular movie being a revival of "Danko Pista," a prewar film which had not been shown during the Rakosi years. (*Nepszabadsag* [Budapest] March 20.)

Poland

Sejm Debates 1958 Economic Program

On March 28 the Sejm ended its long second session, which had lasted five months and involved 160 committee meetings. The Party newspaper *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw) March 30, contrasted this session, which passed 28 laws and ratified only one government decree, with the session of April 1956 which had ratified 32 decrees and passed only four laws. The Sejm's chief undertaking was the discussion and amendment of the government bills on the budget and economic plan for 1958. The plan bill was presented to the body on December 28 and the budget bill on January 21. They were then discussed by 19 committees which held 82 meetings, and presented to the Sejm again on March 19.

A Loyal Opposition?

Five days of discussion and debate ensued, during which 95 deputies took the floor. The speakers included 56 Communists, 16 Peasant Party members, 7 Democratic Party members, 3 deputies of the Catholic group and 13 other non-party deputies. There was apparently a great deal of criticism of the government program, by the Catholic group deputies particularly, and the regime appeared to be perfectly agreeable to such criticism (as long as it did not deny the basic premise of a "Socialized" Poland). However, the criticism was largely confined to the privacy of debates in the Sejm and, more especially, Sejm committees, and the press tended not to print the more trenchant passages of attack, but emphasized those sections in the speeches of critical deputies where they affirmed their general support of the regime.

The most critical speech, it appears, was delivered by Zbigniew Makarczyk of the Catholic deputies group. The *New York Times* reported on March 29 from Warsaw that Makarczyk made a vigorous attack on the regime's policy of restricting private trade. "Should private and Socialized stores work side by side under identical conditions," he was reported to have said, "and should a Socialized store under these conditions serve the customers better, this would be

an adequate argument in favor of Socialized world trade." He was also said to have criticized inequities in the wage system. *Trybuna Ludu* editorialized on March 20 that his speech "was characterized by negation, and it is not the first time that this attitude has been manifested by the Catholic deputies with regard to the government's economic policies." He was answered on the floor by Communist Deputy Boleslaw Drobner, who said that Makarczyk's speech "was nothing more nor less than an attack on our economic system." Drobner argued that the government had taken a very liberal attitude on the taxation of private trade, and that Makarczyk's information on wages had been taken from an out-of-date source.

Later Makarczyk made a conciliatory rebuttal, while another Catholic deputy, M. Kolakowski, said that the Catholic deputies had made critical speeches only to serve the "betterment of the republic." They would vote for the two bills, Kolakowski added, in the belief that on balance they represented a positive course. The debate was closed by Stefan Jedrychowski, chairman of the government's planning commission, who praised the nature of the debate and indicated that the Gomulka regime is willing to tolerate the Catholic bloc in the Sejm as a kind of loyal opposition:

"The government is deeply pleased with the critical

tone of the debate, which is not only characteristic of the speeches of those few deputies who might be numbered among the parliamentary opposition, but also of the constructive, creative criticisms, however sharp, of deputies who belong to groups and political parties which fully support the policy of the government. The government would not consider praise and panegyrics as a help in its work. Critical speeches, on the other hand, are a tremendous help for the government. They enable us to correct errors and to perfect our economic policy, provided their common motive is a desire for the good of the working masses and for the best possible construction of Socialism."

1958 Plan and Budget

The budget bill passed with three dissenting votes and the plan bill with two. The Sejm made only minor amendments in the plan, but the budget underwent more fundamental changes. The government draft had called for revenues of 160,280,200,000 *zloty* and expenditures of 158,039,700,000 *zloty*, whereas the amended bill raised the figures to 160,995,400,000 and 158,663,600,000. Some of the increased expenditure was accounted for by the recent decision to raise retirement pensions (see *East Europe*, April 1958, p. 41): an additional outlay of one billion *zloty* will be met in part from government reserves and in part from higher revenues to be achieved by better economic



Young Polish Writer in Trouble

MAREK HLASKO is the most popular of young Polish writers. He was awarded a major Polish literary prize in January 1958. His work is taut, angular, outspoken on the difficulties of life in Poland (see *East Europe*, September and October 1957, for two typical Hlasko stories, "A Point, Mister?" and "We Take Off for Heaven"). Recently, Hlasko has come under attack for his revealing and penetrating frankness. The major Polish Party daily, *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), April 5, seized on the fact that two of Hlasko's stories* were published by the Paris literary magazine of Polish emigres, *Kultura*, as an occasion for attacking Hlasko's works and the fact that they are being published abroad. *Trybuna Ludu*, in an article entitled "Prima Donna for a Week," stated:

"Hlasko has drawn the lucky number. He has the chance of becoming a prima donna in the West for one political week, but for some time now thoughtful readers of Hlasko's books have noticed the false direction of his development . . . This young writer's first book, it is true, was a protest against indifference in relations between people, against evil and hypocrisy, and a defense of pure human feelings. However, this literary protest was

later transformed into a nihilist attitude toward all values. The attempts to shock with brutal details and to describe pathological states . . . the imitation of "black" western literature were all apparent in Hlasko's writing even in 1957. . . . But it wasn't until 'Cemetery,' essentially a political story, that the final 'arrival' of Hlasko is indicated. It is finally in 'Cemetery' that one sees not the influence of Hemingway, the model of many of the [earlier] stories . . . not Dostoevsky, the father of [Hlasko's book] 'Petli,' . . . but clearly and simply and directly Orwell himself, the classic master of contemporary anti-Communist libel. Orwell, in every step and on every page: This change of models is most expressly indicative not only of a change to increasingly mediocre models, but is increasingly 'accurate' politically . . . And don't let anyone remind me that the action in 'Cemetery' takes place in 1952, because Hlasko wrote it in 1957 with the most contemporary passion and sells it in 1958—outside the country—into the hands of international traitors using anti-Communist weapons."

* "The Next One for Paradise," and "Cemetery"; both were denied publication in Poland.

efficiency in State enterprises, higher postal rates and higher prices for theater tickets. Another amendment raised the grants to local budgets by 509 million *zloty*. The Sejm committees also cut 192 million *zloty* from the proposed expenditure on national defense, which had been previously set at a level 2.2 billion *zloty* higher than last year (reportedly because of higher costs for military supplies).

"Stabilization and Hope"

Deputy Eugeniusz Ajnenkiel, speaking for the Economic Plan, Budget and Finance Committee, expressed the wish that this "budget of stabilization and hope" would prove an effective weapon in the fight to put Poland's economy on a self-sustaining basis and prepare the way for future progress. While the full texts of the bills as passed by the Sejm are not yet available, their general shape has emerged in the discussions carried on in the press during past months. In contrast to the last two years, when money incomes rose so fast as to threaten the country with inflation, the 1958 plan seeks to raise productivity while holding the total wage fund close to its present level. The production of Socialized industry is supposed to go up by 6.1 percent: production of the means of production by 4.3 percent and the production of consumer goods by 8.1 percent. The total value of agricultural production is to rise by 4.1 percent, including an increase of 3.3 percent in crops and 5.4 percent in livestock. In the crucial sector of foreign trade, the government hopes to raise exports by 27.3 percent while holding imports to an increase of only 5.5 percent. While national income is to increase by 5.9 percent, only 4 percent will be distributed and the difference will go toward reducing foreign indebtedness.

Polish Relations With West Germany

Although the general areawide attitude toward West Germany continues to be one of hostility—especially since the March decision of the Bundestag to accept NATO rocket bases and nuclear arms—there are some indications in the Polish press of a willingness to search for areas of agreement and understanding. The Tyrmand articles, published in the Warsaw Catholic weekly *Tygodnik Powszechny* (see *East Europe*, April 1958, pages 44-45), were an example of this attitude of limited hopefulness. Two less optimistic articles appeared subsequently in the unofficial organ of the Gomulka regime, *Polityka* (Warsaw), February 23 and March 1. These advocated "reserve" in the "idea of closer ties with West Germany," but were, notwithstanding, far less truculent in tone than press pronouncements on the Federal Republic in the more orthodox Satellite countries.


Another development in Polish-West German relations was the visit, March 9-15, to Warsaw of Carlo Schmid, Vice Chairman of the Social Democratic Party and Deputy Speaker of the Bundestag. Although Schmid supports the Rapacki Plan and his party opposes much of West German Chancellor Adenauer's foreign policy, the visitor assured the Poles that the Bonn Government had no warlike designs on the Polish-controlled western territories. According to Western sources, Schmid's visit had considerable impact in Polish regime circles.

A less hopeful development in relations between the two countries was the "discovery" in western Poland of the mass graves of 20,000 World War II Allied prisoners. According to *Trybuna Ludu*, March 26, many of the corpses showed signs of starvation and exhaustion, and many others had been executed. It may, perhaps, be assumed that this belated revelation of Nazi war crimes 13 years in the past—similar to an equally belated mass graves "discovery" in Czechoslovakia (see Czechoslovakia, below)—was at least in part an implementation of the recent trend to areawide conformity in Polish foreign policy.

Similar indirect hostility to the Germans may be inferred—coming as it does in the present state of international diplomacy in the area—from the sentencing of six "German nationalists of Polish citizenship . . . for distributing pamphlets hostile to Poland and placing slogans of the Bonn revisionists on the streets of Zabrze." (Radio Warsaw, March 13.) The men received jail terms ranging from two to seven years.

Khrushchev Interviewed

On March 12 *Pravda* (Moscow) printed the text of an interview granted by Soviet boss Khrushchev to the Moscow correspondent of *Trybuna Ludu*, the major Polish Party daily. "Mutual cooperation" was the theme most strongly emphasized by Khrushchev in the relationship between Poland and the USSR. He stressed the support given by the Soviets to the Polish Rapacki Plan for a denuclearized zone in central Europe, and the backing which the Poles have provided for recent Soviet foreign policy maneuvers



The back cover of the February issue of *Zebra* (Cracow), a monthly of the arts. This graphic portrayal of Polish yearning for worldly goods had no caption.



Leopold Tyrmand

Author of an article (*Tygodnik Powszechny* [Warsaw], January 26) which minimized the danger of revived militarism in West Germany. It sparked a lively controversy in the Polish press (see *East Europe*, April, p. 44). The "revival" of German militarism in West Germany is currently an important theme of areawide propaganda.

(see Arca). On past relations between the two countries, he admitted "certain violations of Leninist principles," but stated that these had been "fully eliminated."

Interestingly, he linked the events of October 1956 when the Gomulka regime was installed with the Hungarian Revolt of the same period:

"It is common knowledge that the imperialist, reactionary forces wanted to cash in on the events in Hungary and also on the difficulties encountered by Socialist construction in Poland. . . . The enemies of Socialism shouted their heads off and are continuing their rumpus about some sort of 'special processes' or tendencies showing that Poland is departing from the Socialist road of development. They bring to mind the proverb: 'A hungry man dreams of sugarbuns.'"

Militia Increase Forecast

A probable increase in the size of the Militia (national police force) was indicated by an article in *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), March 23, which spoke of "the people's demand" for a rise in the number and "competence" of the force. According to the newspaper, there are "6,000 vacancies" in the Militia, and it is expected that these will be filled, to a large extent, by former white-collar workers and bureaucrats who have been dismissed in the current decentralization campaign.

The article also stated that the number of crimes in 1957 rose to 405,000, as compared with 369,000 during the previous year. The percentage of unsolved crimes in 1957 was 32.2, and the Militia reported least success in solving cases which involved stolen property.

"Spies"

On March 21 Radio Warsaw reported that a 30-month prison sentence had been given to a Pole convicted of "transmitting State secrets to the French Intelligence Service." The same broadcast also announced the apprehension of another Pole "suspected" of spying for British Intelligence.

Sztandar Mlodych (Warsaw), March 13, devoted an article to the "discovery" in July 1957 of the "Under-

ground Youth Organization," formerly known as "Stella." According to the journal, members of the group—most of whom were from 16 to 20 years of age—were "pledged to fight the present Communist system . . . were trained to spy on military units . . . and attempted to contact foreign embassies." *Sztandar Mlodych* stated that since no "anti-State deeds" had been accomplished and since the members of the organization were so young, "most have already been released."

Catholic Parliamentarians Outvoted

The comparative freedom of speech permitted in the Sejm (Parliament) was exemplified by the recent activities of the "liberal Catholic" Parliamentary group "Znak," as reported in *Trybuna Ludu*, (Warsaw) March 21. At the same time, the inability of the minority to make its weight felt against the overwhelming regime majority was made clear. The area of controversy included two bills, one on "real estate expropriation," the other on "the sale of State farmland." The "Znak" deputies introduced amendments to both bills: in the first they sought to "restrict" possible expropriations of "sacred objects"; in the second they tried to facilitate the purchase of farmland by Catholic or other religious organizations.

According to *Trybuna Ludu*, both amendments were

Two Views on Mrs. Dulska's Morals

A CLASSIC OF THE Polish theater, "Mrs. Dulska's Morals," was the subject of one of the latest disagreements between the Poles and the Soviets, disagreements which Soviet-bloc countries other than Poland almost never permit. *Sztandar Mlodych* (Warsaw), February 27, quoted a report in Moscow's *Pravda* that V. P. Loginov, a speaker at a Party conference in Leningrad, complained about the theater's role in fostering "immoral behavior" among Soviet youth. The speaker said that "the worthless plays performed by Leningrad theaters exercise a great influence on youth—such plays as 'Do Not Make an Idol,' 'Mrs. Dulska's Morals,' and 'What Every Woman Knows.'" [The last mentioned is presumably the Barrie play.]

The Polish newspaper said:

"It seems to us that mentioning of Gabriela Zapolska's well-known play ['Mrs. Dulska's Morals'] together with worthless trash must be due to some misunderstanding. Even the 60th volume of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, released to the printer in 1952, points out that 'Mrs. Dulska's Morals' is a play whose edge is directed against petty-bourgeois morality. . . . 'Mrs. Dulska's Morals' was translated into Russian in 1922 in the USSR."

Even the Polish press, however, did not think to defend Sir James Barrie from V. P. Loginov.

rejected by an "overwhelming majority." The newspaper also quoted a rebuke administered to "Znak" Deputy Kisielewski by Deputy Drobner, who averred that the October 1956 reforms were due to "the patriotic policies of the whole nation and the Communist Party and not to those of Catholic democrats and emigre politicians." Drobner went on to characterize as "upside-down" the view that "one can want to help the Polish nation, but not the Communist authorities."

Trade Union Council Meets

A plenary meeting of the Central Council of Trade Unions was held in Warsaw, March 21-22. It was concerned chiefly with preparations for the National Congress of Trade Unions, which opened April 14. A resolution strongly supporting the Rapacki Plan was passed and the delegates were addressed by the Chairman of the Central Council, Ignacy Loga-Sowinski, who warned of "reformist and revisionist conceptions which seek to split the trade union movement." He also had a word of caution for those of his listeners who might have been looking too expectantly to the workers' councils: "The existence of the workers' councils should by no means restrict the trade unions' part in solving the economic problems of the enterprises." (The workers' councils are far less subservient to the regime than the trade unions.)

Loga-Sowinski also dealt with some of the current personnel problems faced by the enterprises. He warned against absenteeism on the part of the workers and "the shirking of decisions" by management. Among the latter he found "lack of a sense of responsibility," and advocated "energetic steps against all who fail to understand that the people's power does not entrust them with responsible posts so that they may neglect their managerial duties."

Government Defines Employment Policy

In the wake of the decision by the Party Central Committee on March 1 to take steps to reduce surplus employment in industry, the government adopted a resolution spelling out the proper procedures for State enterprises. According to Radio Warsaw, March 25, factory managers and workers' councils were requested to estimate their surplus employment by March 31, taking into consideration the qualifications of their workers and whether or not those to be dismissed had other sources of income. Dismissal notices were to go out between March 31 and August 31. The hiring of new workers will require approval by the government employment office. Emergency funds will be supplied by the Ministry of Finance to help create new jobs for dismissed workers, and an effort will be made to transfer unemployed persons to regions where vacancies exist. Local administrations are assigned much of the responsibility for putting the unemployed back to work.

State To Sell Half Million Hectares

Poland's costly and unproductive State farms are being thoroughly reorganized, with a view to getting them out of the red by the end of 1958. On March 12 the Sejm passed

On Communist Trade Unions

THE FOLLOWING BITING comments on the servility of Polish trade unions appeared in the Warsaw daily *Zycie Gospodarcze* (March 9) a little more than a month before Party boss Gomulka proclaimed the curtailment of workers' councils, which, workers had hoped, might have proved a real force for the defence of their rights, unlike the unions. The newspaper pointed out how little the workers could expect from trade unions:

"Workers of various kinds questioned by the authors of this article did not consider trade unions as social organizations but as institutions serving to 'provide recreation and loans.' Everybody complained about the bureaucratization of the union links. . . .

"So the question comes to mind: where do the five million members of the unions come from? There is only one answer: although the statutes stress that trade union membership is voluntary, there is actually an effective economic compulsion to join, which is the cause of that membership figure. This 'economic compulsion' is in the form of certain economic rights and advantages which trade union members have . . . such as rest, recreation, cheaper railway tickets . . . free sanatorium care, aid in cases of birth or death in the family, etc. Even these advantages do not increase the trade unions' popularity. . . . In the past the State made numerous mistakes which reflected rather painfully on the life of the working people. The trade unions as a rule stood on the side of the State in these real conflicts and helped it actively and not always justly. . . . Work discipline, Socialist in name and feudal in contents, often adhered to so strictly as to be quite silly, got on many people's nerves. . . . The facts could only leave a deep-rooted conviction in the minds of people that trade unions have entirely discarded the function of defending the current interests of their members and that they have become some sort of adjunct to State institutions—not of much use and sometimes irritating."

a bill authorizing the sale of 300,000 hectares of land belonging to State farms as well as 200,000 hectares of other land belonging to the State. The land from the State farms, comprising about 12 percent of their total area, is situated mainly in Poland's northern, western and southeastern border areas. Most of it was taken over by the State farms during the Six Year Plan (1950-55) and, requiring large investments for proper development, remained a liability to the farms.

Minister of Agriculture Ochab told the Sejm that the State could not afford to farm this land with the funds presently available to it, and intended to sell it to "peasants who will be able to make their own important contribution to the full cultivation of the land purchased by them." (*Trybuna Ludu*, March 13.) Sales will be at market prices, but since most of the land is in thinly populated regions these prices will be considerably lower than current prices in other regions. Ochab expressed the hope that this would encourage small farmers in the overpopulated south to sell their land and move to the border areas. Purchasers will pay 10 or 20 percent down and the rest in installments over

10 or 20 years. The area purchased by any individual, added to his previous holding, may not exceed 15 hectares except for livestock farms, where the maximum is 20 hectares.

Poland Receives UNICEF Aid

Poland has been allotted 160,000 dollars by the United Nations Children's Fund. According to *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), April 2, the money will be used to set up vocational training facilities in Bydgoszcz, Bialystok, Lodz and Warsaw, and for the purchase of automobiles required for various pediatric activities.

Movie Prices Raised

Motion picture theater tickets, which had cost on the average from two to three *zloty*, were made substantially more expensive on April 6. According to *Trybuna Ludu*, March 27, seats in city movie houses now cost from four to ten *zloty*, although children, soldiers and "retired persons" will be charged only two *zloty*. The journal said the price boosts were due to "the spread of speculation and ticket scalping," but a *Zycie Warszawy* article on March 24 inferred that there were other considerations, including "a theater deficit of 100 million *zloty* per year." The newspaper also mentioned "the ever-increasing deterioration of movie houses due to a lack of funds for repairs and modernization of equipment."

Czechoslovakia

"Mass Murders" Belatedly "Discovered"

Two continuing regime offensives—one against Slovak nationalism, the other against so-called "enemy agents"—merged during the month of March, as a group of 47 alleged "Hlinka Guardists" were charged with "taking part in the murder of 3,723 persons in the last months of

World War II" (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], March 15). Hlinka Guardists were members of the Slovak People's Party, an extreme right-wing political organization which ruled Slovakia during the wartime Nazi ascendancy. Since the party was led by two Catholic priests, it may be presumed that the Church is also one of the targets of the mass propaganda barrage which surrounds the preparation for the show trial of the accused. The Slovak People's Party, disbanded after the war, has been used by the regime to tar all Slovak nationalist and separatist tendencies.

Other targets of this curiously belated action may be—along with such remnants of the Slovak People's Party as possibly still exist—the former Democratic and National Socialist Parties who are accused of "shielding" the Hlinka followers, and the West, which has long been charged with financing the Slovak nationalist and separatist anti-Communist movements. A particular point has been made that Westerners were among the victims, and demands for extradition of accused "culprits" were made on March 29 to 7 Western nations.

The regime propaganda machine went into full blast on the case and the press and radio announced "waves of indignation" sweeping through the country. Radio Bratislava set the tone on March 15 with an announcement that factory meetings had passed resolutions demanding "the cleansing of our political life of all discredited Fascist and separatist elements." On March 31 the same source linked the Guardists with "bourgeois nationalism of a special type, characterized by separatism and venomous hatred of the Czech nation." The broadcast also called "clericalism and the misuse of the people's religious sentiments for reactionary political aims" another manifestation of the separatist movement. It virtually admitted the widespread unrest in Slovakia:

"The Slovak people are prevented from seeing the truth in certain instances by bourgeois nationalism which is directed against the Czech people, and by bourgeois illusions of future prosperity for a so-called Slovak State. Such things weaken the unity of Czechs and Slovaks. Separatist elements in the country and emigre propaganda nurture in the minds of some of our people these obsolete and outmoded views, hoping to use them for their sinister political aims."

Death Sentences

In another belated trial, ten persons were convicted for the January 1952 "murder" of a female activist named Anna Kvasova, who had been Chairman of the local Party organization in Chrastna, eastern Bohemia. Three of the defendants were sentenced to death, the other seven received jail terms ranging from four to 25 years. *Rude Pravo*, (Prague), March 26-29, stated that the condemned group represented "business and factory interests," had distributed anti-regime leaflets, organized escapes and collected weapons for "further acts of terror."

New "Security" Commissions

Police control over the country has been even further strengthened by the recently created "Commissions of



In a Provincial National Council office. Scientists: "We request the establishment of a central laboratory for atomic research." Bureaucrat: "We're decentralizing now. Forward your request to a village council."

Szpilki (Warsaw), March 16, 1958

Local Security" which are being set up in all communities. On March 28, Radio Prague stated that the aim of these Commissions is to enable the ordinary citizen to take a direct part in ensuring "security" and "to strengthen the links between the people and the security organs."

Further Criticism of Writers

The regime press apparently still feels it necessary to attack writers for not aping its own ideological orthodoxy. One of the most wide-ranging of these denunciations of unbending literary men was printed in the March 7 issue of the leading Party daily, *Rude Pravo* (Prague). The focus of the regime strictures was the interpretation of the work of Frantisek Halas, the renowned Czechoslovak poet whose death in 1951 preceded authoritative reports in the Western press that he had repudiated Communism.

Much of Halas' work contained elements of what the doctrinaire "Socialist realists" would term "modernism" and "bourgeois abstractionism," while others of his best-known poems are drenched in melancholy. It is, apparently, these qualities which have been most stressed in recent discussions of Halas' work, such as an introduction by Jan Grossmann to a collection of Halas' poems. Such interpretations,

The Cage and the Keepers

TWO ASPECTS OF THE youth problem in Czechoslovakia were revealed by *Mlada Fronta* (Prague), the Party youth organization newspaper. In the first, March 11, the paper printed the following in its inquiry into the problems of education:

"The boarding school was like a cage. . . . We received political but not moral education, at least I don't think so. . . . I believe that it was the dictatorship [in the school] which eventually made me hate the boarding school as well as my work. . . . During the first months of our apprenticeships we were enrolled in the [Party] Youth League, although we hardly knew what it was. . . . I know scores of youths for whom the League means something unbelievably boring and indigestible—they would much rather live in a cage."

The second item appeared in the March 13 issue. It described a recent Czechoslovak innovation, the first auxiliary youth unit of the Security Police. Eight young people were sworn in as junior big brothers. Their task was described as follows:

"The new unit has given itself the following duties: to be on the look-out for those who drink too much at dances and to see that young people are not served with alcohol in restaurants. . . . They will identify schoolboys and girls who loaf on the streets until late at night, and will seek improvement by reporting them to their parents, to their schools and, if necessary, to youth welfare centers. In factories they will watch out for young shirkers and find out reasons for their absences from work."

Rude Pravo asserted, "concentrate on the least positive aspects of Halas' work and by thus distorting them, serve questionable purposes." The paper accused Grossmann of a "peculiar arrangement" of the poems which gave undue prominence to the following admonition: "To rely on the grandeur of uncertainties, rather than on the scarcity of certainties."

Rude Pravo said that "such a statement may be true for people living under capitalism, but it cannot be applied to people who support Socialism."

Another writer, Vaclav Cerny, was chided in the same article for an essay in *Slovenski Pohľady* (Bratislava), the organ of the Slovak Writers' Union. Cerny was accused of "boldly-sketched individualistic conceptions," and the editors of the journal were reprimanded for their "forgetfulness of Marxist views" in publishing the article. Writers and editors "must never allow bourgeois estheticians to be treated as equal or even superior" to truly "Socialist" literary men, *Rude Pravo* averred.

The Party journal also hit out at "Slovak writers who have gone so far as to take positions of modernism or traditionalism." Such concepts, especially that of "the modern man," are in the opinion of *Rude Pravo* "indistinct and ambiguous and too frequently utilized nowadays."

Party Congresses Prepared

The Eleventh Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party will be convened, June 18, according to a decision of the Central Committee on April 3 (*Rude Pravo*, [Prague], April 4). Previous to this, there will be a Slovak Communist Party Congress held May 16-18. The *Rude Pravo* report quoted First Secretary Antonin Novotny as saying that the "fundamental prerequisite" for progress was the strengthening of Party control and Party supervision over the economy. The second speaker, Premier Siroky, called for the creation of a State Planning Commission to "settle basic economic questions" and the setting up of an Economic Council to deal with "fundamental questions of Plan implementation."

Alcohol Prices Up, Milk Prices Down

The prices of distilled liquor were raised by roughly 20 percent as of April 1, according to an announcement of the Ministry of Internal Trade (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], April 1). The announcement said that this would make possible a reduction in the price of milk by 10 *Halere* per liter, or about 5 percent.

Bulgaria

Party Congress to Convene in June

The Seventh Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party will open on June 2, according to an announcement from the Central Committee in *Rabotnicheskoe Delo* (Sofia), March 29. Party statutes state that a congress must be convened every four years; the previous one was held in February 1954. The Congress will deal with economic matters, primarily the Third Five-Year Plan (1958-1962), with internal political and cultural affairs and with



In Czechoslovakia, an exhibition has been touring the country with "information" on "Western espionage agents" captured in the country. The exhibit stressed the "reactionary propaganda" spread by these "agents" as well as their "espionage." Above, a member of the Public Security Forces delivers a lecture on the exhibit. Photo from *Svet v Obrazech* (Prague), March 29, 1958

"elections" to the central Party committees.

Preparatory to the Congress, there was a series of trade union meetings. Between March 27 and the end of April, officials of the following unions were scheduled to meet: Administrative Employees (March 27); Agricultural and Forestry Workers (March 31); Writers (April 7); Heavy Industry and Electrification Workers (April 10); Miners (April 20); Health Workers (April 25).

Report on Second Five Year Plan

The official report by the Central Statistical Department on the results of Bulgaria's Second Five Year Plan (1953-1957) was published in *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia) on March 16. Covering a period that began before Stalin's death and ended a year after the Hungarian Revolt and the Polish October, the report is a study in the vicissitudes of planning and the limits of prescience in human affairs. While the report makes the customary assertion that the Plan was fulfilled in essentials, the context shows that in most respects it was underfulfilled. In several important areas, particularly agriculture and light industry, the results were far short of what had been planned. The best results, as usual, were in the privileged domain of heavy industry, although even here there were serious lags in coal and steel output. The balance shows that the regime is making progress in the general direction it has chosen—the industrialization of Bulgaria—though not in the way it has claimed nor at the rate it had intended.

Investment Shortfall

The Plan had been substantially revised in its final year in a hasty effort to raise living standards after the object lesson of the Hungarian Revolt. The measures included wage and salary increases, higher pensions and family allowances, lower prices in workers' canteens, pensions for collective farmers and higher prices for agricultural products. To offset these heavy new expenses the regime was forced to slash its planned investment in 1957 by more than a third, cutting back in all departments of the economy. For the Five Year Plan as a whole, capital investment fell short of the target by around 10 percent, according to the official report.* However, investment in industry was said to have met its target 100 percent, and the paring took place in other areas such as transportation and communication (15 percent short), educational, social and cultural projects (18 percent short), housing (46 percent short) and agriculture, where no final figure was given. Within industry itself, the report stated that 89 percent of the investment was channelled into the heavy sector, while investment in the light and food industries fell short of the target by 33 percent.

* Official reports on planned and actual investment in Bulgaria are unreliable. The regime seems to revise its annual plans *ex post facto*, so that the sums actually spent on capital construction are later identified as the planned expenditures. Following up the original directives of the Five Year Plan for investment, and comparing them with the sums actually spent each year, it appears that the shortfall was considerably greater than 10 percent.

Production and the Plan

Production results for various industries were given by the report in terms of percentage increases over the five years. Comparison with the original targets shows that the Plan was exceeded in the fields of ore mining, machinery and chemicals—to which the regime has given particular emphasis in recent years—and substantially underfulfilled in coal mining and steel, where it has had difficulty.*

	Plan	Actual
All industry	60	76
Electric power	100	100 (nearly)
Coal	89	—
Brown coal	60	59
Lignite	170	63
Hard coal	150	87
Anthracite	100	35
Lead-zinc ore	160	170
Copper ore	230	280
Machinery industry	83	140
Chemical industry	93	190
Lumber	46	not fulfilled
Textiles	53	59
Cotton fabrics	34	44
Woolen fabrics	52	45
Cement	78	31
Sugar	150	150
Meat	86	70
Canned vegetables	97	200
Canned fruit	65	19

The Plan had listed a number of specific projects to be completed during the five years. Among those finished were the Karl Marx soda plant in Devnia, a penicillin plant in Razgrad, a vitriol plant in Pirdop, four open hearth furnaces and a blast furnace at the Lenin Works in Dimitrovo, a plant for fireproof materials in Novoselti, a fruit and vegetable canning factory in Svishtov, and the expansion of the Maritsa Cotton Textile Factory in Plovdiv. Electric generating capacity was expanded by 288,000 kilowatts rather than the 340,000 scheduled in the Plan. A number of projects were not completed: plants for the production of artificial fibers, sulfur cellulose, cement, textiles, leather, glass, tools, sugar, margarine and vegetable oil.

Agricultural production was said to have expanded by 25 percent during the five years, but this was admittedly much less than had been planned. Yields of the main crops in 1957 were as follows, in quintals per decare (planned yields in parentheses): wheat, 164 (183); corn, 101 (185); sunflower seed, 111 (140); barley, 186 (215); cotton, 70 (78); sugar beets, 2,280 (2,100); oriental tobacco, 81 (85); beans, 65 (72); tomatoes, 2,408 (2,850); potatoes, 910 (920); grapes, 441 (510); alfalfa, 349 (500). On the other hand, the Party succeeded in collectivizing virtually all of Bulgaria's agricultural land.

Sales of food and other consumer goods to the people rose substantially over the level of 1952, according to the

* The planned increases are from *Rabotnichesko Delo*, March 6, 1954, and the actual increases from *Rabotnichesko Delo*, March 16, 1958.



In honor of International Women's Day, recently celebrated throughout the area. Man: "Well, certainly I agree about the leading position of women."

Za Kooperativno Zemedelie (Sofia), March 7, 1958

report, but fell short of the goals specified in the Plan. Percentage increases for some products were as follows (planned percentages in parentheses): flour, 113.7 (n.a.); meat and meat products, 84.7 (meat 91; meat products 130); milk, 54.1 (60); cheese, 79.8 (n.a.); sugar and sugar products, 81.8 (sugar 120); rice, 108.3 (110); vegetable oils, 52.4 (52); canned vegetables, 124.2 (110); cotton fabrics, 84.3 (150); woolen fabrics, 121.6 (230); silk fabrics, 85.1 (140); shoes, 116.5 (180); radio sets, 838 (630).

New Five Year Plan

The Second Five Year Plan was to have been succeeded by a Three Year Plan which would have ended in 1960 concurrently with the Five Year Plans of the other five Satellites. That idea has been dropped, and the regime has announced a Third Five Year Plan running from 1958 through 1962. The Plan, now in draft form, will be officially unveiled at the Party Congress scheduled for June 2. According to *Rabotnichesko Delo*, April 10, it calls for the following increases in production: all industry, 60 percent; heavy industry, 77 percent; light and food industry, 50 percent; agriculture, 35 percent. National income is to rise by 50 percent and retail trade turnover by 40 percent. The Party Central Committee has called for a "nationwide discussion" of the draft directives before the opening of the Congress.

Party Unity Lacking

Further indications of disunity, factionalism and apathy in the Party ranks may be inferred from an editorial in the leading Communist newspaper *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia), March 11. After stressing that "the existence of factions and groups is impermissible" in Party organizations, the journal reiterated the principles of the "subjugation of the minority to majority decisions" and the "unconditional obligation" for lower Party organizations to accept the decisions of higher ones. The editorial hit at

"revisionist elements" (whether in Bulgaria or elsewhere in the area was not stated) which "attack Party discipline and demand that factional struggle be recognized as a normal event." There was also criticism of "a small number of Communists who do not fulfill their obligations and who do not set an example for non-Party workers."

The presence of factionalism in the Party was even more clearly indicated in the February issue of the Party theoretical organ, *Novo Vreme* (Sofia):

"Individual, unhealthy and hesitant elements have started to develop petty bourgeois concepts of 'freedom' and 'democracy' at meetings, conferences and in the press. They have demanded the weakening of the role of the People's Democratic State in the building of Socialism, the revision of Party policy in the villages and the abolition of the collective farms. They have declared themselves against democratic centralism in the activities of the Party and the State and against the leading role of the Party on the ideological front."

Students Worry Regime

In tones reminiscent of those used recently to attack writers and painters, the Communist newspaper *Otechestven Front* (Sofia), March 13, expressed its concern over the "shortcomings and omissions which have been noted of late in the ideological-political education of the young generation." The journal stated that "the struggle against bourgeois influences among the youth, against hooliganism, religious delusion and withdrawal from active political life" could not be combated by the Dimitrov Youth Union (the Communist youth organization) alone. "This struggle must be assisted by the numerous other public institutions and organizations," the paper averred, "which are either directly or indirectly responsible for the education of the young generation."

The major Party daily, *Rabotnichesko Delo*, devoted its lead editorial on March 22 to castigations of the "bourgeois ideology manifested among student youth." Party activists also came in for criticism, especially in the Dimitrov District of Sofia where "not one Party school organization has on its own initiative discussed the decree" (of the 1957 Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee calling for the replacement of the traditional stress on liberal arts by emphasis on vocational training).

Czechoslovaks in Syria

ONE OF THE LATEST steps in the Soviet bloc's steady economic infiltration of Africa and Asia was announced by Radio Prague, March 11:

"Czechoslovakia will build an oil refinery in Syria this year which will process one million tons of oil annually. This is the second project for Czechoslovak technicians in Syria. The first, a Czechoslovak-built sugar refinery, is now successfully operating. The oil refinery will be composed of eight huge buildings. Among the tasks awaiting Czechoslovak technicians will be the assembling of 70 kilometers of pipes."

In a succinct statement, the Party organ summed up other manifestations of youthful wrongdoing as: "truancy, smoking, drinking, bad language and laziness."

Changes in State Deliveries

Livestock and certain farm products will bring higher prices under a decree published on March 26 (*Rabotnichesko Delo*, March 27). The decree abolishes compulsory deliveries of pigs, lambs and kids beginning January 1, 1959, of wool from collective farms beginning April 1, 1958, and of barley sold for beer brewing. This adds to the list of other products released from compulsory deliveries previously: grapes, apples, plums, potatoes, oats, hay and the milk of cows, buffaloes and goats (in January 1957) and sunflower seed (in February 1958). The products remaining subject to compulsory deliveries are wheat, rye, barley, corn, beans, mutton, beef and sheep milk.

Purchase of the first-mentioned products by the State will henceforth be made through contracts with the producers, at higher prices than formerly. The new prices compare with the old as follows (in leva per kilogram):

	Old	New
Pigs	5-7	7.93 average
Lambs and kids	4-6.4	6
Wool	27.12 average	31 average

Prices are also to be increased for some products still subject to compulsory deliveries:

	Old	New
Cattle and buffaloes	2.77	3.80
Calves	3.31	4.80
Sheep	2.71	3.70
Sheep milk (above quota)	2.30	2.56
Cocoons	21.84	25
Hempseed	3.20	6
Vetch	1.30	1.50
Rape	1.32	2

Prices for animal hides, eggs and oriental tobacco will also be raised depending on kind and grade. The new prices will go into effect on various dates between April 1, 1958 and January 1, 1959. Premiums formerly paid for above-quota deliveries of these products—for example, woolen fabrics in exchange for wool—will be abolished. The decree stated that its purpose was to correct "certain disparities" in agricultural prices and to encourage greater production.

Common Lands Transferred

State-owned pasture land will be given to collective farms, State farms and other agricultural enterprises, along with commons belonging to villages and towns, according to a government decree issued on March 21 (*Rabotnichesko Delo*, March 21). The recipients of the land are expected to use it for pasturing livestock and growing hay, with the proviso that they must maintain and improve it. Private farmers, of whom few remain in Bulgaria, will also be allotted land for their use. The distribution, to be completed

by next September, is intended to encourage livestock breeding and the improvement of pastures.

Land Reclamation

The drive to bring fallow land into cultivation was implemented on March 22 by a decree permitting local governments to transfer unused private property to the management of collective and State farms (*Rabotnichesko Delo*, March 23). The private owners would be paid rent for the use of their land. The decree requires collective farms, local authorities and the Ministry of Agriculture and Forests to account for the use of land in their possession. Local and national authorities are also ordered to make surveys of the arable land in their purview and to carry out measures for drainage and flood control.

Erosion and Flood

The Bulgarian regime, like some of its East European colleagues, does not publish figures on the precise area of the arable land, and apparently officials themselves are not certain of its extent. Heavy taxation of the peasantry in preceding years, based on land area rather than on production, caused much land to be taken out of cultivation and encouraged farmers to conceal the true extent of their property. Some arable land has been lost by erosion: a recent estimate placed the damage at 320,000 hectares in the last few years (*Za Kooperativno Zemedelie*, February 6, 1958). This erosion, to which the authorities have been devoting considerable attention lately, is said to be partly a product of collectivization and the removal of boundaries between farms. The newspaper *Otechestven Front* (Sofia) stated, for example, on July 16, 1957:

"It must be observed that during the collectivization of agriculture in the semi-mountainous districts, in order to create fields suitable for mechanized cultivation, the existing terraces were removed or destroyed, and as a result, the process of erosion was hastened and considerable damage was done to the rural economy."

Another source of loss has been the flooding of land through poorly built irrigation systems. According to *Zemledelsko Zname* (Sofia), December 28, 1957, some 17,000 hectares have been lost in this way. The decree of March 22 specifically requires the Ministry of Electrification and Water Economy, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forests, and the local authorities, to drain marshy land and to see that measures are taken to prevent irrigation floods in the future.

"Embezzlers" Executed

Five employees of the State meatpacking enterprise were executed for "embezzlement," according to Radio Sofia, March 14, and five others received jail terms ranging from three to twenty years. Two previous death sentences for "economic crimes" had been announced in January. In 1957 four similar trials resulted in executions.

Reports from Vienna on April 14 stated that Bulgarian newspapers had announced two death sentences and 17 jail terms for participants in a fraudulent scheme involving the

private sale of bed springs made of materials stolen from government supplies.

Rehabilitation

One of the targets of Stalin's more fanatical followers, former Partisan General Slavcho Trunski, who fell into disfavor when Traicho Kostov was executed in 1949, appears to have been quietly "rehabilitated" recently. He was "elected" a Peoples' Deputy from the Kovil district in by-elections held early in March (*Rabotnichesko Delo*, March 21).

Another State Lottery

A new national lottery has been inaugurated, in which the prizes will be consumer goods—20 automobiles, 150 motorcycles, 1,000 bicycles, etc.—and excursions to the Soviet Union and the Satellite States (*Rabotnichesko Delo* [Sofia], March 26). Another lottery, featuring money prizes, is already in existence. The regime, hard-pressed financially, resumed the lotteries in 1957, after a five-year hiatus.

Romania

Severe Punishments

The wide latitude of the courts in sentencing "malefactors" was exhibited in two cases, reported in the same article of *Rominia Libera* (Bucharest), March 13. After being convicted of "slandering a woman neighbor," Natalia Negoescu was sentenced to three years in prison, while "for the same kind of insults against a neighbor," a Bucharest couple received two-month prison terms and a fine of 500 lei.

The *Rominia Libera* article also cited a two-year jail sentence dealt a Bucharest man who had "made noise and used obscene words upon returning home after a night of merriment."

Intellectuals Denounced

The regime press is continuing its denunciations of the creative intelligentsia after having belatedly—in comparison with most other countries of the area—overcome its disinclination to admit publicly that the areawide ferment among artists and writers is deeply ingrained in Romania. On March 28 the leading Party newspaper, *Scinteia* (Bucharest) hit out at the state of the "plastic arts" in the country, which is "still unsatisfactory." Religious themes were particularly attacked: distaste was expressed for "hieratic forms," for the predilection of artists for the "Byzantine" and for "the revival of old forms showing a conception of the world . . . not in line with modern humanism."

The same newspaper, on March 16, attacked a play by Ana Novac, entitled "What Kind of a Man Are You?" *Scinteia* singled out the characterization of the protagonist, an old Socialist who manages a factory, for its chief strictures. This man's "desire to expand his enterprise, to develop production, is presented as contrary to the in-

terests of the workers," charged the journal. It was especially incensed at the denouement, when the "honest" old man, "devoted to the Socialist cause . . . behaves like a coward, takes to drinking, to skepticism, and begins to doubt the cause for which he has given his entire life."

Stringent criticisms of editors and publishing enterprises was made in the March 9 issue of *Rominia Libera* (Bucharest). The journal complained of the "large printings . . . of books without value and in which no one is interested." The article did not single out by name either books or editors.

Students Criticized

A Romanian example of the areawide dissatisfaction with the political and social attitudes of students (see Bulgaria) was expressed in the official publication of the Communist Youth Organization (UTM), *Scinteia Tineretului* (Bucharest), March 6. The newspaper denounced "political and ideological confusion" as well as "cosmopolitanism, chauvinist nationalism and mysticism" among the nation's youth. It also condemned "the attitudes of adulation for all that is Western and vilification of our own achievements." The journal particularized as follows:

"Senseless parties, at which rock and roll, calypso, the conga and the mambo are danced by students dressed in the so-called Western fashion, distract our young people from study and from their social tasks. Such manifestations must be uncompromisingly combated with the utmost severity. Another attitude which must be combated is that of many honest students, UTM members and even, unfortunately, UTM cadres, who lightly ignore these manifestations."

Teachers were also taken to task in the official Communist press. The March 6 issue of *Scinteia* (Bucharest) spoke of the necessity for combining "combateness and well-founded criticism of the main currents of contemporary reactionary philosophy" with the teaching of "dialectical materialism." According to the newspaper, some teachers in institutions of higher learning "are vulgarizing the ties between philosophy and life." They are also "replacing the philosophical and theoretical interpretation of Socialist life with superficial treatment of current politics." The need to struggle against "revisionism" was also stressed.

Latest Farm Structure Figures

Less than 12 percent of Romania's peasant families have joined collective farms, according to First Party Secretary Gheorghiu-Dej. In a speech to a national agricultural conference held in Bucharest April 3-6, he gave the following data on the country's farm structure. The "Socialist sector"—a euphemism that includes agricultural associations, collective farms, State farms and government land—now includes almost 7.5 million hectares or 52.4 percent of the total agricultural land, compared with 35.2 percent at the end of 1955. However, the "cooperative-Socialist sector"—the above minus State farms and government-owned land—covers less than 27 percent of the agricultural area accord-

ing to the figures Gheorghiu-Dej gave. It includes about 45 percent of all peasant families. Some 56 percent of this area in turn belongs to associations of independent farmers who engage to some extent in common plowing or sowing or harvesting and are thus considered to be on the road to collectivization though they have not yet arrived. These associations number 11,631 and include 1,125,082 families. If these are subtracted from the "Socialist sector" there remain about 403,496 households organized in 2,881 collective farms. Most of the collective farms in Romania are of the Russian kolkhoz type, in which all of the land is held in common except for small private household plots, but there are about 125 "agricultural production cooperatives" in which the land is nominally under private ownership as in the Bulgarian TKZS. On the basis of Gheorghiu-Dej's figures the organization of Romania's agriculture takes the following shape, as of March 1, 1958 (in approximate percentages):

	Households	Area
Socialist sector	45	52
State land	—	26
Cooperative-Socialist	45	27
Collective farms	12	12
Associations	33	15
Other farms	55	48

The conference was devoted to a discussion of the regime's goals for agriculture under the Second Five Year Plan which ends in 1960. It was mainly a repetition of the aims set forth two years ago when the Plan was initiated, and the Party leaders permitted themselves no retreat. Among other things, farmers are to produce at least 5.5 million tons of wheat and rye in 1960, and 8 or 9 million tons of corn. Yields of wheat and rye per hectare are to rise by the improbable figure of 30 percent as compared to 1957. Gheorghiu-Dej described the grain program as "the most important thing in the development of agriculture," pointing out that "the development of all other branches of agriculture and the constant improvement of food supplies to the town and village population depends on this to a very large extent."

Consumer Goods Scarce

An interesting exchange between a writer on the newspaper *Rominia Libera* (Bucharest) and one of the directors of the Ministry of Heavy Industry took place on the pages of the journal, March 7. The journalist complained about the short supply and "bad quality" of "switches, batteries and the ordinary, indispensable small wares" in the State stores. He suggested that such items should be made from more easily obtainable materials, specifying plastics as an example. The director replied that the supply of plastics could not satisfy the demand in 1957, and that he "did not see a better prospect for this year." He went on to say that the Ministry was "preoccupied with important problems, the manufacture of motorized equipment, for instance, and, in comparison, the small wares you mention are of very remote interest."

Texts and Documents

BULGARIAN WRITERS' REVOLT

In his speech to the Bulgarian Writers' Union Conference, April 9, 1958, Party leader Todor Zhivkov reiterated the Party's demands for full control over the dissident writers. The high point of overt unrest among Bulgarian writers had occurred somewhat previously, when, on November 29-30 and December 1, 1957, the Party organization of the Bulgarian Writers' Union held a meeting, extraordinary for both its genesis and actual proceedings. The Party hierarchy was forced to convoke the meeting because the ferment among "liberal" Communist writers which had been simmering ever since the February 1956 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party had not cooled down despite vigorous attempts at repression in the Summer and Autumn of 1957. The session was therefore intended to be a final, swift and silent coup de grace for the erring "revisionists." Plans, however, went awry. The writers did not come to the meeting penitent and with bowed heads. Many of them chose this opportunity to reassert their stand, to justify their works, to defy their Party superiors. Though censored and truncated, the account of the meeting which appeared in Literature Front (Sofia), of December 26, 1957 (almost a month after the event), is a memorable document, particularly significant for the analogies to previous events in Hungary and Poland. The following is a full version, except for repetitive generalities of the Party's official stand. For a discussion of the Bulgarian Writers' Revolt, see the article of that name in EAST EUROPE, March 1958, pages 15-23.

ON NOVEMBER 29-30 and December 1 the Party organization [that is, *activ*] of the Union of Bulgarian Writers held a Party meeting which was attended by Comrade Dimitur Ganev, Politburo member and Secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, and Comrade Ruben Avramov, member of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party and head of science, art and education.

The chairman of the meeting, Comrade Kamen Kalchev, opened the session with a brief speech and said: "Considerable time has passed since the historic 20th Congress of the CPSU [February 1956] and the April Plenum of our Party's Central Committee [April 1956]. . . . There is no doubt that during this difficult period there were certain hesitations and confusions among our writers.

"In the just struggle against dogmatism and sectarianism . . . some of our writers fell under the influence of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois 'theories' and 'little theories' which obviously came or were inspired from the old breeding places of the decadent and idealist philosophy of the West. These comrades did not understand Lenin's truth that on the ideological front there is no place for compromises. . . ."

Andrey Gulyashki, Secretary of the Party *activ* (of the Writers' Union), read the report of the Party bureau [probably the steering committee of the *activ*], en-

titled "Let us unite in our ranks under the banner of the Party."

[Gulyashki's reading of the Party report]: . . . "It was reasonable to assume that the temporary confusion of certain Communist writers following the April Plenum would be rapidly overcome. However, we observe certain things which do not please us. The editorial offices of our literary publications receive an increasing number of poems, short stories, novels, and plays, in which our reality is reflected in an incorrect and distorted manner, works which, instead of inspiring faith in the cause of Socialism, . . . arouse in the reader's soul, to put it mildly, a hesitant attitude toward Socialism, toward the Party, and toward its officials.

"In recent times the publication of such works has become more frequent. Among a certain portion of our writers, including Communist writers, views are propounded which in essence are directed against Party policy in literature.

. . . "By declaring themselves to be passionate supporters of the decisions of the 20th CPSU Congress, some writers and critics, particularly those of the younger generation, wave in an inspired manner the banner of petty-bourgeois liberalism, and flirt with their 'courage' to cast doubt on the method of Socialist realism. If somebody attempts to criticize them for this, they immediately de-

clare themselves to be victims of 'restored dogmatism' and so forth.

"The basic majority of Communist writers stand aside and do not approve of such manifestations, but in their statements at meetings or in the press they either pass over them in silence or do not oppose them in an active and crushing manner.

"In view of all this we cannot but return to the statements of some Comrades who even now continue, under various forms, to propound their former incorrect positions, to manifest them in their works or in their actions, and to adhere to certain lines of behavior which are in contradiction to Party policy.

"Comrade Todor Genov is one of our members who not only at meetings but also in his creative practice has separated himself from the principle of Party literature and in words and deeds rejects Party leadership. He said at the discussion of the decisions of the April Plenum of the Central Committee 'our Party and all the people around it denied in a sharp, overt, clear and unprecedentedly unanimous manner the wisdom and correctness of some decisions of the Central Committee April Plenum. This is a tremendous historic fact with tremendous historic significance.'

"[Genov] offers us his play 'Fear,' which portrays our State apparatus and our Communist cadres in a ridiculing way. In the center of the most depraved vices he has placed a former partisan. This partisan is depicted as a murderer, a libertine, good-for-nothing, a bad father, a sycophant, a scoundrel, and a nitwit. This type of man survives happily in our day, climbs upward, and even hopes to get a Ministerial post. He does not move in a social atmosphere which isolates him and eventually rejects him. . . .

"There is no doubt that among State officials there are people with various weaknesses. . . . We can see all the time that the Party dismisses many Party workers from the highest State and Party positions because of their various errors and crimes, although they may have had great merits in the past.

"This social atmosphere is not shown in the play. Therefore, instead of a healthy criticism of shortcomings, the work is slanderous and is directed against the Party. It could be staged in any bourgeois theater and it would have a great success because it represents our reality in a vile manner. . . .

"We would hardly have bothered about this play if it had not received certain public approval. It was published in the

journal *Teater*, which is managed and guided by members of our Party organization. It was included in the repertoire of various theaters and, in an article by Comrade M. Velichkov, it was shown to be a great achievement. If Party public opinion had not interfered in time, our audiences would have been offered a theatrical performance without ideological and artistic value.

... "Is it by accident that Comrade Velichkov failed to notice the ideological and artistic worthlessness of 'Fear'? At our meetings Comrade Velichkov has repeatedly said that the Central Committee 'petrifies' Party-mindedness and the work of writers. He spoke against the Party policy in rural areas, and demanded that the assessment of literary works be made according to the opinion of the public and not that of the Party, and so forth.

"There is no doubt that in Comrade Velichkov's views there is disorder and confusion, and there is evidence of an established line of conduct which he expressed most clearly in a statement in October 1956 when he spoke to an *aktiv* of writers.

"Velichkov said at this time: '... that in suppressing many Central Committee documents, for instance in the case of Traicho Kostov ["national Communist" leader executed in 1949, partly rehabilitated in April, 1956], it seems to me that we displayed greater fear than many of other neighboring Parties in speaking about our own errors. ... Here, from this rostrum, the question of what would happen in our country if we wrote about this case was discussed. What happened in Budapest when the papers printed pictures of Rajk's son and wife, of his funeral [that is, his reburial], and of other things which were shown in great detail? What happened? In my opinion, only useful things happened.' [Like Kostov, Rajk was a "national Communist" leader, sentenced to death in 1949 and completely rehabilitated in 1956 by the then tottering Hungarian regime.]

"Only two or three days after this statement the counterrevolutionary rebellion erupted in Budapest and a massacre of Communists began. ... We are entitled to ask why Comrade Velichkov has never considered it necessary to step forward ... and criticize this statement of his? Why is he still silent on this question? There also were other Comrades who advocated the adoption of the Hungarian and Polish experience, who criticized the participation of Soviet troops in the crushing of the counter-revolution, and so forth. ... Instead of

our giving [Polish and Hungarian writers] an example, several of our Comrades were advocating that we muddle our heads with their example. In reality certain heads, particularly those of the younger writers, became quite muddled.

... "In connection with a recent tendency to direct our literature toward the negative phenomena in our reality we must also discuss Comrade Gocho Gochev's behavior. He called on writers to follow Lermontov's [19th century Russian writer] example. He said: 'It is good to have writers who do not care about so-called censorship, who write works [attacking the system]. Just as Lermontov wrote "The Death of the Poet" without considering whether he would be sent to Siberia.' Comrade Gochev, as chief editor of the journal *Teater*, presented to its readers literary works which were directed against the Party, as happened with the publication of the play 'Fear.'

... "Comrades K. Penev and R. Ralin have become known in Sofia as authors of anti-Party aphorisms and epigrams. At our meetings Ralin demanded that the Central Committee must not look into what Communist writers write, and that these writers ... should judge 'all things' for themselves.

... "Later, after the events in Hungary and Poland ... these Comrades of ours did not succeed in drawing the necessary conclusions regarding their attitude.

... "It is our opinion that these Comrades would not have erred, at least not as much and especially not in their literary work ... if certain prominent writers and critics had not introduced an element of confusion in the field of theory. ... Thus, we would like Boris Delchev to clarify, for instance, exactly what he does mean by the term 'revolutionary realism.' Does he think that the term 'Socialist' does not express the essence of our creative method?

... "Among Communist writers there can be no dispute for or against Socialist realism. ... There is no doubt that in life as well as in opinions there cannot be absolute canons. ... However, there are Marxist-Leninist principles which are obligatory for all Communists. If some Comrades believe that the decisions of the fifth Party Congress regarding literature are incorrect ... they must not attack these decisions in an anarchistic manner. ... These decisions oblige us, as Party members, to defend Socialist realism. ...

"Comrade Emil Manov has published

his novel 'An Unauthentic Case.' We do not desire to establish a mechanical connection between Comrade Emil Manov's wrong views on certain problems—for instance, regarding the April Plenum or the method of Socialist realism—but, no matter how things stand now, the reflection of certain doubts and errors has left its imprint on his latest work.

"In his novel Comrade Manov depicts the portrait of a present-day Communist. This Communist is principled, talented, and good, but after his marriage he returns to an old love affair, is torn between it and the awareness that he must not abandon his family which is blameless, and finally takes to alcohol and goes insane.

"There is no doubt that there are such cases. However, the author has not shown the atmosphere of firm ideology and irreconcilability in the struggle against personal and social shortcomings, an atmosphere which is characteristic of our Party. The dreams and the thoughts of Manov's hero, with whom he obviously sympathizes, do not extend beyond his love. He and his friends, who are also Communists, are narrow, debased, and thrown into a life which is not characteristic of a true Communist.

"What are the Communist ideals of the heroes of this novel? Does the novel's main hero think about the future of his children whom he loves? Does he realize that in our present life things are being built and progress is being made? Has the author shown that our Party displays unlimited solicitude for the improvement of living conditions and the development of the individual and the entire people?

"There is nothing of this in the novel. One can clearly sense in it an implied protest ... against the fact that the spiritual troubles of individual Communists remain misunderstood, and that, under our conditions, nobody looks deeper into the personal drama of man in order to understand and help him. It appears as if the reasons for the moral catastrophes of individuals and the disruption of personal happiness must be sought in the social and public institutions, in the Party, and in the Socialist community. ...

"Comrade Lyudmil Stoyanov's views regarding the separation of literature from actual politics have had a negative influence on our literary life. Comrade Stoyanov has already criticized his views. ... However, this self-criticism has remained unknown to the public.

"Comrade Stoyanov is a writer of international authority. Each thought of his

is carefully followed, and when it is in support of peace, the Soviet Union, and Socialism, it is taken up by the entire progressive press. Therefore, Comrade Stoyanov must correctly assess the wrong opinions which he has allowed to become public and thus remove one of the strongest arguments from those who want to speculate about his position.

"Now that Lenin's norms in Party and public work are being restored we must also restore Lenin's norms in the field of literature. . . . This is particularly necessary because the most flagrant manifestations of revisionism are hiding behind the banner of 'defense of Leninism.'"

. . . "Comrade Ralin and others . . . have frequently said that the Communist press must not be led and guided by the Party and the Central Committee and that there must be complete freedom for the Communist press to castigate all shortcomings, errors, corruptions, and distortions. A similar demand was made in 1921 by the Communist, Myasnikov, in the Soviet Union. [Gulyashki then quotes extensively from Lenin on the freedom of press and literature.]

"The trouble is that the criticism of some writers, even when they claim good intentions, seems to imply that errors, incorrect methods of work and action, are the style of work in our Party, that they spring from the very essence of our Socialist relations, and that they are implanted and supported by the entire Party and State apparatus.

. . . "We cannot judge literary works only from a narrow literary point of view and neglect their political ideas. . . . At the same time, however, we cannot renounce artistic judgment because a work which is artistically inadequate will remain ineffective however urgent it may be politically. 'We demand unity of politics and art.'

. . . "At the present moment the valuable function of literary criticism—to react promptly against literary works which are deflecting us from the Party line—has dwindled. . . . It is a serious weakness of our literary criticism that at the moment when bourgeois ideology was engaged in an angry onslaught against Marxism-Leninism, it remained passive. . . . It is necessary that works be discussed carefully, thoroughly and widely, in the editorial offices of our literary press and publishing houses. (This was not done by *Narodna Mladezh* when it published 'The Laskov Family,' nor by *Teater* when it published 'Fear,' nor by *Plamuk* when it published 'An Unauthentic Case.')

"It is necessary to make every effort to convince and persuade the author that he has made mistakes. Only in isolated and very rare cases is it permissible to publish an author's work in order to prove to him that he has erred. In such cases, however, the editorial office must promptly organize a correct evaluation of the work in order to help the author and to orient the readers properly.

"Unity, cohesion, and battle-readiness of the Party and non-Party writers depend to a great extent on the condition and leadership of the Writers' Union and of the Writers' Party organization. Communist writers are an overwhelming majority in the leading organs of the Union. We alone are to be blamed that its life is so feeble.

"The task of the present meeting is as follows: to clarify certain basic ideological questions and to unite our Party organizations around the Central Committee.

"The lack of unity concerning basic ideological questions has also disrupted Party discipline. There are members who declare that they will not submit to the decisions of the majority, which is stipulated by the Party statutes. There are members who do not fulfill the decisions of the Party bureau and of higher Party organs.

. . . "The struggle against revisionism and against various writers' errors which have been allowed to occur . . . is conducted in the name of the ultimate triumph of Marxism-Leninism, not in the name of a 'turning back' toward the period of the [personality] cult. This must be heavily emphasized, because there are many people who, some wittingly, some unwittingly, try to term the struggle for ideological purity and for unity of the Party a reversion to the cult [that is, to Stalinism].

"At present the main line of development of our literature is as follows: The writers must link themselves closer to the people and the Party, they must reflect . . . the richness and variety of our Socialist reality, they must show the role of the people and Party in transforming life, and they must point out the high moral qualities of the working people who build Socialism.

. . . "We will begin with a broad discussion directed above all against the danger of the influence of bourgeois ideology and revisionism, which at present is the main danger. After this we will reorganize the leadership of our organizations and we will unite closely under the banner of the Party led by the Central

Committee in defense of Lenin's principles on Party literature.

"This attack against rightist dangers does not mean that we are closing our eyes to displays of dogmatism and sectarianism. . . . Marxism-Leninism teaches us to stress one or the other side of our revolutionary work at various stages of development. Grasping the experience of the international Communist movement and keeping the international situation . . . in mind, we must concentrate above all on our unity under the banner of the Party. At the present moment everything else must be sacrificed to this task."

[Editors' note: Then *Literature Front* printed some of the statements made by the writers at the meeting, with its editorial comment on these statements. In the following the writers' own words, as reported by the paper, are set off within quotes.]

Kamen Zidarov:

"There was a time after the April Plenum when we did much talking, and later, after the June [1957] Plenum, when we were silent. In the first case as well as in the second there was something wrong. A writer must explain not only the things he writes and says but also why he is silent." In spite of this advice Kamen Zidarov did not say anything about his errors, did not reveal the real cause of his hesitation, was silent on his behavior during the time of the April Plenum. . . .

Kharalan Rusev:

Rusev devoted his statement to Emil Manov's novel "An Unauthentic Case," which he criticized in an oversimplified manner. He did not say a word about himself, about his attitude toward the decisions of the April Plenum, about the anti-Party suggestions he used to make at Party meetings. Because of all this, his statement left an unfavorable impression.

Panteley Zarev:

. . . Zarev believes that "in politics revisionism would not have occurred without dogmatism." According to him the situation in literature is similar. Without dogmatic trends "in our esthetics and in our artistic practice, unhealthy and revisionist creations would not have developed."

This assertion by P. Zarev refutes Lenin's views on revisionism and contradicts the opinion expressed in the Declaration of the Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist countries [the No-

vember, 1957 Moscow Declaration] concerning the nature and causes of revisionism.

Todor Genov:

"I consider my gravest error to be my statement concerning an immediate convocation of a Party Congress in the days following the April Plenum. Today I believe that the main reason for this error was my indubitable lack of political orientation regarding the international events at that time.

"Now I fully realize my Party duty: To prove in my future behavior by deeds and not merely by empty statements that I have really and truly realized my errors."

However, in his further analysis of his play "Fear," Genov showed that he still does not grasp the objectively slanderous character of his work.

Lyudmil Stoyanov:

"In the impassioned discussions [following the April 1956 Plenum] there were hasty, incorrect thoughts, formulations, and statements. As regards my statement on literature and actual politics, I explained the emotional source of this thought as early as the next meeting, and said that this statement of mine was of a conditional nature since at the same time I advocated the writing of profound works such as Sholokhov's 'Quiet Flows the Don,' Fadeyev's 'Defeat,' and Vazov's 'Under the Yoke,' all works which are imbued with a deep political consciousness. . . ."

Stoyanov correctly believes that our salvation lies in unity. But he did not say a word about how he undermined this unity with his statements and behavior. . . . [He] did not engage in self-criticism regarding the bad influence of many of his statements, which nurtured unsound tendencies in the Party organization and in the Bulgarian Writers' Union. . . .

Georgi Karaslavov:

"If we attentively study imperialist propaganda which is intended for men of art, we will see . . . that in all cases the imperialists advise writers and artists to rid themselves of the 'tutelage' of the Communist Party.

"It is no secret that some of our Party members, overtly or obliquely, consider Party and Central Committee leadership in such 'delicate' and 'sensitive' fields as literature and art as inopportune, to put it mildly. . . . Some Comrades went so

far as to reject all our artistic literature created prior to the 20th CPSU Congress and the April Plenum.

. . . "At Party meetings people openly expressed the opinion that it is not obligatory to fulfill Party decisions. When at a Party meeting . . . I said that such views are the result of a petty-bourgeois 'intellectual' and individualistic tendency, Comrade Todor Genov . . . took the floor . . . and, speaking not only on his own behalf but also in the name of several Comrades, said that he was insulted by such terms.

. . . "Here we must admit openly, clearly and with dignity, that at our Party meetings there were various forms of opposition against every word defending the positions of the Central Committee.

"These meetings of ours proceeded under such conditions . . . in the face of overt statements by many Comrades that they would remain silent if we criticized them. Comrade Pencho Danchev, who tried to smooth over the incorrect statements of many Comrades, at the same time advised us to stop using 'names,' [by which] he meant 'revisionism,' 'opportunism,' and so forth, and to start behaving politely toward each other as if we were at the dinner table in an English boarding-school.

"Comrade Krum Pennev does not recognize Party leadership or the Central Committee. He has turned into an active and merciless slanderer of the Party line. All this filth is being expressed at regular Party meetings and Comrade Pennev's behavior attracts the attention of regular rank and file members and of ordinary citizens. I am very much surprised that our Party bureau has not once called him on the carpet . . . in order to ask him where he is headed and what he is doing. He submits to the editorial office of the journal *Septemvri* poems so anti-Party that even the non-Communist editors of this journal have become indignant.

"When we take into account that Party members and poets such as he exercise influence over our young cadres, we must consider what harmful effects this may have. This harmful influence has already resulted in deplorable consequences, and our Party organization especially, and also the Writers' Union . . . will have to deal seriously with the behavior of some of our young poets and novelists. . . ."

Emil Manov:

Using an unsuitable tone and language, he made two preliminary remarks as re-

gards Kharalan Rusev's criticism of him. Manov suggested that "slaps in the face be applied as the the best means of taming." Obviously this is not the "democracy" and "freedom" for which Manov has been pleading for so long.

. . . Unfortunately Manov once again displayed a disdainful attitude toward the criticism voiced against him and a lack of understanding of the errors he has made in his statements and work as a result of his incorrect understanding of Socialist realism.

"That fact that many reproaches were directed against my novel, reproaches which were partly right and partly wrong, still shows that my novel contains some unfortunate formulations and some incorrect and incomplete ideological and artistic elements, and I do not refuse to think all this over as the Party bureau advises me to do.

"However, a thing which I have always unreservedly rejected and which I reject again is the assertion that the novel is an expression of my ideological positions in general, as some people tried to prove in the press, that its tenor was 'directed against our contemporary order,' as Ivan Ruzh wrote, that it was written 'from a position of refuting our reality,' or that it was inspired by Przybyszewski's [Polish writer of the 19th century naturalistic school] example, as Stefan Karakostov said."

. . . Emil Manov admitted that in the deliberations following the 20th CPSU Congress he had underrated the rightist danger and has made certain one-sided and incorrect statements when common errors and the style of our literary life were being discussed.

Ivan Ruzh:

. . . Ivan Ruzh said that recently authors of unhealthy works storm editorial offices and, a fact which is even more significant, talented writers start out on this slippery path. He said: "There are many talented young people among us who set out on this road. This was reflected in the pages of *Septemvri* and, I must admit, this was condoned by me."

Pencho Danchev:

. . . "Those who are in continuous contact with our writers cannot help but be concerned about the situation of some of our young writers. It is among those writers that decadent tendencies and views, resignation, and grumbling are strongest. With a few exceptions the greatest political backwardness is to be found among them.

"It must be openly and sincerely admitted that neither the Party nor the Union leadership was equal to their tasks in this whole period. The Party leadership should have spoken a little more in detail about its own work. I personally am of the opinion that certain differences and contradictions which can be seen between the members of the Secretariat [of the Writers' Union]—differences which, I believe, do not refer to basic ideological positions but rather to the methods of action—are not the most important reason for the passivity of the Secretariat in regard to creative questions.

... "What is the reason for my own inadequate activity [as chairman of the literary critics committee]? I will say it right out. It is my liberalism toward the errors of Comrades, in whose purity of intention and motives I profoundly believe..."

Gocho Gochev:

"It would be naive to maintain that in all my statements and actions in recent times I have been without fault. ... I feel that my greatest error is in connection with the publication of Todor Genov's play 'Fear' in *Teater*."

However, instead of seriously criticizing the error of the editorial office and his own error as chief editor in connection with the publication of the play in question, Gochev made a senseless attempt to minimize his guilt by devious explanations and by trying to put the responsibility on the author, on the Ministry of Culture, and so forth.

Gochev does not realize that Genov's play is of a politically damaging and slanderous character, not because of its low artistic level but because the ideological and creative motives of the author are basically vicious.

... In the same manner Gochev continued his explanations. ... By stressing that it is necessary to continue the struggle against dogmatism, Gochev arrived at the incorrect assertion that in our country dogmatism is a greater danger than revisionism, thus ending in a crude contradiction of and clash with the views of the Bulgarian Communist Party's Central Committee on the questions of revisionism and dogmatism.

Gochev is of the opinion that in his novel *Manov* did not try to make a general synthesis of our reality, and that therefore it is impermissible to draw the conclusion that "An Unauthentic Case" is a negation of our entire reality. Obviously Gochev does not agree with the criticism leveled against *Manov's* novel.

By making such incorrect and confused statements Gochev only deepened his errors.

Lilyana Stefanova:

... "In their desire to create a new lyricism and in their reaction to conflict-less and empiric poetry, some young poets set out on paths which were walked long ago. ... Instead of overcoming the schematism of the past they again replace vivid human emotions with empty abstractions.

"Some Comrades welcomed these poems as being something new and called them innovations. They failed to see that the authors of such poems had put on the old rags of outdated bourgeois decadence and that they were repeating old songs instead of conducting open, forthright and sincere talk about the difficulties which we meet on the road of building Socialism, about the people who win victories, and how difficult it is to attain these victories. ..."

Pavel Vezhinov:

"Regardless of the purity of our intentions, we frequently displayed an inexcusable irresponsibility, less in our written works than in the things we said in public or in private. We should have known the strength of the spoken word; we should have realized that a few words, spoken frivolously, are capable of harming the most sacred thing that we have in life—Communism and our new social order. ..."

Vezhinov discussed his review of Lyuben Stanev's novel "The Laskov Family." He fell into a contradiction by saying on one hand that it is true that "he has failed to take a close look at the book's atmosphere and that this book shows a certain hostile attitude toward our social order," while on the other hand it is his opinion that, as regards the author's method, "it is difficult to criticize."

Asen Nenov-Bdinets:

Bdinets strove to take advantage of the criticism leveled at some Comrades to further his personal aims. With this and with his unsuitable tone he justly aroused the indignation and the energetic reaction of the audience.

Mikhail Velichkov:

"On two conferences called by the Central Committee last year I made statements which, to a great extent, were characterized by incompleteness and the inaccuracy of hasty improvisation and anxiety caused by unassimilated mental shocks. Some of the thoughts I expressed

at these meetings were refuted by the development of events; while others, although correct in essence, could have been misunderstood under the circumstances and could have had undesirable consequences."

However, M. Velichkov did not speak concretely about his previous statements in order to explain what he considers was refuted by events and what he considers inadequately expressed although correct in essence. ... His explanation of his statement regarding the Hungarian events, an explanation which was particularly naive, was as follows: He minimized and neglected the symptoms [of the oncoming uprising] because he judged the Hungarian Party and the Hungarian leaders by analogy with our Party and our leaders. He also spoke very mildly about his incorrect review of Todor Genov's play "Fear," and said that he merely showed "political shortsightedness concerning some of this play's serious ideological shortcomings." ...

Marko Marchevski:

Marchevski expressed his dissatisfaction with Gochev's statement. According to Marchevski, things are not going well in the editorial office of *Teater* and this journal needs strengthening.

Slavcho Vasev:

... "Comrade Delchev's statement ... that the creators of our culture were too much the courtiers of the regime ... had concrete negative repercussions on the minds, the behavior, and the work of our young poets. Today there are not a few such poets who believe that to write about our regime and about the deeds of the people's government is not very dignified.

"Instead of supplying an explanation ... which Delchev owed the Party organization, he wrote an article on our general painting exhibition in which he criticized the fact that our painters are turning to topical subjects; that is, toward contemporary reality.

... "At the present meeting we must point to those Comrades who stood and continue to stand on correct Party positions. An atmosphere of underrating and rejection has been created around these Comrades. This is not a proper Party approach.

"It almost appears as if it is a crime to stand on Party positions. ..."

Angel Todorov:

... "Manov, Genov, Velichkov and Gochev chose to declare in a loud voice

that they are with the Party and the Central Committee. But, in regard to the aspects that were criticized, they made various remarks, appeared to be insulted, and refused to take up not only the 'insults,' if there were such, but also to see the main thing, namely, that they have become carriers of a wrong trend.

"[Vezhinov] stated that Stanev's novel evoked 'enthusiastic approval' and sees in it an unprecedented positive event in our new literature. Vezhinov judged the value of a work on the basis of whether the artistic method used by the author is the so-called critical approach and thus ignores the basis of our method, which consists in approving of the new order even in satire."

Khristo Radevski:

... "Today, and even in the past, some Comrades said that they were shocked by what was revealed about Stalin, that they could not sleep all night, that they were deeply affected, and so forth. We have no reason at all to doubt all this. However, a Communist is called a Communist because he keeps a level head and knows how to orient himself even in the most complicated and confused situations, and because he displays steady discipline and firmness.

... "In previous meetings as well as now, many Comrades maintained we are not like the Hungarian and Polish writers. That is very true. But I do not believe we can console ourselves by comparisons. We Bulgarian writers must assess our behavior by the standard of discipline and firmness which exists in our Party. Every other criterion can give us consolation but can also place us in an incorrect position.

"We all know the anti-Soviet hysteria which took place after the 20th CPSU Congress. This hysteria even expanded to involve some Socialist countries. Sometimes it directly attacked Soviet policy and our ideology. Sometimes, under the guise of literary criticism against Socialist realism, it refuted, slandered and denied Soviet literature; thus, of course, again directing blows against the Soviet Union and Socialism. ...

"It is my impression that we are too slow in pulling ourselves out of the situation in which we placed ourselves after the April [1956] Plenum. At that time some Comrades openly expressed non-Party views. After that some of these Comrades wrote several works which they imbued with their views. ... I believe that never before in the history of our revolutionary literature has the harm done

by the idea that artistic works can be created without or even against Party policy been evidenced in such a striking manner.

"Manov's novel, Genov's play, some poems by Krum Penov, and other works lead our literature along a wrong path. The main characteristic of these works ... is that they instill in the reader disbelief in the triumph of justice in our society. This means disbelief in the policy of our Party.

... "At this meeting one could observe an attempt to get by with as little [in the way of self-criticism] as possible. ... If we follow this procedure, we will arrive at an apparently satisfactory correction of errors, while in reality the cancer will remain.

"For instance, Emil Manov quite clearly assumed a position of attack instead of listening to criticism. I do not know whether Todor Genov has forgotten or only pretends to have forgotten his accusations against the Central Committee to the effect that the Central Committee is digging a gulf between the Party and the intelligentsia, and so forth. Why did he not speak about that and other such matters? Comrade Lyudmil Stoyanov, who for two years has been defending and protecting incorrect statements, today also did not deign to express his opinion about the errors of the criticized Comrades. He limited himself to explaining only one of the many incorrect statements which he has made. And this explanation is quite unconvincing at that. He says that his advice to stand one step behind actual politics sprang from emotional sources!

... "Our literary critics are to a great extent responsible for what took place in our literature. Criticism is called criticism because it must orient our writers and direct them along the right road. ...

"The Secretary of our Union, Comrade Pencho Danchev, who guides our literary criticism, exercised self-criticism [at this meeting] but preferred to pass over silently what is most important; namely, that not only did he assume a liberal attitude toward the errors of the Comrades ... but he actually encouraged and supported these errors.

... "In recent times a great number of 'professors,' specialists on the decisions of the 20th CPSU Congress, have emerged in coffee-houses and bars. They warn that people like myself are petrified and ossified because of dogmatism and sectarianism and do not understand the decisions. It would be very fortunate if we could ask these people who know so much, most of whom are writers, to

come to us so that we can learn something from them. Perhaps they could also learn from us. The main thing is to speak openly and honestly on these problems."

Lozan Strelkov:

Strelkov said that "for the first time in two years this meeting really resembles a Party meeting." [But, he said], it is very disturbing that there is an attempt to excuse past errors and anti-Party statements by the shock and confusion created by the 20th CPSU Congress and the April Plenum.

"It is absolutely true that there was some confusion, but at that time and even later some Comrades did not act like confused and disturbed people ... but in an energetic, decisive and crude manner and thus influenced those who were really confused and hesitating. Let us recall the actions and statements of the most active 'fighters' who demanded a Party Congress. They were by no means disturbed or confused souls.

... "Take for instance Todor Genov's case. ... At that time he by no means had the appearance of a bewildered man. On the contrary, he looked like a man for whom the hour to act has struck. Therefore, I think that Todor Genov is not convinced of the justice and correctness of the criticism leveled against him. As a matter of fact, he said so himself when he rejected the assessment which the Party bureau report made of his play.

... "Among our young writers apocryphal literature is written on a typewriter and [surreptitiously] distributed; these writings repeat the statements of some writers who, with no reservations, defend Dudintsev's novel ["Not By Bread Alone," a Soviet work severely criticized by Khrushchev himself.] I will not speak about other types of spurious literature disseminated among the writers. ...

... "Although it is well known that ... our Party considers revisionism the main danger, Gochev said that at the present moment the danger of dogmatism in our country is greater than the danger of revisionism. This statement by G. Gochev is overtly anti-Party."

In conclusion Strelkov ... stressed the fact that many critics such as Delchev, Gochev, Zarev, and the younger Zdravko Petrov and Lyuben Georgiev have been quite active "but not to the profit of our Marxist-Leninist ideology." Some critics have displayed inexcusable passivity, while others who have attempted to retort to incorrect and alien 'theories,' and to criticize works which distort Socialist reality, have been subjected to insults

and threats that "they will see what happens in two years."

Ruben Avramov:

"... It is clear that a few Comrades have deviated from Party policy. . . . These deviations were also manifested by the disagreement of a few writers with a very important *Rabotnichesko Delo* article against petty-bourgeois laxity while at the same time some of those Comrades themselves yielded to this laxity. Some also cast doubt upon the positions of Socialist realism. Finally some people displayed hesitation and liberalism and tolerated such manifestations.

"... 'Let us take Comrade Velichkov's statement concerning the collectivization of agriculture. He has accused the Central Committee of having issued 'a series of wrong directives.' Can this be termed anything but a repetition of enemy propaganda regarding enforced collectivization? Why didn't Comrade Velichkov try to quote these wrong directives?

"... 'Comrade Emil Manov must understand that it is not by accident that the BBC has begun to praise him. . . .'

[Editor's note: Avramov then discusses Gochev's statement on dogmatism and revisionism. In conclusion Avramov speaks of the immense improvement in the material welfare of Bulgarian peasants]; "There is also a great upswing among the workers. Here you have wonderful subjects for your work. As you can see, Socialism has begun to produce magnificent results, but not enough is being written about them. On the contrary, at the moment works have appeared which deprecate our life. . . ."

Radoy Ralin:

"I was criticized as early as last year for the fact that by my ceaseless mocking jokes and heckling in meetings I created a frivolous atmosphere and showed a disdainful attitude toward important problems under discussion. . . ."

In spite of [further] statements he made [on the necessity for real, not "formalistic," self-criticism] Ralin craftily passed over in silence many of his unhealthy and anti-Party statements, jokes, and insinuations. He touched on some of his errors but in this case also he attempted to engage in self-criticism in an even more crafty, formalistic and general manner. Therefore it is necessary to remind him of his own words about formalistic self-criticism.

Boris Delchev:

Delchev spoke about the Party bureau report and praised its tone, but this did not prevent him from rejecting almost

the whole report in his statement. Delchev rejected the criticism leveled at him in the report.

He again rejected the method of Socialist realism as the only correct method for creating works of art. . . .

He denied the right of the writers' Party organization to discuss and pass judgment on the literary works of its members and explained himself as follows: "At present our Party bureau is discussing an important political question—the unity and cohesion of cadres. . . . Surprisingly, in its report it links this question with two books: Genov's 'Fear' and Manov's 'An Unauthentic Case.'"

According to Delchev, those works are "essentially contemporary satires." Since satires are very poorly represented in our literature, they should not be criticized. They should only be subject to literary reviews.

Delchev asks: "Is it necessary to direct machine gun fire at them in a report which is aimed at strengthening Party unity? . . . I am not convinced of the effectiveness of such measures."

According to Delchev, unity can be achieved by passing over in silence and smoothing over mistakes. . . . With his unprincipled and non-Party defense of these works he opposed himself to Party leadership in literature. . . .

Does he still support his "theory" which he developed at meetings after the April Plenum to the effect that writers must stand above Party leadership and that it is not correct to speak about Socialist realism in our country? At that time he said: "In general our literature must become and be accepted first of all as a Fatherland Front literature, if this can be said, and only then as realistic."

Or let us take his statement: "We do not have confidence, we do not any longer have esteem for the Central Committee, an esteem which is simply obligatory according to the statutes. We do not have it."

... Replying to a question as to whether he had said that there are writers who do not recognize the leading role of the Central Committee in literature, Delchev claimed he never said such a thing but that he did say there are writers who believe that the Central Committee is not competent to lead and guide literature.

... Without bothering to quote concrete evidence, Delchev viciously attacked *Literaturen Front* and its editors. He called the [paper's] criticism of his article on the general painting exhibition "baiting," although the criticisms were signed with the full names of their authors.

It appears, finally, that nobody is permitted to make a rejoinder to B. Delchev. If somebody attempts to do this there are words like "baiting," "no freedom of opinion," and "there can be no unity and cohesion of writers." Delchev's statement, which was nothing but an attempt to turn back the Party organization to where it stood one year and a half ago, caused general dissatisfaction.

Ivan Martinov:

"We must struggle against all deviations from Marxist-Leninist ideology. However, I disagree with those Comrades who maintain that the mistakes which have been made are merely echoes of the insinuations of hostile intelligence agents. If we really maintain and believe this, we will not be seeking truth and we will not help our erring Comrades."

Martinov said that if we want to reach our aim, unification under the banner of the Party, we must seek and reveal the real causes. Martinov sees the causes in the unsatisfactory situation of the Party organizations and in the frequent and, in most cases unprincipled, struggles, strivings and personal squabbles.

From Gulyashki's concluding speech:

"These Comrades of ours were given a wonderful opportunity to step forward before the Party and . . . assume responsibility for their errors. It is much to be regretted that these Comrades, instead of showing that they have understood and felt the things for which they were criticized, have in varying degrees tried in their statements to minimize their errors, and by resorting to distortions, insinuations and replacing the basic with the secondary, to prove that their guilt before the Party is less than it actually is. There were many empty phrases in Comrade Kamen Zidarov's statement and very little concrete self-criticism. Comrade Todor Genov also made miserable attempts to whitewash his behavior and his play. Gocho Gochev's defensive speech was casuistic and attempted to gloss over rightist dangers. It must be frankly said that Emil Manov's statement fell short of the Party's expectations of him. He should not be surprised if the BBC again takes him under its wing.

"Boris Delchev's attempt to assume the defense of the criticized Comrades and the fact that he does not openly condemn their anti-Party views . . . means that he identifies himself with these views. . . .

"Let us conclude. Let us take up arms for the militant unity of our Party organization under the banner of the Party and the leadership of the Central Committee."

Recent and Related

The Soviet System of Government, by John N. Hazard (*University of Chicago Press*: \$4.00). A comparative study of Soviet political institutions in contrast to those of the West. The author, besides showing contrasts, notes points of similarity in form especially when an apparently familiar institution has been reshaped to achieve ends far different from those of a democracy. It is Mr. Hazard's thesis that the Soviet Union utilizes "democratic forms" operating in a context of what he calls "totalitarian counterweights" and that the interplay between the two constitutes the dynamic of the system. The author feels that in the field of comparative government too much emphasis has been placed on the formal and legal institutions and that too little effort has been made to relate them to what he calls the "contextual" elements of a political system—ideology, social structure, pressure groups, etc. Some of the chapters in the book are: Controlled Mass Participation, Terror and Its Rationalization, Popularizing Administration, Fostering the Community Spirit, State Intervention in Private Affairs, and Employment by the State. Foreword, preface, appendix, bibliography, index.

Communism and Christianity, by Rev. Martin D'Arcy, S.J. (*The Devin-Adair Company*: \$4.00). In the belief that one must know one's enemy better than oneself, Father D'Arcy enumerates the basic tenets, quoting directly from Marx and Lenin, upon which Communism is founded, and compares and contrasts them with the principal tenets of Christian philosophy. Father D'Arcy, an Englishman, states in his "Preface to the American Edition": "Above all others the citizens of the United States of America should be well informed of the principles which must govern human institutions, that they may . . . detect what is in the present situation insidious, and insure the future." Preface, introduction, bibliographical note.

Yearbook of the United Nations, 1956 (*Columbia University Press*: \$12.50). The tenth in a series of annual volumes produced by the UN Department of Public Information describing the work and achievements of the United Nations and its specialized agencies. Part One presents a documented account and review

of the work of the United Nations on political and security questions (included in this section is the Hungarian question), economic and social questions, the Non-Self-Governing Territories and the International Trusteeship System, legal questions, and administrative and budgetary matters. Part Two surveys the work of each of the specialized agencies during the year. Appendices, illustrations and charts, index.

Mao's China: Economic and Political Survey, by Ygael Gluckstein (*Beacon Press*: \$8.50). It is the author's purpose to analyze Mao-Tse-tung's rise to power and the efforts of the Maoist bureaucracy to modernize China into a major industrial and military power. Various aspects of Mao's regime are examined in light of the central theme: land reform and collectivization, the role of the trade unions, forced labor, the Maoist elite, State propaganda, and Party structure. The present and future relationship between China and the USSR is the subject of the final section and the author concludes that China will be the strongest and most impregnable citadel of Stalinism in the world. The basis for this book is factual material drawn from official Chinese Communist publications: laws and decrees, speeches of the leaders, reports and resolutions of conferences, and articles in the Chinese Communist press. Preface, appendix, indexes.

Escape From Fear, by Martin A. Bursten, Introduction by Scott McLeod (*Syracuse University Press*: \$3.50). A reporter's view of the Hungarian Revolt with emphasis on the fate of the 200,000 Hungarians who fled the country. The author discusses the role of Austria as the exit point for the refugees and the agencies there which aided in the "processing." America's problems in working out emergency immigration legislation are examined in the introduction as well as in the book. The author devotes a chapter to an examination of Radio Free Europe and the controversy that surrounded it after the Revolt. What the future holds for the refugees in America and whether Hungary will be the setting for a second Revolt are subjects for speculation in the final chapters. Introduction, photographs, index.

Sisu, The Autobiography of Oskari Tokoi, Introduction by John I. Kolehmainen (*Robert Speller & Sons*: \$6.00). The autobiography of the first Premier of Finland, who spent nine years in the United States before his political career in Finland and who came back to America in exile to make his permanent home here. In 1891, at the age of eighteen, Tokoi emigrated to the U.S. and worked in the mines of Colorado and Wyoming. He returned to Finland in 1900 where he found his place in the vanguard of the resistance movement. After his election to the Diet (1907-1917), the chairmanship of the Trade Union Organization (1912), the speakership of the Diet (1913), he became the first Premier of Finland in 1917. The events of 1917 and 1918—the outbreak of the Russian Revolution, the rise of an independent Finland, the fratricidal war which accompanied the birth of the nation—involved Tokoi in charges and countercharges and late in 1919, as an enemy of both the Communists and the Finnish reactionaries, he was forced to leave Finland and come to America as an exile. Tokoi was later exonerated of the charges brought against him but continued living in America. Introduction, illustrations, index.

Dostoyevski in Russian Literary Criticism, 1846-1956, by Vladimir Seduro (*Columbia University Press*: \$7.50). An analysis of the critical writings on Dostoyevski from Belinski, who in 1846 first praised the novelist, to the present Soviet men of letters and politics. In the century that has elapsed since Dostoyevski was accepted as a great Russian writer there has been much shifting in critical approach and interpretation by leading Russian critics. Dr. Seduro first considers the critics before the Revolution and then devotes the last part of the book to Soviet attitudes, including chapters on Gorki, stylistic and historical studies, Pereverzev of the Sociological School, Lunacharski and the old-guard party intellectuals, the trends of the 1930's, the Second World War, the 125th anniversary of Dostoyevski's birth, and Zhdanovism and the collapse of Dostoyevski scholarship. The author emphasizes that Dostoyevski is held in esteem in the Soviet Union today as witnessed by the new phase of treatment of his work which began in 1956. Bibliography, index.



East Europe
Free Europe Committee, Inc.
2 PARK AVENUE, NEW YORK 16, N. Y.
Return Postage Guaranteed

Sec. 34.66, P.L. & R.

**U. S. POSTAGE
PAID**

New York, N. Y.
Permit No. 13933

*Form 3547 Requested
Forwarding postage guaranteed*



Printed in U.S.A.

UNIVERSITY MICROFILMS
313 NO FIRST ST
ANN ARBOR MICH
ATTN STEVENS RICE
5168

7-57